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Foreword
Globalization and the dynamics of knowledge and innovation are at the root of cur-
rent socio-economic transformation. This book is intended to contribute to our un-
derstanding of globalization of knowledge-based economies. Its content is based
on the conference Going Global – The Challenges for Knowledge-Based Econo-
mies, held in 21–22 September 2006 in Helsinki, Finland. – Why to organize a
conference and compile a book of such complex issues as globalization of R&D,
arising challenges for knowledge economies, and impacts of changing environ-
ment on national policies?
In rapidly changing global business environment, dominated by knowledge and
innovation, nations and policy-makers must examine and improve their under-
standing of on-going trends and phenomena. The trend towards knowledge society
and interdependent world economy increasingly complicates our operational envi-
ronment, and its governance is not possible without a profound understanding
based on scientific analysis. Although the influence of single nations to global de-
velopments is limited, we need a dialogue on what governments could and should
do together, to be better equipped to changes of the world economy. Such a dia-
logue is especially needed among the EU Member States to ensure the effective
and successful implementation of the Lisbon strategy for growth and employment,
in which knowledge and innovation are playing an important role. For all these
reasons globalisation was one of the priority issues of EU Presidency agenda of
Finland, besides having been an overarching theme in EU´s Competitiveness
Council and the European Council for several years.
In this book we wish to take a broad view on globalization. Globalization has en-
tered a new phase due to the impact of knowledge-based paradigm over economies
and societies and also to the development of large Asian economies. Transnational
corporations remain among main drivers of globalization and internationalisation
of research and development. The impacts of globalization on welfare and sustain-
able development challenge innovation systems and policies in any country irre-
spective of their development phases. The negative effects of globalization on wel-
fare in developing economies were also discussed without ignoring the positive as-
pect that the growth of the world economy entails a potential towards higher wel-
fare for all countries and people.
The contributions of high-level experts from all over the world from industries,
government and research give new insights of the current state and future develop-
ments of globalization. With this book we wish to disseminate these insights to all
interested communities and stakeholders. The book hopefully serves as a step to-
wards more in-depth understanding of globalization of economies and knowledge
creation as a phenomenon.We hope that it will breed further dialogue of globaliza-
tion of knowledge-based economies.
On behalf of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy I would like to express
my gratitude to the sponsoring organizations of Helsinki conference, DG Enter-
prise and Industries of the European Commission and the international innovation
network Six Countries Program. I acknowledge all the authors producing articles
to this book, and thank the VTT team for organizing the conference and editing
this book.
Mr. Sakari Immonen
Industrial Counselor
Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Conference
Ministry of Employment and the Economy
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SECTION 1
A Broad Overview
1 Globalization and the Challenges for
Knowledge-Based Economies
1.1 Introduction
Globalization and the dynamics of knowledge and innovation are at the root of
socio-economic change. This is true regardless of the specific development phase
countries are undergoing or of their location. Intense worldwide relations make lo-
cal happenings shape and being shaped by events occurring elsewhere. Examples
of our globalised world are the international production and trade of goods and ser-
vices; the global mobility of capital and investments; the mobility of labourers,
know-how and intellectual capital; and the global flow of data and information,
also facilitated by the Internet and the Information and Communication Technolo-
gies (ICTs). Global are also concerns as the worldwide security, as well as aims
such as eradicating poverty and preserving the environment. In our intertwined
world science and technology (S&T) and innovation have become all the more in-
herently global and have the potential to increase local, national, regional and
global welfare by satisfying global needs and by offering new solutions to global
problems.
Globalization is a complex multidimensional and multifaceted phenomenon,
whose drivers, components and effects are far from being fully understood. Still,
globalization is not a new phenomenon, as market and trade had become increas-
ingly international since the 19th century. The same happened to production fac-
tors and settings – including the acquisition of energy and raw-materials –, to in-
vestments and financial markets, and to industrial R&D and innovation. Especially
since the 1980s global scientific co-operation, international collaboration of firms,
universities and R&D institutes, and research co-operation along the production
chain has also been growing. These and other trends currently characterizing glob-
alizationmay give right to argue for a new “development phase” of globalization.
1.2 “New phase” of globalization
In recent decades globalization has reached a new phase. On the one hand this has
been due to the impact of ICTs and the new knowledge-based paradigm over econ-
omies and societies. On the other hand, the sustained development that some large
Asian economies have been experiencing since the late 1990s has profoundly
shaped globalization dynamics. In this new phase, companies’ internationaliza-
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tion, and in particular the role and behaviour of transnational corporations (TNCs),
remains among the main drivers of globalization.
Globalization as product of the knowledge-based economy
The current traits of globalization are shaped by ICTs and the new technologies.
As Thurow (2000) argues, this new phase of globalization is a product of the
knowledge-based economy and just one of the ways in which new technologies
will reshape the economies of the third millennium. Worldwide ICT networks and
tools enable fast communication for all purposes, including the effective division
of labour, as well as research and product development, around the clock and the
globe. This gradual although unbalanced shift from a resource-based economy to a
knowledge-based one occurs to different degrees and at various speeds in both de-
veloped and developing countries.
This is why the knowledge-based global paradigm – also and especially enabled
by ICTs – offers opportunities while posing serious threats, irrespective of the de-
velopment phase of countries and societies. ICTs and the new technologies con-
tribute to modify the structure of industries and spur the change towards the
knowledge economy. These may in turn affect productivity, while triggering radi-
cal changes in both employment patterns and skill requirements.
Knowledge and innovation have become strategic assets for the success of enter-
prises and nations alike. Economies are gradually although continuously shifting
from tangible manufacture-based structures to intangible and knowledge- and-ser-
vice based business models.
Changes of foci and dynamics of global economy and innovation
The current phase of globalization is also characterized by the growth of some
large Asian developing economies. The patterns followed by countries like China
and India are changing the foci and dynamics of the global economy, including
markets, investments, finance, production, business strategies and innovation sys-
tems. Besides offering affordable cost levels and fast growing markets, these econ-
omies are characterized by dynamic “region-states”, which are able to absorb for-
eign investments also thanks to their increasingly attractive S&T systems (e.g.
Zhou and Leydesdorff 2006). Chinese and Indian multinationals have thus gradu-
ally proved to be strong new contenders for global markets, and increasingly so
also for R&D activities.
More generally though, as far as techno-economic development is concerned, re-
gions are acquiring an ever-growing importance. Region-states are even predicted
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to gradually replace nation-states (Ohmae, 2005), thus making global competition
among innovation systems all the more fierce.
In such a dynamic global environment, education, S&T, R&D and innovation are
of paramount importance and may drive or hinder growth. In particular, when it
comes to R&D activities, it is the globalization process of multinational enter-
prises’ (MNEs) R&D that plays a major role worldwide. MNEs in fact account for
a remarkable share of global business R&D (OECD 2006). According to
UNCTAD’s World Investment Report, trans-national corporations (TNCs) ac-
count for a major share of global R&D, with 310 billion US $ spent in 2002. In this
same year, the 700 world largest R&D spending firms – 98 % of which are TNCs –
accounted for close to half of the world’s total R&D expenditure and for more than
two-thirds (69 %) of the world’s business R&D. As examples, it may suffice to
note that, according to UNCTAD’s (2005) figures, Ford Motor’s R&D expendi-
tures surpass the R&D expenditures of Spain or Switzerland, and Daimler-Chrys-
ler or Siemens’ R&D expenditures are greater than the overall R&D expenditures
of Belgium or Israel.
According to the UNESCO Science Report 2005, the global annual budget de-
voted to R&D will soon exceed one trillion US $. From a geographical point of
view though, R&D is still mainly concentrated in developed countries. In 2002 the
world devoted 1.7 % of its gross domestic product (GDP) to R&D, with R&D in-
vestments amounting to 830 billion US$. These were allocated as follows: 37 % in
North America (of which 35 % in the U.S.); 31.5 % in Asia (with 12.8 % in Japan,
8.7 % in China and 2.5 % in India); 27.3 % in Europe (with 6.7 % in Germany, 4.2
% in France and 3.5 % in the UK); 2.6 % in Latin America and the Caribbean (with
1.6 % in Brazil); 1.1 % in Oceania, and 0.6 % in Africa (with 0.4 % in South-Af-
rica).
The role of big Asian developing countries, especially of China, is however in-
creasing. According to OECD’s projections, China was predicted to spend over
136 billion US $ on R&D in 2006, with an annual growth rate in R&D expendi-
tures of over 20 %. Doing so, China should have surpassed Japan’s forecasted
130 billion US $ and position itself right behind U.S.’s predicted 330 billion US $
(STI Outlook 2006, OECD). The EU-15, including France, Germany and the UK,
was predicted to spend over 230 billion US $ in 2006. China’s R&D intensity, i.e.
its R&D spending as a percentage of GDP, has more than doubled over the last de-
cade, passing from 0.6 $ of GDP in 1995 to just over 1.2 % in 2004. At current
prices, this represents an increase from just over 7 billion US $ in 1995 to 94 billion
US $ in 2004. China’s R&D spending is growing at an even faster pace than its im-
pressing overall economy growth, showing annual rates between 9 % and 10 %
(ibid.).
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1.3 Globalization challenges innovation policies
The current trends of globalization are shaping the structure of the markets and
agents’ competitiveness. To face the new challenges posed by globalization and
the knowledge-based economy all countries, whether big or small, need to imple-
ment the most suitable strategies, as no player can afford to stay out of the game or,
worse, lose it. Of paramount importance hence is to carefully re-think and re-for-
mulate innovation policies, being innovation a key component of countries’ com-
petitive strategies.
Knowledge-based economies like the United States, the Pacific Rim countries led
by Japan, and the European Union are already doing so. Europe, as well as other
players around the globe, is in fact increasingly relying on the creation and exploi-
tation of knowledge, held as the key competitiveness asset at the root of S&T. This
need to reshape S&T policies is felt even more compellingly by the EU member
States, faced by the challenge of Europe willing to become the most competitive
knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010.
Regardless of past and present economic performances though, the global-and-
knowledge-based paradigm calls for synergic actions.The achievement of long
term growth objectives calls for new economic and societal frameworks. Science
and technology policies are no exception in this respect, especially when it comes
to dealing with pressing issues as the mobility of scientists and the exploitation of
knowledge and know-how.
Sustainability and globalization
In the past, globalization has mainly been driven by the economic actors and their
strategies, implemented in order to fulfil the interests of their stakeholders. While
attempting to combine the desires of all players involved, markets may however
fail and have often failed to meet the needs of those that are not able to shape the
decision process. This is true for companies – especially Small and Medium-sized
Enterprises (SMEs) – lacking, for instance, the necessary technological capabili-
ties or managerial expertise, as well as for individuals and poorer societies. Pov-
erty, social exclusion, digital divide, security threats, environmental concerns and
brain drain are to name but a few clear symptoms of the market failures deter-
mined, also although not exclusively, by globalization.
If globalization undermines the pillars on which economies have traditionally re-
lied upon, it also opens up new opportunities of development and growth. Knowl-
edge-based economies are in a privileged position to harvest globalization’s best
fruits, but should be prepared to share its costs and behave responsibly. This entails
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pursuing the best socio-economic outcomes for all human beings while preserving
nature and the environment, both at present and in the future. Economies that are
truly knowledge-based should, as the concept itself implies, seek innovative solu-
tions to socio-economic and environmental problems, and aim to increase global
welfare.
Eradicating poverty, protecting natural resources, and changing unsustainable
production and consumption patterns constitute self-evident although difficult ob-
jectives to pursue. The need hence arises to call for a more active role of govern-
ments in conjugating economic, social and environmental needs. Heterogeneous
past and present characteristics and development trajectories make in fact unsuit-
able the application of “standard” innovation and technological-change models.
One size simply does not fit all: the kaleidoscopic variety of worldwide contexts
calls for a variety of approaches and actions, if global welfare is to bemaximized.
1.4 Helsinki’s Going Global 2006 conference
The Helsinki conference took a holistic approach to globalization and the knowl-
edge based paradigm. The event addressed globalization’s main drivers, dynam-
ics, threats and opportunities and encompassed the main challenges facing knowl-
edge-based economies and societies.
The leitmotiv of the Helsinki conference was that globalization is not be feared but
rather understood. Although many aspects of globalization are known, it is still
very difficult to clearly picture cause-effect relations, as well as to exactly forecast
possible impacts and ascertain interrelations. Besides, as globalization is a dynam-
ically changing phenomenon, the questions we pose and conclusions we draw to-
day may not necessarily be the right or relevant ones for tomorrow. Hence the ne-
cessity to have a holistic and proactive approach to globalization. Problems can be
solved and opportunities seized when awareness and knowledge are paired with
willingness, capacity and capability.
To this end, the conference approached the challenges that globalization poses to
the knowledge based economies from various economic, policy and sustainability
perspectives. Besides, the event considered various interrelated aspects character-
izing S&T globalization. The analysis, both theoretical and empirical, encom-
passed the R&D dynamics related to enterprises, socio-economic development
and the broader national innovation systems.
The conference began by shading light over the main traits characterizing corpo-
rate international (re)location and knowledge dynamics, including Intellectual
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Property Rights (IPRs). Whether Multinationals (MNEs) or SMEs, firms in fact
show an ever growing propensity to become more “ubiquitous”. It is then funda-
mental to understand why is it so, i.e. which are the drivers that push companies to
locate production plants and R&D facilities elsewhere than in the home country.
The analysis of the competitive advantages that enterprises seek in the host coun-
tries entailed industries in general and high-tech firms and R&D divisions in par-
ticular, given their relevance to knowledge based economies. The trajectories that
corporate relocations take were also analyzed, thus highlighting the new
techno-economic geography that emerges. The time dimension of these phenom-
ena was also addressed, from the perspective of the development stage of the home
and host country, the characteristics of both firms and industries, and the Product
Life Cycle of the latter.
Once understood the drivers of globalization, the conference addressed the impact
that the various corporate relocation phenomenamight have on intellectual capital,
innovative output and the labour market. The analysis of the possible cause-effect
links, and of the interrelations and feedbacks that might exist, took into account
many elements. On the one hand, (re)locating affects intellectual capital formation
and exploitation, as well as knowledge creation, absorption, circulation and
spillovers. These depend on the absorptive capacity of the agents – whether coun-
tries or firms – and are also moulded by the educational system, the labour market
and, more generally, the broader institutional framework. In turn, intellectual capi-
tal and knowledge creation, exploitation and circulation play a fundamental role in
shaping the development and growth of both enterprises and countries. On the
other hand, internationalization phenomena – especially those entailing the (re)lo-
cation of R&D – directly affect innovative output in both the host and the home
country and shape the ability/capability of firms and systems to innovate. In turn,
innovative output contributes to shape productiveness and competitiveness, thus
either boosting or depressing trade. Last but not least, the technological and
socio-economic impact of going global is shaped by the relationships and loop
mechanisms that might exist between intellectual capital formation, innovative
output, productiveness and competitiveness. These can in fact either amplify or re-
duce the impact that the knowledge based global dynamics might ultimately have
on growth and development, at all levels.
After the socio-economic analysis of the drivers, dynamics and impacts of corpo-
rate R&D relocation and globalization the conference addressed the questions of
whether and to what extent the current and prospective global dynamics call for
new types of governance. Such a need arises if different policy domains have to
converge towards common strategic objectives like, for instance in the case of Eu-
rope, the Barcelona and Lisbon targets. Attention was also devoted to the impact of
the various policies put in place by small open economies that “go global” – such
as the Finnish global economy program – as well as to international challenging
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initiatives like the European Research Area. The aim was to shed light on those
policies that can catalyse innovation and strengthen innovation systems, thus im-
proving the competitiveness of both member States and the European Union as a
whole vis-à-vis their international competitors.
Finally, some sustainability aspects of going global were addressed. The rationale
behind this session was to discuss how to better share the social, economical and
ecological benefits and responsibilities arising from globalisation, technological
change, and innovation. It investigated the impact that globalisation and the
knowledge-based paradigm might have on both developed and developing coun-
tries (e.g. India versus Europe), at various geographical levels (regional, national,
etc.). Past, present and future needs and shortcomings were also addressed, in line
with the Helsinki Process (started in 2004). The session also explored sector-spe-
cific dynamics, with particular attention devoted to high-tech industries. A crucial
part of the debate was represented by the role of all socio-economic agents –
whether public or private – and their responsibilities.
1.5 Structure and content of the volume
The Going Global 2006 experts discussed selected issues while framing their anal-
ysis in the broader contest. Their contributions were thus never narrow, but they
rather dealt with specific topics while offering each time coherent although differ-
ent perspective over the challenges that going global poses to knowledge based
economies.
The present volume mirrors such a feature of the conference and is divided into
five chapters. After the introduction (Chapter 1), Chapter 2 gathers together the
contributions related to the drivers and dynamics of globalization and the knowl-
edge based economies. Chapter 3 is instead made of six contributions discussing
the implications of globalization for science, education and innovation policies, as
well as governance. Chapter 4 encompasses those analyses reporting specific
countries’ and firms’ experiences and strategies, vis-à-vis the challenges posed by
globalization. The first three of them relate to some “countries under the spot-
light”, i.e. countries that are currently looked at as engines of change. The remain-
ing three instead unveil the global strategies of some MNEs corporations. Chapter
5 summarizes the knowledge value-added of the conference and draws some con-
clusion and policy implications.
Section 1.5.1 below contains a brief summery of all the contributions included in
the present proceedings, per chapter.
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1.5.1 Chapters’ content and contributions’ outline
Chapter 2 encompasses various aspects, drivers and dynamics of globalization
and the knowledge based economy.
David Audretsch considers globalization, knowledge and new growth strategies.
He first offers a brief historical overview of the impact of globalization, especially
on industries and employment in Germany. He then considers the “European para-
dox”, questioning the reason why Europe sees high investments in knowledge
leading to low returns in terms of economic growth and employment. Although in-
vestments generate new knowledge, the latter does not spill out of universities and
does not (or, at least, not sufficiently) become the object of commercial activities.
This impinges upon Europe’s expected returns, especially growth and jobs. In the
traditional economy, investments in new plants and equipments resulted in growth
and jobs. This does not happen with investments in knowledge, as they have to go
through the “knowledge filter” to become valuable and to be commercialized, thus
bringing results and returns. Themissing link between knowledge investments and
returns is entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship serves as a mechanism, a conduit by
which knowledge investments bring the expected fruits. Given that universities are
important sources of knowledge, Audretsch calls for a more entrepreneurial role of
universities. This would facilitate the transfer of knowledge and its commercial-
ization and thus result in economic growth and higher employment.
Francis Gurry discusses globalization, intellectual property (IP) and knowledge
policy. He analyses the radical transformations of IP rights during the last 15 years.
The IP system, he argues, is currently under stress, due to the massive expansion of
demand for IP rights (as in the case of patent protection for new inventions), and to
ever-growing piracy and the need of new innovation models (e.g. the open source
approach). Gurry illustrates the recent geopolitical shift happening in the genera-
tion of technology, and in particular the new role of North-East Asia. He also high-
lights how ICTs have led to the worldwide democratization of the ability to access
new technologies. Examples are the various world patent collections, i.e. the his-
torical record of humanity’s technologies, which are available online and are in a
searchable form. Gurry then moves to analyse the IP rationale itself. As IPRs rep-
resent a policy tool intended to encourage innovation and creativity, he proposes to
broaden the discussion on IP and to consider other models of innovation. He also
advocates a broader policy focus, encompassing not only IP but the broader
knowledge policy, and proposes possible pathways that might help solving some
of the tensions the IP system is currently experiencing.
Torbjörn Fredriksson considers the internationalization of TNCs’ R&D, being
trans-national corporations among the key drivers of globalization. He relies on
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the UNCTAD 2005 survey and presents some evidence about the current global-
ization dynamics. TNCs account for 46 % of the total R&D expenditures world-
wide and for 69 % of business R&D expenditures, figures that confirm TNCs to be
key players in global R&D. Although R&D is among the least internationalised
business functions, TNCs have started recognising the attractive conditions of-
fered by some developing countries. This is why R&D, which remains one of the
most strategic corporate functions, is becoming more and more global. Among the
drivers of R&D globalization there are the needs to innovate, to keep costs down,
and to access new talent pools.
Jean-Eric Aubert encompasses some of the global trends characterising knowl-
edge based economies. Being competitive in the knowledge economy requires the
ability to develop more complex communication skills and expert thinking, rather
than carrying out routine tasks. The ability to use, create, and adapt knowledge are
becoming fundamental determinants of the global competitiveness capability of
countries. The question hence arises of how to measure knowledge-based econo-
mies. Aubert deems that both quantitative and qualitative indicators are needed
and describes the knowledge assessment methodology (KAM) of the World Bank.
The KAM is an analysis tool developed for benchmarking purposes. With respect
to the qualitative assessment, country performances are framed within the broader
anthropological context. Innovation systems are pictured within the broader devel-
opment systems, and the latter within the societal systems, which are related to cul-
tural dimensions. This qualitative approach has a lot of implications, in terms of
both culture and society, and may pose political challenges.
Pierre Mohnen deals with cross-border technology flows, knowledge spillovers,
and the globalized world. Knowledge spillovers refer to the unintended transfer of
knowledge, in which no payment is involved. Evidence is robust with respect to
the existence of significant R&D spillovers, at different levels of aggregation.
Generally spillovers are found to represent positive externalities. Econometric
studies find the social rate of return to R&D investments to exceed the private rate
and spillovers to be the difference between private and social rates of return. This
argues in favour of policy intervention, by which governments offer incentives to
push firms to invest in R&D up to the point where social benefits equal social
costs. However, in order to be able to benefit from spillovers, agents must posses
the necessary absorptive capacity, as in-house R&D and incoming spillovers are
complementary. Moreover, geographical proximity, networking and labour mo-
bility do matter for spillovers. Mohnen argues that we are still far away from being
able to offer normative guidance to governments with respect to spillovers. We are
neither able to measure the exact amount of spillovers that is created, nor we know
for sure which channel of transmission spillovers use. Conversely, very clear is the
necessity to build absorptive capacity, also and especially in developing countries,
and to increase interactions, networking and knowledge exchange. Mohnen finally
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concludes suggesting that would we have perfect markets where selling and pur-
chasing knowledge, there would no longer be spillovers.
John Zysman considers the changing dynamics of innovation and information
technology (IT) in the global transformation of services. Knowledge becomes es-
pecially important for development in what he calls “the global digital era”.
Knowledge has become digitized and more rapid and IT tools create new possibili-
ties to convert information into knowledge and to employ knowledge in the econ-
omy. The critical step has been the discovery that IT users made of how to employ
their ever greater and cheaper computing power, to do what previously was impos-
sible. The network-based transformation of services represents a critical part of the
story of the global knowledge economy. Services are embedded in the structure of
social regulations, and the reconfiguration of services alters the value creation in
services.We are in the midst of the fourth service transformation, “from revolution
to delusion”. This change begins to influence the character of innovation. The ad-
vantage lies in being able to innovate business models, and in the blurred bound-
aries between products and services as a source of innovation. Service production
requires more knowledge than manufacturing, and this knowledge is embedded in
the IT tools, now available as commodity products. Zysman concludes that the key
question for corporate strategy is how to reorganise routines. The policy task is in-
stead to create an environment enabling experimentation and innovation. The abil-
ity to reorganise the service sector becomes critical.
Chapter 3 focuses on the implications of globalization for science, education, in-
novation policies and governance.
Daniele Archibugi discusses the recent changes in the development of public sci-
ence and takes a stand in defence of public science. He argues that public science is
increasingly moving away from basic science to become an instrument supporting
the achievement of medium to short-term industrial R&D and competitiveness’
objectives. Even academic jobs are becoming progressively more related to indi-
viduals’ ability to raise research funds. Archibugi offers some evidence about how
the relative proportion of public and business R&D expenditures has been chang-
ing in the OECD countries, leading to a situation where business R&D represents
the leading component. This change is considered good by many, both within the
OECD and the EC. South Korea and Japan are among the countries with the lowest
amount of government R&D. Those countries having a traditionally large public
research sector (US, UK, France) are also shifting towards a situation where busi-
ness-financed R&D dominates. In the OECD countries the share of academic
R&D is less than 20%,with more than 80% of R&Dbeing done outside academia.
Archibugi describes the present situation as a consequence of an agenda aiming to
link science and industry, where science parks, academic entrepreneurs, etc. would
contribute to improve the commercialization of science. As a consequence, univer-
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sities are getting less money for research and depend more on external contracts,
and this triggers many problems. Archibugi suggests that universities should be
strongly integrated in the societal context and the market economy. He advocates
the integration between public and business R&D resources, but deems that the
public sector should pursue its own scientific priorities, i.e. to develop knowledge
and offer it to the citizens. Academia should be forced to socially justify its activity
and scientific research should be funded through general taxation, as it provides a
public good. Archibugi concludes that we would need business and academia to
work together, but academia should not work for business”.
Heikki Salmi analyses globalization and the knowledge-based economy from a
European perspective. Europe can only rely on its knowledge capacity, as its in-
herent strengths are not in competing through low costs. Comparing the innovative
performance of Europe, the U.S. and Japan Salmi argues that Europe’s strengths
are in the ability of university R&D to be financed by business, in design and in
trademarks. Conversely, Europe looks comparatively weak in terms of patents,
population with tertiary education, ICT expenditures, and in protecting and com-
mercializing R&D. Although some European industries are strong in global mar-
kets, manufacturing is dominated by medium-high technology sectors. Innovative
companies go where innovation can flourish, workforce is well-educated, R&D
labs excel, and strong clusters exist. He briefly mentions the objective of what he
calls the “Revised Lisbon Agenda” as well as other EU activities that aim to in-
crease the attractiveness of Europe. Among them the 7th Framework Programme
(FP) with its Joint Technology Initiatives (JITs) and the 25 national reform
programmes, all aiming to increase the share of EU R&D in from 1.9 % to 2.6 % of
the GDP in 2010. Salmi holds that the key ingredients needed to “put knowledge
into practice” are: education, competitive internal markets, favourable regulatory
environments, clusters and knowledge transfer, a modernised university system,
and a European Institute of Technology (EIT). Salmi also presents some results of
a study investigating the implications of R&D off-shoring on the innovative ca-
pacity of the EU Firms. Among other findings, the study suggests that firms antici-
pate a relative growth of off-shored R&D in the future. In Europe R&D off-shor-
ing happens from the old to the new member states. Effective IPR protection, qual-
ity of the education system and developed infrastructure are highly valued vari-
ables in the decision to off-shore R&D, but public support is not crucial. Salmi
concludes that R&D off-shoring benefits home activities and European R&D pro-
ductivity in general. Hence Europe should try its best to become a good destination
for incoming off-shored R&D but also look for opportunities to off-shore R&D to
other countries.
András Siegler discusses Europe international scientific cooperation (ISC), espe-
cially in the context of the 7th Framework Program. He offers three main argu-
ments in favour of ISCs. The first relates to Europe’s competitiveness in the global
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scenario. The second is that scientific challenges become progressively bigger and
more global, and without cooperation it is simply impossible to pursue them.
Thirdly, he underlines the need to underpin other policies of the EU based on inter-
national relations as trade, development, environment, energy, and so on. The EU
promotes ISCs in order to carry out better science and to pursue broader policy
goals via scientific achievements. Specific strategic objectives have been defined
accordingly for ISCs. The first is to make world-wide scientific excellence avail-
able for Europe via circulation and not via brain-drain. The second is to support
sustainable European competitiveness through strategic partnerships with third
countries in selected science fields and, through this, to explore new markets (e.g.
through European Technology Platforms). The third objective is to address spe-
cific problems on the basis of mutual interests and benefits with third countries or
regions where Europe has particular interests (for example, poverty-related dis-
eases, environment issues, etc.). The fourth objective is to address global scientific
challenges, e.g. big science projects (fusion reactor, high-speed information net-
works, etc.). To accomplish the strategic objectives of ISC the EU has proposed a
segmented and focused approach, based on strategic reference frameworks. They
may either have a thematic focus or concentrate on specific regions, or both, de-
pending on the issue. Siegler also describes the steps to be followed in the imple-
mentation of the strategic frameworks. He concludes stating that the main chal-
lenges of ISCs rest on the ability of Europe to effectively coordinate ISC, in the
budgetary commitment to the ISC actions, and in pursuing a geographic and the-
matic variety of ISC actions with third countries.
Dominique Foray, discusses the political economy of how to organize a public
goods policy response in the light of the Lisbon strategy and reports the work of
the EC Expert Group “Knowledge for Growth”. The Expert Group suggests four
policy axes for the development of the European knowledge economy. First, Eu-
rope needs to dramatically change its resources allocation and to focus on the criti-
cal domains of the knowledge economy, i.e. education and research. As the private
sector responds only to incentives, these must be changed in order to make invest-
ing in R&Dprofitable. Second, Europe needs to orientate the economy towards the
right fields of specialisation. Each region and country should think about what
makes its knowledge base unique and distinctive. Third, Europe should think
about transforming its economic institutions and its modes of governance. Fourth,
Europe would need to adapt the “other” policies to the knowledge economy, above
all the macroeconomic policies. These should act in a countercyclical fashion dur-
ing depressions, when companies have problems in funding their R&D. Unfortu-
nately this is not obvious at the EU level. Foray concludes that the governance and
coordination of national actions in Europe is not effective because the Lisbon
Strategy is based on voluntary coordination and on a soft message of coordination.
There is a mismatch between the soft method of governance and the nature and ob-
jectives of the R&Dpolicy. Member countries may free ride in order to get benefits
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from community actions without making own investments. Moreover, Europe has
a low budget at the central level and high national budgets. As a result, a dissipated
effort of the national states echoes the weakness of the centralized EU capacity.
Europe needs to ensure sufficient resource allocation, given that the allocation pro-
cess is decentralized, and that knowledge has the characteristic of a semi-public
good. Finally Foray proposes some policy suggestions aimed at helping Europe in
the global knowledge game.
Otto Toivanen discusses the economic rationale behind innovation policies, from
the point of view of a small open economy such as Finland and in the light of glob-
alization. Innovation policy is generally justified on the basis of the assumption
that R&D investments not only benefit inventors but also others, i.e. the whole so-
ciety. Social benefits thus offer an argument in favour of closing the wedge be-
tween private and socially optimal investments in innovation, and this wedge calls
for active innovation policies, with taxes or R&D subsidies. The implicit assump-
tion of the analysis is that the society is all mankind. The story changes when we
look at a small open economy in a global community, or the mankind. The inven-
tion benefits now the inventor, the users and the companies of a small open econ-
omy, but also the whole mankind. For example, Finns are only 0.08 % of world
population, and most of the gains to consumers and spillovers to other firms are
somewhere else. Toivanen concludes that if innovation is to be justified according
to economic theory, the reasons to support private innovation by public means are
much less strong in a small open economy than they would be if we had a world
government. However, Toivanen presents the results of a research project support-
ing the idea of innovation policies being desirable also in small open economies.
The research relies on data regarding R&D projects and firms’ applications for
R&D subsidies in Finland and shows that the benefits of R&D projects to firms
(profits) are large. R&D projects also benefit society, but less so than firms.
Toivanen draws two main policy implications. Firstly, the need to coordinate
R&D policies at higher levels, like the EU, in order to internalize more spillovers.
Secondly, a small open economy should nurture its absorptive capacity to benefit
from knowledge created elsewhere.
Manuel A. J. Teehankee discusses the trade rules of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) and how development is related to international rule-making and tech-
nology transfer. Rule-making at the WTO can be future and development oriented
and geared towards poverty alleviation. However, development is related in many
ways to capital and technology. Teehankee describes the various phases of the de-
velopment cycle in which investments in S&T, research funding, and intellectual
assets play important roles. He reckons technology transfer should also involve de-
veloping countries, if poverty eradication is to be achieved. Teehankee describes
how, since the 1970ies, technology transfer and R&D and S&T have become de-
velopment goals of both developing countries and international organizations, as
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the WTO, the UN, the OECD and others. He surveys the technology related provi-
sions of the WTO, which all have a significant meaning in the international
rule-making. Teehankee also refers that the WTO’s discussion about technology
transfer has widened and currently includes investment flows, competition rules,
IP regimes, and limits to IPRs. Teehankee calls for a multilateral set of rules re-
garding technology transfer, where recognising the role of technology absorption
and adoption, and encouraging domestic and multilateral fiscal incentives and
funding for R&D and S&T. He wishes the focus of intellectual property protection
to shift towards a win-win situation where, without prejudicing IPRs, technology,
cooperation partnership and dynamism would benefit development.
Chapter 4 presents some countries’ experiences and industries’ perspectives
vis-à-vis the challenges posed by globalization. The countries under the spotlight
are China, India and Malaysia, whereas the companies that present their experi-
ences are Valio (FI), Unilever (NL) and Honeywell Specialty Materials (US).
Max von Zedwitz, besides dealing with knowledge creation and use in China,
hints at a somewhat little explored issue, i.e. Chinese multinational corporations
as new contenders in global R&D. von Zedwitz pictures the growth of the Chi-
nese knowledge pool by looking at the entry and exam figures of Tsinghua Uni-
versity. On the one hand, the number of graduate students has been increasing
exponentially over the last years. On the other hand, there are heavy investments
in building up university infrastructures and in hiring and educating professors.
China is trying to gradually move away from imitating, while pursuing an endog-
enous and innovative use of knowledge (as, for instance, the worldwide patent
figures show). Some Chinese companies come up as aggressive global players
but, in general, internationalisation is not as a strong driver as it is for Western
companies. Some Chinese companies, like Haier and Huawei, have established
R&D centres in Western countries. One of the reasons why they do so is that
Western companies are reluctant to send the latest technology to China, due e.g.
to home security reasons. Chinese companies have hence decided to go west-
ward, for example to the U.S., and to become part of Silicon Valley or of the
Cambridge-Boston phenomenon. They also invest in research in Western uni-
versities to become legal owners of the IP being created. The main barriers for
the internationalization of the Chinese companies are currently represented by
their scarce resources, little experience in foreign markets, lack of history of
product innovation, and lack of R&D resources and management expertise. Con-
versely, the cost of doing R&D in China is relatively low. von Zedwitz concludes
that Chinese companies are good in learning, imitating, and at picking up and ab-
sorbing skills, and they will likely be strong competitors in R&D as well in the
near future. If technology does not go to China, Chinese go to the sources of the
technology and get it right there.
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R.A. Mashelkar analyses India’s emergence as a global innovation hub, survey-
ing both drivers and consequences for society, culture, policy, the economy, and
the country’s future strategies. India has undergone four science based revolu-
tions, the last of which is the Grey Revolution and is related to the emergence of
educational and engineering institutions. The Grey Revolution has helped India to
move in areas like software, where 600,000 professionals will generate 35 % of the
Indian export by 2008. India’s performance has remarkably improved since the
country opened up globally in 1991. India’s development happened in three main
waves: first came foreign direct investments, then technology, R&D and manufac-
turing, and then foreign nationals got to work in India. The brain drain situation
has also changed, as the number of graduated that migrate abroad has dramatically
decreased. India’s strategy to strengthen its position as a global R&D hub is two-
fold. On the one hand, the supply side strategy relies on the massive expansion of
high-quality education and research systems. On the other hand, from the de-
mand-side, India has put in place many policy measures aimed to enhance compet-
itiveness and R&D, also through government support. Mashelkar also discusses
some of the problems the country needs to solve in the future, like primary educa-
tion. He also refers to global challenges and mentions the Global Research Alli-
ance (GRA), established by public research laboratories from both developing and
developed countries to address global problems.
J.M. Jarjis illustrates Malaysia’s transformation from an agriculture-based into a
knowledge-based economy and describes the various phases of its economic de-
velopment. Malaysia’s transformation into an industry-based economy in the
1960s led to major changes in its infrastructures, finance and education. Among
other actions, the Government developed incentives to attract foreign investments.
These investments generated substantial export earnings from manufactured
goods, in particular electrical and electronic products, and succeeded in attracting
foreign direct investments (FDIs). Today Malaysia is the 18th largest trading na-
tion although it faces growing competition from countries such as China and India.
Recognising the increasingly critical role of knowledge, Malaysia had already in-
troduced in 1990 a national plan called “Vision 2020”, aiming to attain the devel-
oped nation status by 2020. The country has since been gearing itself towards the
transformation into a knowledge-based economy. At present, the Ninth Malaysia
Plan states the development strategies and measures for 2006–2010, of which
Jarjis gives a detailed description. The Government is aware of the possibility that,
while attempting to transform Malaysia’s economy, it may create economic and
social divide among regions and the population. ICT have an important role to play
in this respect and may help overcoming socio-economic inequalities. This is why
ICT policies are at the core of the strategy pursued to achieve Vision 2020’s objec-
tive.
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Jan Maat from Unilever, the Netherlands, explains the company’s global R&D
structure. For Unilever, which is a fast moving consumer goods and common
household product business, understanding consumers’ needs is of key impor-
tance. Unilever spends about 2 % of its turnover in R&D, and the company has re-
cently simplified its R&D structures in order to speed up innovation and
strengthen its global market position. Unilever has now an aligned global innova-
tion and R&D organisation in which projects, as well as resources and compe-
tences, are global. Such competences obviously require excellent management ca-
pabilities in order to avoid duplication of R&D.Unilever R&D in Europe is carried
out in three main research centres, located in the UK and the Netherlands. In addi-
tion, Unilever has one lab in India, one in China, and various technology centres
worldwide. Besides describing Unilever global R&D approach, Maat draws some
conclusions regarding the national Dutch and the European innovation policies.
Tiina Mattila-Sandholm illustrates Valio’s approach to R&D and open innova-
tions. Valio is a dairy industry company, born in Finland 100 years ago. Innova-
tion-wise Valio is a very successful firm and has a long history of R&D, its top
name being that of Virtanen, who won the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1945.
Mattila-Sandholm stresses the importance of the traditional respect of research
within Valio and of the belief that long-term research investments pay back. Valio
board concluded already in 1916 that “Only such a country whose entire economy
is based on science can attain and keep the first place in the economic war between
nations”. The board had already understood the importance of the knowl-
edge-based economy a long time ago, before the locution itself was introduced.
Valio’s innovation strategies are dictated by consumer-driven, competi-
tion-driven, vision-driven, technology-driven and curiosity-driven factors. Valio
invests in consumer and competition-driven sectors more than 50 % of its R&D re-
sources. However, the challenge is to find the right balance between all these com-
ponents. Mattila-Sandholm talks about open innovations and networking. In order
to have open innovations and to co-operate, firms need people to do in-house re-
search. Although many hide their strategies, what matters is who is coming out
first and with a different approach. Alike the Dutch technology top institutes, Fin-
land is developing top leading institutes, and different industries, including the
food industry, are competing for building such institutes. Fundamental is to rely on
partnerships and to adopt win-win strategies.
Bernard Pellereau illustrates Honeywell Specialty Materials’ international R&D
activities and then makes recommendations about how to encourage innovation in
Europe. He first explains the reasons why Honeywell Specialty Materials is glob-
alizing its R&D. Among these, the willingness to benefit from the world’s best tal-
ents, to use all the available 24 hours for research, to adapt to customer needs, and
to take advantage of reduced R&D costs. Pellereau discusses how Europe could
improve its innovativeness, from the perspective of the main actors necessary to
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succeed: businesses, government, academia and the labour market. Businesses
should provide funds to develop new and innovative products and business mod-
els, while at the same time committing to safeguard environment, health and
safety. They should also take advantage of new legislations to create new business
opportunities. Governments should protect and enforce intellectual property and
make of it a top priority in free trade talks. The European system should be simpli-
fied, bureaucracy eased and regulations become simpler. The measures needed to
strengthen the competitive advantage of Europe are collaborative platforms, R&D
fiscal incentives, R&D coordination and sector foci. Pellereau also stresses the im-
portance of having competitive energy prices and energy efficiency regulations.
As for academia, he sees universities as incubators for entrepreneurs, but more so
in the U.S. than in Europe. He hence suggests to support students interested in tak-
ing ideas into the marketplace. Besides, academia should seek to work closely with
governments and businesses to ensure that R&D is carried out in specific area and
provides the most benefits. Academia must also avoid the silo approach whereby
disciplines rarely cross. Finally, the labour market should enable life-long learning
to ensure that skills meet the current global demands. The supply of a deep and
wide talent pool is critical to success and the labour market has a central role in en-
suring opportunities for talent growth. The workforce needs to be flexible and mo-
bile, in order to better face the change forced by global markets and economic cir-
cumstances. Pellereau concludes arguing that globalisation and globalisation of
R&D are changing the way firms operate, but far from being a threat they consti-
tute an opportunity.
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2 Knowledge Based Economies Going
Global: an Economic and
Competitiveness Perspective
2.1 Globalisation, knowledge, entrepreneurship
and new growth strategies
D. B. Audretsch
Introduction
The first congress that I participated in about globalisation took place in the late
1980ies. We were all wondering what globalisation is about. One of the speakers,
the chairman of Daimler (then it wasMercedes-Benz), addressed the audience say-
ing that Mercedes had always been a global company. I suppose by that he meant
Mercedes had been selling its automobiles all around the globe for decades and, as
the chairman indicated, it had done very well with internationalising its markets.
Back then people had not really used the word globalisation very much and it was
probably the first time I myself heard the word as well. However, the internation-
alisation process that had taken place subsequent to World War II had served not
just Mercedes-Benz very well, as it sold its automobiles all around the world, but
also Germany as much of Europe. Later, when the Berlin wall fell, people realized
pretty quickly that this was going to positively affect the peace prospect and the in-
tegration of Europe, unprecedented of course since the war. I also recall that most
scholars, economists and policy makers alike, anticipated that the expansion of
internationalisation – what we now call globalisation – would not only certainly
benefit companies like Mercedes-Benz, but Germany and Europe as a whole. The
idea was that – as the chairman of Mercedes-Benz had implied – if they succeeded
in selling to the Americans surely they could sell to their neighbours, i.e. the
Czechs, the Hungarians, not to mention Asia and the rest of the world.
However, as we know, it did not quite work out that way. Probably what was not
anticipated as much as the Berlin Wall fell is that it was not just a continuation of
internationalisation Europe, Germany and Mercedes-Benz had experienced in this
post-war era. There was a fundamental shift, including a new low-wage competi-
tion. What changed with globalisation was wage disparities between the OECD
countries, the Western countries, Europe, North America, Japan, and the countries
of Eastern and Central Europe, India and China. The wage gaps were really sub-
stantial, so that Europe could not succeed pursuing a low-wage strategy (see Fig-
ure 1).
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Hourly wages in $
Country Factory
Worker
Engineer Accountant Middle
Manager
Poland 3.07 4.32 4.03 6.69
Czech Republic 2.81 5.38 4.10 6.81
Hungary 1.96 5.09 4.62 7.44
Slovakia 2.21 4.15 3.37 5.48
Romania 1.41 2.58 1.23 3.23
Bulgaria 0.73 1.43 0.83 2.80
China 0.80 3.50 3.20 4.42
India 0.43 2.40 1.93 3.13
Germany 18.80 38.90 26.40 40.40
United States 14.18 30.32 27.48 38.77
Source: Audretsch (2007)
Figure 1. Hourly wages in various countries
It thus became clear that competitiveness and the comparative advantage of Eu-
rope would not be based on what, for instance, drove the auto industry, i.e.
large-scale manufacturing production based on physical capital, machines and fac-
tories. Europe’s competitiveness had to rather be based on ideas, on knowledge.
Investing in knowledge and human capital
Throughout Western countries investing in knowledge has always paid.
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Source: Economic Report of the President, various years
Figure 2. US income gap based on educational attainment over time
As can be seen in Figure 2, if we look for instance at the returns to investments in
human capital in the United States over time, we immediately realise that returns to
investing in more human capital and more education have been progressively
greater over time. In fact, the income gap existing between the different levels of
education, i.e. between high-school dropout and high school graduates up to hav-
ing advanced degrees, has grown over the last three decades.
If we compare the number of Science and Engineering PhDs employed in the
United States in the early 1970ies and in the turn of the century, we see the figures
exploding over time, especially in the case of PhDs employed by industry.
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Figure 3. Increase of Ph.D.s in the U.S, 1973–1999
Source: Stephan, 2006
Figure 4. Number of Ph.D.s by sector, 1973-1999, all science & engineering by
fields (5 or more years since Ph.D., 65 or younger)
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This again supports the idea that knowledge counts and that it does evenmore so as
economies become globalised. Europe realised the existence of shift and that
knowledge would be more important for competitiveness than it was in the tradi-
tional capital-based economy of manufacturing and large-scale production. Eu-
rope seemed to be in a very good position in this respect. At least in the post-war
era, Europe had very strongly invested in knowledge. This is true whether one
wants to measure those knowledge investments in terms of universities, secondary
education, trainee and apprentice systems, research, research institutes (such as the
Max Planck Institute and a plethora of other types of research institutes), or even
more broadly in terms of investments in social capital, relationship capital and cul-
ture. However, when globalisation truly took off, Europe found herself facing a
tough problem: job creation at the local level.
Knowledge, globalisation and job creation
Let us continue with our Germany example to look at what actually happened in
the country’s leading firms. This figures are extracted from a study done at the
Ministry of Economics, in Berlin, and show employment at the advent of
globalisation, before the Berlin Wall fell, and then right after the fall of the wall.
The study looks at the employment figures of the thirty largest German companies.
For example, let us consider three eminent cases, namely Volkswagen, Hoechst
and Bayer. The trends we observe in their cases resemble those of the other compa-
nies in the study.
Source: Audretsch 2007
Figure 5. Employment in large German firms
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We see that in the case of Volkswagen, one of the German and European flagship
companies, total employment basically remained the same between 1884 and
1994. Hence, one might be led to think that there was really no effect. However,
when one looks at that darker area of the bar, i.e. employment outside Germany,
one realises that employment within Germany in fact decreased. In the case of
Hoechst, instead, we observe that total employment decreased over the period con-
sidered. And this contraction basically affected Germany alone, as the out-of-Ger-
many level of employment actually rose. Last, in the case of Bayer, we see that the
firm’s job creation mainly favoured countries other than Germany. More gener-
ally, when we look at the chemical industry as a whole we see that right after the
Berlin Wall went down jobs were created outside of Germany while 80,000 were
lost in Germany.
Table 1. Change in employment in Germany and foreign subsidiaries
(1991–1995)
Manufacturing Chemicals Electrical
engineering
Autos Mechanical
engineering
Textiles
Foreign + 189,000 + 14,000 - 17,000 + 30,000 + 16,000 - 6,000
Domestic - 1,307,000 - 80,000 - 198,000 - 161,000 - 217,000 - 68,000
Source: Audretsch 2007
The same happened with respect to sectors like electrical engineering, automotive
and mechanical engineering. Overall 1.3 million jobs were lost in manufacturing
in Germany, while jobs were going up outside of Germany. German companies, as
well as the other companies in the West, were learning – some more than others –
to take advantage of the opportunities offered by globalisation. Evidently, this
caused problems at the level of individual locations in Germany. What appeared to
be good for the competitiveness of the companies ended up certainly not favouring
the competitiveness of specific regions and locations. Those people that had been
working in the automotive or chemical companies, really the traditional strong-
hold of Germany, saw their jobs in peril.
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Source: Audretsch 2007
Figure 6. Number of manufacturing employees in Stuttgart 1976–1999
Figure 6 shows the manufacturing employment dynamics observed in Stuttgart,
which is at the heart of Baden-Württemberg and really the heart of German manu-
facturing. One can see that manufacturing increased from the 60ies until the 80ies,
crashed when globalisation took off and never recovered afterwards. The Stuttgart
figures are unfortunately in line with what has been observed throughout Europe.
Source: Audretsch 2007
Figure 7. Rise in European unemployment (France and Germany) VS US trend
(1960–2000)
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For instance, in the case of France and Germany, unemployment rose from levels
below 2 % in 1960 to levels above 8 % in the 1990ies. Besides, from figure 7 one
realises the divergence in the unemployment trends of North America and France
and Germany. Evidently, it was not just France and Germany, it was the whole of
Europe to suffer from unemployment.
Five years ago or so I was in Sweden, at a meeting held by theMinister of Econom-
ics, discussing what Sweden could with respect to globalisation. The question was
how the country could get out of its stagnant growth and how to address its unem-
ployment problems. I had become a kind of a born again disciple of the endoge-
nous growth theory of the new economy. The mantra there was knowledge, invest
in knowledge, in research, in universities, in human capital, facilitate patenting
and so on. I delivered this message and I remember that our host, the minister of
economics, pointed out the difficulty of putting in practice such an advice in Swe-
den. Sweden had the highest investments in knowledge by any measure, whether
using patents, R&D as a share of GDP, human capital and so on. It indeed can be
difficult to say that, well, the solution is to invest in knowledge when you are talk-
ing to one of the economies with the highest investments in knowledge.
Moreover, when one looks at the simple correlation between one type of invest-
ment in knowledge, i.e. R&D, and the growth rate of countries, there is no obvious
relationship, no positive correlation emerges. This can be seen in figure 8 where
such patterns can be observed for the OECD countries over the 1990ies.
Source: Acs, Audretsch, Braunerhjelm and Carlsson, 2005
Figure 8. Correlation between growth and R&D
This is what the Swedes called the Swedish paradox: if knowledge is so important
as a response to globalisation, where is the growth, where is job creation?
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Globalisation seems to help the competitiveness of the companies, who are able to
outsource R&D and go where there is the knowledge they need. However, going
abroad they take the employment with them in many cases. The Swedish paradox
was later renamed by Romano Prodi as the well known “European paradox”. The
question that arises is: if knowledge is so important, why has growth remained so
elusive in the European countries? Why is unemployment higher and higher?
The “European paradox” and the knowledge filter
In fact, if one looks at the other side of the Atlantic the paradox is by no means a
European phenomenon only. The senator Birch Bayh observed way back in 1980
that huge investments in knowledge, a wealth of scientific talents, as well as nu-
merous innovative scientific breakthroughs, were going to waste as a result of bu-
reaucratic red tape and illogical government regulations. He questioned the ratio-
nale of spending billions of dollars each year in government-supported research
and then prevent new developments from benefiting the American people. Basi-
cally Birch Bayh was observing the same phenomenon that was also observed in
Europe. Nobody called it the American paradox, but it really was. The basic prob-
lem lies in the fact that, although the investments generate knowledge, there is not
enough commercialisation. Not enough knowledge is spilling out of the univer-
sity, thus leading to growth in the economy. The concern hence is whether the pub-
lic will really be willing to continue investing in knowledge if it cannot experience
a return in what matters to people. By return I mean jobs, growth, what the Ger-
mans call the “Volkstand” a kind of standard of living and security.
This is what we call the knowledge filter, i.e. an elusive phenomenon by which, in
the present global economy, investments in knowledge are a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition of job creation, growth and competitiveness. Investing in knowl-
edge is different from the traditional investments in new plants and equipments.
These used to sort of automatically result in growth and jobs. Conversely, invest-
ments in knowledge go through the filter as knowledge is essentially about ideas
and nobody is really sure of whether an idea is good or not. The advantage ofWest-
ern countries is their knowledge. This implies that we need institutions, policies
and a society that can deal with ideas. Asymmetries exist by which people are not
quite sure of which idea is valuable. What one person thinks is a good idea another
person might think is not. Besides, explaining why an idea is good is not trivial ei-
ther. This implies that transaction costs are also high.
Entrepreneurship: Exploiting knowledge to sustain growth
Having the knowledge is simply not enough. Somebody actually has to take action
and start a new business. Figure 9 shows a simple picture highlighting the possible
trajectories that incumbents and newcomers might follow.
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Source: Audretsch, Keilbach, Lehmann 2006
Figure 9. Entrepreneurship as conduit of knowledge spillovers
As can be seen, in an incumbent organisation – it could be a firm, a university, a re-
search institute – somebody might have an idea about how to do something differ-
ently. She might be able to realize that idea in that very context, in that organisa-
tion. Often though, due to uncertainty, this might not be possible. Let us take the
example of IBM. A few years ago three young IBM German staff came up with the
idea that IBM should produce business software. IBM was not sure about the value
of this idea and preferred not to proceed. Had those three young men stayed in the
context of that incumbent organisation B, they might have done a little better.
What they did, instead, was to jump out of B, go to A, and start SAP. SAP went on
trajectory D and the rest is history.
It was entrepreneurial action, i.e. taking the knowledge from one context – in this
case it was IBM – and commercializing it by starting A, that made the difference.
SAP has since then generated a lot of growth and many jobs for Germany, as well
as for Europe.
I believe this is why entrepreneurship serves as a conduit, as the mechanism by
which those investments in knowledge – whether cultural of social knowledge,
and Europe has invested substantially in people, as well as in science and technol-
ogy – bring fruits.
An obvious question that arises is what happens when new ideas are not accepted.
Either they get lost and just disappear or, as we saw in the case of SAP, somebody
actually pursues those ideas in the context of a new organisation. This, in a way, is
an important mechanism, a conduit of these knowledge spillovers. Knowledge by
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itself is not sufficient, it is a necessary condition but one also needs the conduit that
facilitates the spillover of knowledge from the context where it was created. New
ideas must be commercialised. Obviously entrepreneurship is not the only possible
conduit, but it certainly is an important one. It seems to be the missing link in eco-
nomic growth and it implies a very different way of carrying out (small) businesses.
For instance, in the old German “Mittelstand” approach (see table 2) the focus is on
traditional sectors. In the entrepreneurial model we instead see that emphasis in on
new, emerging sectors, where new ideas are important. The mittelstand tradition
had also a focus on the family group. The entrepreneurial model envisages a diver-
sified range of managerial and ownership assets, has a focus on high R&D – com-
pared to low R&D –, and emphasis is on high human capital, scientists, and cut-
ting-edge research. We also observe high wages compared to lower wages. Rather
than stability we see much more turbulence: people try out new ideas and many
times those ideas simply do not work. However, it is only through that experimen-
tation, through the investment in new ideas, that high growth can ultimately be
generated.
In Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction entrepreneurship does play an im-
portant role. New entrepreneurs drive out of the market the existing firms through
what he calls creative destruction. Possibly talking about destruction made sense
in the old economy, over the last century, but I believe that perhaps Schumpeter’s
definition is not so adequate to the new global environment. Entrepreneurship does
not cause destruction. When it comes to job destruction, for instance, it is
globalisation that triggers it in the developed countries. What society can do, what
policy makers can do, given the high levels of investment in research, universities,
education, culture and so on, is to support those mechanisms that may help har-
vesting the fruit of knowledge. And possibly it will be society itself to ask such
mechanisms to be put in place.
Society might be willing to continue making those investments if she gets what she
wants, which is secure, sustainable jobs and a secure, sustainable future.
As Romano Prodi noted, with respect to the EU – Lisbon Mandate of 2000: “Our
lacunae in the field of entrepreneurship needs to be taken seriously because there is
mounting evidence that the key to economic growth and productivity improve-
ments lies in the entrepreneurial capacity of an economy” (Romano Prodi, 2002).
Entrepreneurial capacity means the ability to take those investments and get some-
thing out of them, to facilitate this conduit that exploits ideas and generate new
jobs and growth.
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An entrepreneurial role for universities?
Last, some considerations are needed with respect to the role of universities. Cer-
tainly, their role might be different in an entrepreneurial economy from what it
used to be in a traditional economy. Universities have been fundamental in gener-
ating the capacity for cultural understanding, for society as a whole and, ulti-
mately, for civilization. They have also been engines for democracy. However,
with knowledge becoming all the more important, and with universities being im-
portant sources of that knowledge, it becomes fundamental to let knowledge spill
over. The existence of the knowledge filter suggests that those investments in
knowledge societies have made do not automatically spill over to commerciali-
sation. Conversely, the knowledge filter impedes that knowledge would flow out,
it keeps it within universities’ boundaries. Something has to be done to facilitate
that spillover, to transfer knowledge.
Figure 10. Impact of 1980 Bayh-Dole Act
Figure 10 shows the number of patents from universities as a share of the total
number of patents, in the United States. As can be observed, the trend was pretty
stable throughout the whole post-war period, and suddenly in 1980 it took off al-
most exponentially. Some argue it is because of the Bayh-Dole Act that was passed
in 1980, which gave universities the property rights of federally- and govern-
ment-funded research. It may as well be, but I believe the issue is more compli-
cated than that. It might as well have been the Bayh-Dole Act, but certainly some-
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thing changed within universities. Traditionally, universities were almost totally
funded by the government. Professors spent almost all their time teaching and
ended up almost all earning the same salaries. Although they did carry out re-
search, nobody talked about commercialisation in the 1970ies. What one sees at
present is instead a completely changed picture. There exist a tremendous hetero-
geneity in the personnel of universities, there are very different organisational as-
sets and types of governance. The focus is much more on trying to set knowledge
agents – i.e. researches and scientists – free, let them get out in the economy. Evi-
dently, this requires a completely different kind of university.
A recent study investigated the results of the National Cancer Institute (NCI)
grants, awarded over the period 1998–2002. Overall, 1,693 scientists were given
$ 5,350 million NCI grants. They match NCI awards to patents and see that there
have been 398 distinct patentees, holding 1,204 patents (1998–2004). Besides, one
over four scientist, and these are elite scientists, started her own firm.
These university scientists are receiving support from a multitude of sources. One
of the most significant sources is the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
program of the United States government, a program designed to enable entrepre-
neurship. Under this 1982 law, federal agencies reserve 2.5 % of their budget for
small and innovative firms to do research on projects that are likely to lead to
commercializable innovations. Two and a half percent may not seem like much,
but in 2003 that represented $ 2 Billion worth of federally funded research, along
the way stimulating significant innovation and entrepreneurship. Often these
grants have gone to University professors and researchers encouraging them to
trade their lab coats for suit jackets – pursuing careers as small businessmen, creat-
ing opportunities for economic development opportunities. These scientists are at
the forefront of the entrepreneurial university.
Universities are uniquely positioned and skilled at the task of creating economic
growth: with new knowledge and localized expertise a university with an entrepre-
neurial orientation will be at the heart of a localized cluster. This begs the ques-
tion: what form should a university take as it fosters economic growth. Tradition-
ally universities have focused, nay fixated, on the growth of basic knowledge: phi-
losophy and the natural sciences, for example. This Humboldt style university was
prevalent in Europe and the United States, however American universities started
shifting, adding a layer of applied research. The earliest evolution camewith Land
Grant Universities which were given a mission to improve agriculture in the
United States. This unusual focus beyond the traditional disciplines to agriculture
later evolved to include public administration and business schools, as well as ap-
plied research in physics, chemistry, biology and pharmacology – to name a few.
Once this layer of applied research was added to universities – applied research de-
pendent upon the core basic knowledge sources – universities kept looking out-
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ward. Technology Transfer Offices facilitated the use of university generated
knowledge by outside firms, both pre-existing and start-up. Once the knowledge
is absorbed outside the university, firms could commercialize it and grow, creating
jobs and economic growth that benefited the surrounding community, region,
state, and, ultimately, country. At the heart of it was the university and its basic
knowledge generating traditions – but to fulfil this economic growth job, the entre-
preneurial university had to grow beyond its traditional core to encompass applied
research and technology transfer.
The entrepreneurial society
As research has found, entrepreneurship is the missing link in the knowledge econ-
omy. It is not enough to generate knowledge and put it out there: there needs to be a
catalyst to transform it from static book based information into dynamic job gener-
ating economic growth and entrepreneurship is that missing link. As it was real-
ized that entrepreneurs were driving job creation and economic growth, policy fa-
cilitating entrepreneurship evolved, promoting growth, employment and global
competitiveness. One source of competitiveness turned out to be right next door in
the hallowed halls of the local university: globalization helped universities exem-
plify exactly what their role in society was: a key source of competitive advantage
that can help individual cities and regions make significant economic growth. This
evolution of the university’s role started long ago in the United States, but the evo-
lution accelerated and was aided by the expansion by universities beyond their tra-
ditional Humboldt role of increasing basic knowledge to include applied research
and the spillover of newly created knowledge, via technology transfer, to the pri-
vate sector for commercialization. This role for entrepreneurial universities at the
heart of the entrepreneurial society will only magnify over time.
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2.2 Intellectual property, knowledge policy and
globalization
F. Gurry
Introduction
That Intellectual Property (IP) has been globalised is fairly obvious. In fact, intel-
lectual property itself is both among the causes and the effects of globalisation. On
the one hand, it is one of its causes, due to the inherently international character of
intellectual property. This intangible asset facilitates the establishment of enter-
prises as well as the intellectual structure of enterprises, throughout the world. All
that one has to build upon it is its physical elements, co-determined by the local en-
vironment. On the other hand, IP is one of the consequences as we have, for in-
stance, ubiquitous global marks. Nowadays we have fairly global fashion, cultural,
sporting, entertainment icons and phenomena. Intellectual property has become a
matter of universal – as opposed to local – interest. However, while technologies
of communications have been converging, communication about IP has not.
Radical changes in the world of intellectual property
Whatever the perspective one might want to take with respect to intellectual prop-
erty – whether economic, political, legal, geographical or technological – one finds
that there have been very radical transformations, in the course of the last fifteen
years in particular.
Economically we have witnessed a massive expansion of the demand for intellec-
tual property rights. This is a result of the heightened awareness of intellectual
property and about the value of intellectual property. It is also the consequence of
the desire, on the part of enterprises and intellectual property owners, to achieve
protection across a broader geographical range. We are currently running at about
850,000 new inventions per year for which patent protection is sought. It translates
into an overall figure of about 1.6 million patent applications around the world.
44
Source: WIPO 2006
Figure 1. Number of patent applications worldwide by residents and
non-residents 1985–2004
The component of those 1.6 million that is increasing the most in any country is the
one reflecting non-resident patent applications. The expansion of demand is not
just a question of numbers. We have also seen a demand for new rights and new
legislation in the field of intellectual property rights. In the area of information
technology, for instance, we face demand for IP concerning layout designs and in-
tegrated circuits (TRIPs) as well as database protection. We are also experiencing
an expansion of rental rights, communication rights, whereas broadcasters’ rights
are under discussion. Likewise, expansion to new constituencies – such as tradi-
tional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions – and a desire for expanded
coverage of geographical indications are also under consideration. In the course of
the last fifteen years the extremely frenzy legislative activity in the field of intel-
lectual property has resulted in ten new multilateral treaties, of which the TRIPS
(Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement is one example.
Within the European Union, for instance, we have seen seven new copyright direc-
tives, one biotech directive and one (but failed) Computer Implemented Inventions
Directive.
If one moves away from the economic side of IP and looks at the political aspect,
one sees similarly radical transformations. These are largely the result, I believe, of
the empowerment of a much broader range of participant groups. This, in turn, is
the result of the networked society and the policy debate about intellectual prop-
45
0
200 000
400 000
600 000
800 000
1 000 000
1 200 000
1 400 000
1 600 000
1 800 000
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Non-Resident Direct Non-Resident PCT Resident
erty and the emergence of horizontal global alliances. These imply non-govern-
mental organisation and interest groups in one particular country allying them-
selves, or allying themselves with states in other parts of the world.
We hence have a very changed political scenery discussing intellectual property at
the international level. At the same time we also see experimentation in new inno-
vation models, open source, open publication, the creative commons, and an
anti-intellectual property movement as well.
Source: English Wikipedia 2006
Figure 2. Pirate parties
Figure 2 shows a mapping of a latest phenomenon, which is a Scandinavian phe-
nomenon in origin: the Pirate Party. It is a political party essentially based on its
opposition to intellectual property. As can be seen, it is gaining ground around the
world. I would not expect that we will see governments constituted by pirate par-
ties, but this is nevertheless a new phenomenon.
I believe that legally there has been a quiet revolution with respect to intellectual
property. For the first hundred years of its existence, which we can call the “Single
Model Phase” (1886–1992), intellectual property was really a self-enclosed world
on its own. It answered to its own policy imperatives. The highest level of com-
plexity was the national level, with emphasis put on competition policy, ordre pub-
lic (morality) and national security.
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During the period 1992–1998, we instead saw that intellectual property took no-
tice of its impact on other areas of public policy, notably with respect to exclusions
for patentability. More attention was also devoted to international instruments
dealing with intellectual property.
Since 1998 we have stepped onto yet another stage where there is a much more in-
teractive relationship between intellectual property policy and other areas of pub-
lic policy. We find that at the international level. It is not just the WIPO and the
World Trade Organisation that are concerned with intellectual property, but there
are programs on intellectual property in the World Health Organisation (WHO),
UNESCO, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Food and Agricul-
tural Organisation, the International Telecommunication Union and so forth. Cur-
rently, intellectual property is being scrutinized from the perspective of other pub-
lic policies. Geographically, we have had also enormous changes, and the one in
particular I would like to point out is the geopolitical shift in technological genera-
tion. In terms of resonant patent application, we see an enormous change coming
out of North-East Asia, in particular Japan, the Republic of Korea and China.
Source: WIPO
Figure 3. Geopolitical shifts in technology generation: resident patent
applications in North East Asia
Resident patent application filed within the country have increased by nearly
300 % in the Republic of Korea over the last ten years and by nearly 500 % in
China. If one indeed looks at the top patent offices around the world she finds that
of the first five, three come fromNorth-East Asia. In terms of applications received
it is first Japan, then United States, the European Patent Office (representing now
32 countries), the Republic of Korea, and China, which are very close behind the
European Patent Office.
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Figure 4. Top 20 offices of filing (2004)
Internationally the same development is reflected in the patent cooperation treaty,
at the level of international patent applications. The growth rate from Japan in
2005 was 22 %, 32 % from the Republic of Korea and 46 % from China. Hence
currently those three countries, aggregated simply on the basis of this surge of
growth and their geographic proximity, generate one quarter of the new technol-
ogy for which property rights are being applied internationally. The same has hap-
pened with the respect to the output of science and technology articles, where
China is now the sixth biggest producer of science and technology (S&T) articles
and the Republic of Korea the twelfth largest producer of S&T articles.
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Figure 5. Scientific and technical articles, by country/region (1988–2003)
Finally, with respect to technology itself, we observe a big transformation. I will
selectively choose two examples. One is in terms of quantity. We are currently
generating around the world 850,000 new inventions for which patents are being
applied, as I mentioned, and 1.3 million peer reviewed science, technology and
medical articles per year. This mirrors an enormous increase in technology and the
technological base. As (Audretsch, ibid.) highlights, technology is reaching fur-
ther back into science, particularly in the biomedical area, and university’s patent-
ing and licensing is growing enormously. One can measure these phenomena
through the references in granted patents to non-patented technologies, to what we
call the “non-patented literature”, or science and engineering articles. The times
these articles are cited as prior art or pre-existing technology is rising very rapidly
in terms of universities’ own activities. In 2003, 1 billion dollars was earned in
gross royalties by United States universities.
Intellectual property: A system under stress
As can be easily guessed on the basis of the facts highlighted, the intellectual prop-
erty system is a system that is under enormous stress.
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On the one hand, there is functional stress, as there are growing backlogs in the
system. Patent offices do not have the capacity to deal with the demand well at this
stage. Quality is being put at stake and there are complaints about “bad patents”.
Moreover, we have been changing business models and litigation. Besides we ob-
serve the emergence of patent holding companies whose aim is not to exploit pat-
ented technologies for e.g. manufacturing purposes. Their aim is solely to use pat-
ents, amongst other devices, to generate either royalties through licensing or
through litigation. On the top of all these sources of tension, we have been observ-
ing an explosion of counterfeiting and pirating, largely as a result of the invention
of technologies of perfect imitation, biotechnology and digital technologies.
On the other hand, we also have a great deal of political stress in the system. Inter-
nationally, one of the consequences of this is that we really have two competing
agendas out there. An agenda, very much pushed by the industrialised countries,
concerns the functionality of the system. The other agenda, mainly backed by de-
veloping countries, is mainly political. Basically their argument is that they did not
create the increase in demand that we observe, which is causing this functional
stress, and they do not want to use valuable policy time, at the international level,
to discuss simple functionality. They want to look at the impact of intellectual
property rights on areas of public policy such as health, the environment, agricul-
ture and so forth.
One of the big questions and challenges will hence be how and to what extent
making these seemingly parallel agendas actually converge in the future.
Looking for solutions: Possible pathways
I believe there are no easy solutions to any of the issues at stake, as they are very
radical ones. Still there might exist pathways that might lead to resolve some of the
tensions. I would, in particular, envisage five of them.
Broadening the policy focus
Firstly, it is necessary to reconsider the very basis of intellectual property, that is
the underlying policy incentive for the encouragement of innovation and creativ-
ity. Indeed there are other issues at the basis of IP. However, a fundamental aim of
the patent, design and copyright systems is trying to encourage innovation, that is
invention and the commercialisation of the invention and the creativity involved.
As such, IP is really and simply a tool. Perhaps we should shift the focus a little to-
wards this underlying interest and allow for an inclusive discussion about other
models of innovation rather than intellectual property alone. This does not imply
underestimating the importance of intellectual property but, as we know, there are
other models. Besides, what we are increasingly talking about is not intellectual
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property policy, but knowledge policy, i.e. a broader policy concerning the gener-
ation, transmission, and the use of knowledge, in particular new knowledge.
Geography
Secondly, in relation to the geographical changes that have occurred in the system,
there are three features we need to pay attention to. One is the accessibility of tech-
nology. In fact, the increasing linguistic diversity in the technological base is a ma-
jor issue for us all. As far as WIPO is concerned we have two measures under way.
One is that we actually provide, for any international patent application and re-
gardless of the language of filing, a summary in English and in French. Moreover,
our website offers online access to the full back file of those 1.3 million interna-
tional patent applications. We are also constructing a multi-lingual search system
based on a terminological database, which will use automatic translation tools to
get the application. Linguistic diversity also raises an important question about the
comprehensive nature of an international search of prior art. Of course, talking
about bad patents means talking about patents that should not have been granted as
the idea, the invention, already existed in what we technically call “prior art”, i.e.
pre-existing technology. However, the increasingly linguistically diverse prior art
or technological base put in question the comprehensive nature of the search itself.
At WIPO we have put forward a technical proposal for cooperation between patent
officials in this regard, but certainly this is an issue to which we should pay a sig-
nificant amount of attention.
Development
A third piece of the broader pathway I would like to highlight is the issue of devel-
opment. Although development constitutes an immensely complicated problem, I
would like to put forward a couple of points about the issue. The first is that we of-
ten fail to contextualize the role of intellectual property. Let me compare apples
and oranges for a moment. In 2004 five corporations spent more on R&D than the
individual GDPs of 53 countries in the world. These are Microsoft ($ 7.8 billion),
Pfizer ($ 7.7 billion), Ford ($ 7.4 billion), DaimlerChrysler ($ 7 billion) and Toy-
ota ($ 7 billion)1. This implies that each of these firms spent more on the creation of
new knowledge than 53 countries each did with respect to their whole infrastruc-
ture, health system, education and, more generally, public expenditures. More-
over, the top 1000 public corporate spenders on R&D spent more in 2004 ($ 384
billion) than the GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa in 20022. Evidently, this is just one
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1 Sources: Booz Allen Hamilton Global Innovation 1000
2 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2004
way of contextualizing intellectual property. Still, I believe we often get stuck at
the international level because developing countries have a more political agenda
rather than an economic concept. Moreover, there exist massive diversities in the
economic circumstances of the various developing countries and treating them as a
whole group is a disservice. A disservice to them and to the broader international
ability to create a more differentiated system of intellectual property rights.
Population GNP
$ Billions
Rank Per Capita
Income (PPP)
Rank
Brazil 174 494.5 12 2,830 91
India 1,049 494.8 11 470 161
Kenya 31 11.2 85 360 174
Laos 6 1.7 153 310 176
Mozambique 18 3.6 128 200 195
PNG 5 2.8 140 530 158
Source: World Bank, 2004 World Development Indicators
Figure 6. Differences in conditions among developing countries
Secondly, a much underestimated issue is that there has been a quiet democratiza-
tion of the access to technology. Merely ten years ago the world’s patent collec-
tions – which by the way constitute the most comprehensive systematic and organ-
ised record of humanity’s technologies – were only available in paper format. One
had to go to the place where the paper collection was stored in order to have access
to the technology sought. They are now available online in fully searchable form.
It should not be neglected that unlocking the technology available through the pat-
ent system is an enormous task. This is justified by the very rationale of the patent
system, that is to encourage the disclosure of technology. Let me give you just one
example, the rollerblade. It may not be the most socially useful invention, but the
rollerblade was patented in the United States of America in 1932 and it fell into the
public domain in 1949. And that is probably about 30 or 40 years before the com-
mercial trend of having rollerblades started. In fact, there are many such examples
available.
Functionality and the management of demand
With respect to functionality, I believe that the present model, whereby an inven-
tion and a patent application are searched repeatedly in patent offices around the
world, constitutes a misallocation of resources. Besides, this very inefficient allo-
cation of resources does not produce the best results. A network approach could in-
stead produce much more interesting results. It is simply not possible for small de-
veloping countries with scarce resources to have 6000 post-graduate examiners to
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examine patent applications as the United States Patent and Trademark Office or
others do. Our challenge is thus to find ways to intensify international cooperation
and to oil the mechanics of the system, while at the same time leaving some public
policy flexibilities in areas that are sensitive at the national level. Unfortunately,
we are not succeeding in doing so, at the moment.
Multilateralism
We have observed a very radical change in the architecture of the intellectual prop-
erty system in the course of the last fifteen years. We used to have an “à la carte”
system whereby one was able to choose from a variety of possible solutions. That
was the system enabled by the Paris convention and the Bern convention, each of
which had articles envisaging the possibility of concluding special agreements be-
tween certain members. We have many examples of that, with treaties differing
also in the numbers of contracting parties. Now, after the TRIPS agreement, the
system has rather become a system of “menu de jour”, that means that there is no
other way of approaching the matter. It is a vastly different system, and a lot of the
tension we have seen is a result of this change. I think we need to reflect a little bit
about the sort of system architecture that we need for the future.
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2.3 Transnational corporations and the
globalization of R&D
T. Fredriksson
Introduction
The globalization of research and development (R&D) is attracting increased at-
tention from policymakers in both developed and developing countries. This arti-
cle highlights some of the main findings of the work conducted by the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), notably as reported in
the World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the Interna-
tionalization of R&D (UNCTAD, 2005). It starts by reviewing recent data that
shed new light on this phenomenon. It goes on to consider possible explanations to
the trends observed and concludes by considering possible implications for devel-
oped and developing countries.
R&D internationalization is accelerating
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are major actors within the R&D universe.
They account for the bulk of global business expenditures on R&D and are the
world leaders in terms of creating new technology and diffusing it internationally.
Some firms have R&D budgets matching the R&D expenditures of entire coun-
tries. For example, six TNCs (Ford, Pfizer, DaimlerChrysler, Siemens, Toyota and
General Motors) spent more than $ 5 billion on R&D in 2003. By comparison,
among developing economies, only Brazil, China, the Republic of Korea and Tai-
wan Province of China had larger R&D expenditures. TNCs also dominate new
patent registrations and lead innovation in management and organization. As
TNCs are the dominant players in the creation of new technology, it matters where
they undertake their R&D. Most countries are eager to attract R&D by TNCs in or-
der to connect their national innovation systems effectively with the TNCs’ global
R&D systems.
R&D – probably the most strategically sensitive business function – remains
among the least internationalized corporate activities. There are several reasons for
this “stickiness” of R&D location (Lall 1979). The often complex and tacit nature
of advanced technical knowledge makes it difficult and costly to locate the differ-
ent segments in different places. Research skills tend to develop in a cumulative
manner, so that centres that start early often retain or increase their lead. Such fac-
tors tend to confine innovative activity to specific locations or clusters within an
economy (Patel and Pavitt 1991). Moreover, foreign direct investment (FDI) the-
ory implicitly assumes that R&D, the source of the most important advantage of
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TNCs, would remain at home. Nevertheless, most large companies, particularly
those withmulti-plant operations and diverse products, have dispersed R&Dunits.
In fact, R&D internationalization is not a new phenomenon. In some form, it may
date back to the earliest days of FDI as investors have always had to adapt technol-
ogies (often through local R&D) to sell successfully in host countries (Safarian
1966, Brash 1969). However, the process as it is now evolving contains some in-
teresting new features.
The data situation related to R&D internationalization is generally unsatisfactory.
Still, available data for the past ten or so years paint a rather clear trend: the inter-
nationalization of R&D is gaining momentum. For example, R&D by major-
ity-owned foreign affiliates in total R&D by United States TNCs, rose from 11 %
to 13 % between 1994 and 2002. For Swedish TNCs, the share of R&D conducted
abroad rose from 22 % to 43 % between 1995 and 2003. German firms established
more overseas R&D centres in the 1990s than in the preceding 50 years combined
(Ambos 2005). In a cross-country survey, foreign to total R&D rose from 15 % in
1999 to 22 % in 2001 (Roberts 2001), a trend that has been confirmed also in other
studies (Edler et al 2002, von Zedtwitz and Gassmann 2002).
The picture varies considerably between different home countries (figure 1). An
UNCTAD survey of the largest R&D spenders in the world found that European
TNCs generally have the highest share of R&D abroad3. Within Western Europe,
the foreign part is particularly large in the case of companies from the United
Kingdom (66 %) and Switzerland (61 %). Conversely, Asian TNC’s are the least
internationalized in this respect; TNCs from Japan and the Republic of Korea have
only 15 % and 2 %, respectively, of their total R&D abroad4.
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3 Foreign is defined as the investment in countries outside home country, thus German investment in the
United Kingdom is considered foreign even if both of them are within the category of Western Europe
4 Previous studies (Roberts 2001, Edler et al. 2002, von Zedtwitz and Gassmann 2002) have also found that
Western European firms are the most internationalized. In the Edler et al. survey (p. 158), European firms
were estimated to spend one third of their R&D budget abroad in 2001, followed by companies fromNorth
America (32 %) and, distantly, by Japanese firms (11 %). In Roberts’ survey, Western European firms we-
re estimated to spend 35 % of their R&Dbudget abroad, followed by the North American firms (33 %) and
the Japanese firms (10 %). The discrepancy with the UNCTAD survey is due to the fact that the survey by
Roberts treated intra-European and intra-North American R&D flows as domestic.
Source: UNCTAD 2005
Figure 1. Share of foreign to total R&D
Another way of measuring the increased internationalization of R&D is to con-
sider the role of foreign affiliates in global R&D investments. According to
UNCTAD (2005), the share of foreign affiliates in global business expenditures
R&D increased from 10 % to 16 % between 1993 and 2002. Even more interest-
ingly, in the case of developing countries for which data exist, the share of foreign
affiliates increased from 2 % to 18 % during the same period – a much more rapid
growth than in developed countries. This is but one indicator of the growing role of
developing countries in the context of R&D globalization.
Growing role of developing countries
Traditionally, when R&D was done abroad it typically involved developed coun-
tries only. When developing countries occasionally were involved as host coun-
tries for R&D investment, the R&D conducted served primarily to adapt products
and services for the local host-country market. Even if such observations still ap-
ply for most developing countries, an acceleration has been observed in the
amount of R&D that is being undertaken by TNCs in selected developing coun-
tries. For example, between 1994 and 2002, the share of developing economies in
the total R&D spending by majority-owned affiliates of United States TNCs in-
creased from 7.6 % to 13.5 % (UNCTAD 2005).
A few developing economies have attracted the bulk of this R&D activity. Devel-
oping Asia is the most dynamic recipient. In the case of R&D expenditures by ma-
jority-owned foreign affiliates of United States TNCs, for example, the share of
developing Asia soared from 3% in 1994 to 10 % in 2002. The increase was partic-
ularly noticeable for China, Singapore, Hong Kong (China) and Malaysia. In the
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foreign R&D activities of Swedish TNCs the share of countries outside the Triad
more than doubled, from 2.5 % in 1995 to 7% in 2003. Various data on TNCs from
Germany and Japan confirm a growing importance of developing countries and
some economies in transition as locations for R&D (UNCTAD 2005).
Recent data on FDI projects suggests that the expansion of R&D to new locations
is gaining momentum. Of 1,773 FDI projects involving R&D worldwide during
the period 2002–2004 for which information was available, the majority (1,095)
was in fact set up outside the developed economies. The survey of the world’s larg-
est R&D spenders conducted by UNCTAD during 2004–2005 also found a grow-
ing importance of new R&D locations. A large proportion of the TNCs surveyed
already had an R&D presence in China, India or Singapore. The same survey pre-
dicted a further shift in terms of R&D locations towards some developing econo-
mies (figure 2). China was mentioned by the largest number of respondents for fu-
ture R&D expansion, followed by the United States. In third place was India. The
Russian Federation was also among the top 10 target locations. Other developing
economies mentioned as candidates for further R&D by some respondents were
the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand and Vietnam.
Few respondents indicated any plans to expand R&D to Latin America or Africa.
Source: UNCTAD
Figure 2. Prospective locations for new R&D during 2005–2009 by the world's
largest R&D spenders, (per cent of respondents citing the location)
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R&D in developing countries is becoming more complex
The sectoral distribution of R&D conducted in different locations varies consider-
ably by region and economy. In 2002, three-quarters of the R&D of United States
majority-owned foreign affiliates in developing Asia were related to computers
and electronic products, while in India over three-quarters of their R&D expendi-
ture went into services (notably software development). In Brazil and Mexico, on
the other hand, chemicals and transport equipment together accounted for over
half of all R&D by United States foreign affiliates.
TNCs carry out different types of R&D abroad. Foreign affiliates of TNCsmay un-
dertake adaptive R&D, which ranges from basic production support to the modify-
ing and upgrading of imported technologies. Innovative R&D involves the devel-
opment of new products or processes for local, regional or (eventually) global mar-
kets. Technology monitoring units are established to keep abreast of technological
development in foreign markets and to learn from leading innovators and clients
there (UNCTAD 2005).
While it is difficult to quantify R&D by type, among developing host economies
evidence points to the predominance of Asia in innovative R&D for international
markets. R&D activities in selected Asian economies such as China, India, the Re-
public of Korea and Taiwan Province of China are becoming increasingly impor-
tant within the global R&D networks of TNCs. Some of the innovative R&D con-
ducted is cutting edge, as in the semiconductor industry (Ernst, 2005). One of the
earliest to move production into developing countries, this industry has also been
among the first to move advanced design to Asia. In the case of chip design, the
share of developing Asia has increased from basically zero a bit more than ten
years ago to 30% of all investment in chip design.
TNCs have so far located limited R&D in Latin America. Relatively little FDI in
this region is in R&D-intensive activities; when it is, the R&D conducted is mostly
confined to the adaptation of technology or products for local markets, called
“tropicalization” in the Latin American context. Some important exceptions exist
e.g. in Brazil and Mexico. In Africa, the R&D component of FDI is generally very
low; with the exception of some countries such as Morocco and, especially, South
Africa, R&D by TNCs is virtually non-existent. This is partly because of weak do-
mestic R&D capabilities, and the absence of institutional mechanisms that create
sufficient incentives for investors to devote resources to R&D (UNCTAD 2005).
Why is it happening now?
This new wave of R&D internationalization is both expected and unexpected. It is
expected for two reasons. First, as TNCs increase their production in developing
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countries, some R&D is bound to follow. Second, like other services, R&D activi-
ties are “fragmenting”, with different activities being performed in separate loca-
tions according to their comparative advantages. It is unexpected in that R&D is a
service activity with very demanding skill, knowledge and support needs, tradi-
tionally met only in developed countries with strong national innovation systems.
Moreover, R&D has traditionally been taken to be one the least “fragmentable”
economic activities because it involves knowledge that is strategic to firms, and
because it often requires dense knowledge exchange between users and producers
within localized clusters. So why is it happening now?
The process is driven by a complex interaction of push and pull factors.
On the push side, intense competition is forcing companies to innovate more,
while keeping their costs down. A combination of increased complexity of the
R&D work, rising costs and an insufficient number of certain engineering and sci-
entific manpower in industrialized countries compel firms to explore new sources
of low-cost and highly qualified researchers. On the pull side are a greatly im-
proved availability of scientific and engineering skills at competitive costs, the
continuing globalization of manufacturing activities, and fast growth in some key
emerging markets. Contrary to previous research on R&D internationalization, re-
cent studies have found cost reduction to be one of the main drivers of expanding
TNC R&D in countries like China and India (Ambrecht 2003, Reddy 2000).
The expanding pool of talent in selected developing countries and economies in
transition is particularly important, especially for companies that fail to find a suf-
ficient number of skilled human resources in their home countries. The global sup-
ply of skilled people has increased rapidly thanks to a dramatic rise in the number
of students enrolled in higher education outside the developed world. At the turn of
the century, China, India and Russia together accounted for almost a third of all
tertiary technical students in the world. Even if the quality of education varies, the
fact that the number of tertiary students in these and other economies continues to
grow rapidly is bound to have an impact on the way companies source skills for
their future R&D activities. In addition, more scientists and engineers working
abroad are returning to China and India to perform R&D in foreign affiliates or lo-
cal firms.
The current trend can be expected to continue. First, the competitive pressure on
firms is likely to remain intense, requiring more innovation. Second, the need for
greater flexibility in R&D in response to rapid technological change requires size-
able numbers of research staff with a range of specializations, and necessitates lo-
cating R&D activities where such pools of researchers are available. Third, ageing
populations in many developed countries may limit the supply of specialized,
up-to-date skills, forcing TNCs to look elsewhere for talent. Fourth, developing
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countries that take part in the internationalization of R&D will progressively en-
hance their own ability to conduct more R&D. At present however, it appears that
only a few developing countries led by China, India and some economies of
South-East Europe and the CIS can effectively meet the conditions required to par-
ticipate.
What are the implications?
Innovative activity is essential for economic growth and development. Greater
openness to trade and capital flows increases the imperative of local technological
effort. Liberalization hasmade it necessary for firms – be they large or small, in de-
veloped or developing countries – to acquire the technological and innovative ca-
pabilities needed to become or stay competitive. R&D is only one source of inno-
vation, but it is an important one. In the early stages of technological activity enter-
prises may not need formal R&D departments. As they mature, however, they find
it increasingly important to monitor, import and implement new technologies. The
role of formal R&D grows as a firm attempts significant technological improve-
ments and tackles product or process innovation. For complex and fast-moving
technologies it is a crucial part of the learning process.
No single country can produce all the knowledge needed to stay competitive and to
grow in a sustained manner. Countries are therefore eager to connect with interna-
tional networks of innovation. Outward and inward FDI in R&D are two ways of
doing so. R&D internationalization opens up new opportunities for developing
countries to access technology, build high-value-added products and services, de-
velop new skills and foster a culture of innovation through spillovers to local firms
and institutions. R&D internationalization can help countries strengthen their in-
novation systems and upgrade industrially and technologically, enabling them to
perform more demanding functions, handle more advanced equipment and make
more complex products.
So, the process of R&D internationalization means important opportunities for
those developing countries that become better connected to the global R&D sys-
tems of TNCs. As noted above, it is mainly selected economies in Asia that have
seen major benefits from this globalization process. A review of the policies ap-
plied in these economies shows that they – in different ways and to varying de-
grees – have adopted dedicated policies in many areas in order to become more
competitive from a knowledge perspective and to improve their national innova-
tion systems. Various approaches have been used, but throughout there has been a
strong focus on developing human resources, public research activities and IPR
protection. Moreover, they have also actively sought to leverage the activities of
TNCs. This has been a powerful combination.
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Developing countries that remain de-linked from the global R&D networks of
TNCs may risk falling further behind in terms of innovation performance. Coun-
tries with relatively weak innovation capabilities should not expect any immediate
influx of R&D by TNCs. However, that should not be an excuse for a lack of ac-
tion. Rather, they may consider how to begin a process through which economic
and technological upgrading could be fostered. For latecomers, an essential first
step is to ensure that a process is initiated aimed at strengthening their national in-
novation systems. The policy experience of several Asian economies over the past
decades may provide useful inspiration in this context.
For developed countries, the new trends imply both opportunities and challenges.
The national innovation systems in developed countries as well are in a position to
benefit from new possibilities to collaborate with firms and institutions in develop-
ing countries, and to alleviate some of the shortage of skills that currently charac-
terizes certain industries in developed countries. The possibility to allocate more
R&D activities in new locations may help them to stay competitive. It should be
underlined that R&D investments in India or China does not automatically imply a
reduction of R&D investments in developed countries. Rather, given the rising
need for innovation, R&D could be expected to increase in both developed and de-
veloping countries.
At the same time, globalization of R&D also means greater competition for R&D
investments. The overall implication is that, for countries at all levels of develop-
ment, it becomes increasingly important to pay attention to the strengths and weak-
nesses of their national innovation systems, and to see how those innovation sys-
tems can connect in the best way with the activities of both their own companies
and foreign companies that may want to invest into the countries. For the world as
a whole, this recent trend of R&D internationalization should help speed up the in-
novation process and facilitate more cross-border flows of knowledge and technol-
ogy. More R&D can be performed and in new ways, hopefully helping to find new
solutions to various problems.
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2.4 Knowledge economies: a global perspective
J.-E. Aubert
5
Introduction
It is generally held that what cannot be measured does not exist. Hence, would we
not use indicators about the knowledge economy we might end up thinking that it
does not exist. However, we are not sure that indicators mirror reality, that they
capture what the economy really is. Still, qualitative features are impossible to
measure, and they might not reflect reality either. It is therefore necessary to docu-
ment the quantitative aspects of the knowledge economy vis-à-vis some
benchmarking elements, while offering some socio-cultural and qualitative per-
spectives. This is exactly what we have been doing at World Bank Institute, within
the Knowledge Development Program.
Defining knowledge economies
Since the first day of mankind, it has been knowledge to make the difference be-
tween, for instance, apes and humans. It is hence puzzling why we currently speak
so much about the so-called “knowledge economy”. It has always been there. Pos-
sibly the reason why we do so is because we use more of our grey matter, more of
our brain than in the past. Many are the catchwords used to reflect some of trends
characterising our era: information society, post-industrial era, knowledge econ-
omy, intellectual capital, and so on. These trends are in fact best illustrated by fig-
ure 1.
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5 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be ascribed to the World Bank
and its Member Countries
Source: Autor, Levy, and Murnane, The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003
Figure 1. Changes in job task-skill demands, USA, 1960–1998
In US all the routine cognitive and manual tasks were declining over the 90’s and
before. They were substituted by more complex communication skills and expert
thinking. This is what is behind the knowledge economy. Of course, in addition
there is the globalisation process, also enabled by the information, communication
and telecommunication revolution. Increased global knowledge and development
of new technologies, rapid speed of innovation, shorter product life cycles, greater
importance of intangibles, productivity and up-skilling of labor force, as well as
intensified globalization and competition, have all characterized the “Knowledge
Revolution”. Ultimately, it is this ability to use, create and adapt knowledge that is
really making the difference in the competitiveness capability of countries.
Measuring knowledge-based economies
The question is how to measure the knowledge-based economy. If what matters is
the intangible foundation of the economy, then we have to measure the compo-
nents of this intangible base. And that includes, of course, education, which in
turns relate to the information infrastructure and, more broadly, the national inno-
vation system. Here I join David Audretsch (ibid.) in stating the importance of en-
trepreneurship and of the broader economic and institutional framework, in which
all the investments in knowledge and information can yield results. Such a frame-
work is fundamental, and we need to capture it through indicators related to gover-
nance, the rule of law, the business environment and so on. This is what we are try-
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ing to do at the World Bank Institute, through a benchmarking methodology based
on existing databases. We have built a “KAM”, i.e. a knowledge assessment meth-
odology6 based on 80 structural/qualitative variables. These aim at benchmarking
performance over four main pillars. Variables are normalized from 0 (worst) to 10
(best) for 128 countries. The benchmark is based on ranking and not on absolute
values. The basic scorecard entails 14 variables measured at two points in time,
1995 and 2004 (most recent available). We thus obtain an aggregate Knowledge
Economy Index (KEI).
Let me offer some examples, for instance the Finish scorecard.
Figure 2. Basic scorecard: Finland and G7
As can be seen from figure 2, we can, for instance, compare the G7 and Finland.
There are two variables at the top, which are related to the performance of the
economy, GDP growth and the Human Development Index. Then you have three
variables related to the economic and institutional framework, including trade bar-
riers, regulatory quality and rule of law. There also are three variables related to the
R&D system. We do not use data for measuring innovation, but refer to research
and R&D, publications in scientific and technical journals and patent applications.
Three variables are related to education: tertiary enrolment, secondary enrolment
and the literacy rate. Last we include three variables related to the information in-
frastructure, namely: Internet users, computer owners and telephone owners. The
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6 The database is accessible at www.theworldbank.org/wbi/kam
country’s position is mirrored by the red line: the closer it is to the outside circle
the better off the country is, i.e. the better ranked in the world it is.
As can be seen, the variables we use are in fact basic variables that can be found in
all database. To calculate the Knowledge Economy Index we then simply average
the 12 knowledge economy variables mentioned.
CGI WEF KEI WBI
Country 2005 Country Rank (most)
Finland 1 Sweden 1
USA 2 Finland 2
Sweden 3 USA 3
Denmark 4 Denmark 4
Taiwan 5 Norway 5
Singapore 6 Canada 6
Iceland 7 Australia 7
Switzerland 8 Switzerland 8
Norway 9 Netherland 9
Australia 10 UK 10
Figure 3. Competitiveness and the knowledge economy
Figure 3 compares the rank of countries according to, respectively, the World
Economy Forum and the Knowledge Economy Index. As it can be noticed, there
are some important overlaps.
Another interesting feature of the Knowledge Economy Index is the possibility to
relate it to the economic performance and the GDP per capita.
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Figure 4. Knowledge economy index (KEI) and GDP per capita
As it emerges from Figure 4, there exists a strong correlation between the Knowl-
edge Economy Index and the GDP per capita. Knowledge is hence critically linked
to economic performance. However, correlation does not mean causality. Never-
theless, we have the link between knowledge related investments, the Knowledge
Economy Index and future economic growth. The results we have are, in fact, posi-
tive. There seem to exist a strong correlation, whatever the level of development
considered, and this is an important result that we have obtained. In fact, beyond a
simply correlation, there seem to be a causality between the knowledge economy
investments, performance and the future economic growth. I here show only two
charts where we compare the situation of ten years ago with the most recent data
we have (2003–2004 data).
The first one, in figure 5, concerns the Knowledge Economy Index. The countries
above the 45-degree lines are those that have improved their relative ranking over
the ten year period considered. Below the diagonal are instead those countries
whose relative ranking has declined. By relative ranking we mean that a country is
shown below the 45 degrees line even if it has made strong investments in its
knowledge economy performance variables, but its effort is relatively less impor-
tant than the rest of the 120 countries in database.
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Figure 5. Knowledge economy index
The 45 degrees line points out the general knowledge economy trend of countries:
invest more and more in education, research and so on. However, some are invest-
ing more or improving more their economic and institutional frameworks than oth-
ers. This is exactly what we try to capture. For instance one sees that China has
made substantial improvements. Evidently, the more advanced a country the less it
needs to invest, compared to a developing country. This is the reason why many
developed countries show a relatively declining pattern. But this is due to the exis-
tence of catching up processes and these are the ones we are mostly interested in
capturing at the World Bank.
For instance, we also see that India’s competitive position has declined slightly,
with respect to that had in 1995, despite all the progresses made in terms of, for in-
stance, education and ICTs. In any case, these indicators have to be considered
with great carefulness.
The type of graphs shown allows us to have a very general idea of where countries
are going. Moreover, data are updated every six months or every year, in order to
better support the analysis of both strengths and weaknesses. It can, for instance,
be seen that, the best performers among the advanced Economies are Finland,
other Nordic Countries, Canada, Australia. Conversely, the US shows a slight de-
cline and Japan is somewhat behind, although in a stable position. Among the tran-
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sition economies, the best performers have been the EU accessed countries, while
Russia is recovering from its crisis (keeping its rank compared to 1995). In the case
of developing countries, we see China catching up quickly (more than India). In
Latin America, we observe Brazil moving up, whereas Argentina is declining (due
to EIR). In theMiddle East and North Africa we observe good performances, as for
instance those of the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Tunisia. Finally South
Asian and African countries are generally lagging behind, with few countries un-
dergoing a catching up process (e.g. Bangladesh, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozam-
bique).
A qualitative perspective on knowledge economies
Over the last century we have observed a general trend whereby Western countries
have been the main source of scientific progress. The Far East as well as North and
East Asia have been leaders in applying technologies, whereas the Southern coun-
tries have mainly lagged behind. The question hence arises of how to put these
countries’ performance in an anthropological context.
In fact, if one wants to approach such qualitative aspects, she needs to put the inno-
vation system into the broader development system, which relates to finance, in-
dustry, economy, education and so on. In turn, all these aspects have to be framed
within the broader societal system, which is related to various cultural dimensions.
We can, for instance, compare two different types of approach, which would con-
tribute to explain the differences between Western and Eastern production systems.
Great differences emerge with respect to the way the East is functioning as com-
pared to the West, notably in the relationship between science and technology.
Table 1. East-West behavioural contrasts and innovation climates
West East
Behavioural Contrasts
Western distancing Eastern immersion
• Science separate from technology • Science and technology as a single notion
• State separate from society • State as part of society
• Individualistic exploration of the un-
known
• Collective adoption of the known
Innovation Climates
• Importance of science-based innova-
tions
• Technology/production-driven innovations
• Technology leaders (radical innova-
tions…)
• Technology followers (FDI, licenses)
• Public/private system with “rule of law” • Connection-based system (Guangi)
• Stock exchange bubble-induced reces-
sion, durable slowdown
• Financial crisis (induced by connection-based
economy)
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The way the state is integrated into society and the approach to knowledge are
completely different. The distinction that exists is clear and, in a certain sense, ho-
listic, as the different dimensions are connected by the same type of views and
mindsets: one more distant from reality, the other more merged with reality. Such
differences are fundamental and they might also help explaining the current emer-
gence of Asia, where the state is part of the society and hence powerful industrial
policies can be put in place. This also contributes to explain why Asians have
shown an enormous capacity in achieving new scientific and technological devel-
opments, and the way these are more and more interlinked. We should be aware of
such issues as the trends we are currently observing might continue over the long
run. Besides, the anthropological features mentioned may for instance also have
implications in the way financial crises emerge in those countries.
Table 2. Western profiles and development systems
Anglo-Saxon Latin-Mediterranean Rhine-German
Ethos Exposed individualism Protected
individualism
Co-operative
individualism
Industry High tech/ res. nat State based high tech Medium size industry
Education Elitist, in-equalitarian
Concrete
Democratic, but
in-equalitarian
Abstract
Dual (school-
enterprise)
Research Broad Math/phys
specialization
Eng. Specialization
Finance Stock exchange/
venture cap
Bank Bank/industry
When it comes to Europe, we can observe several societal models and, in particu-
lar, the Anglo-Saxon, the Latin-Mediterranean, the Rhine-German and the Nordic
one. Basically the way society is organised has been extremely individualistic in
the Anglo-Saxon countries. Conversely, the Latin Mediterranean envisage the
protection of individuals by means of institutions, governments, trade unions and
so on. The Rhein-German ethos is instead more related to cooperative individual-
ism and has a lot of implications in the way industry, education and research are or-
ganised. One must be aware of all these feature also because European integration
is not going to happen “overnight”. The way European integration is going to be
implemented will change according to the specific culture considered.
The relevance of the cultural factor can also be deduced by having a look at the
success stories of the past 20–34 years as Finland, Taiwan, Ireland, Israel and
South Korea. What do they have in common? First of all they are islands, either
geographically or culturally speaking, and they have in the past experienced enor-
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mous pressures such as crisis, threats of various type, etc.. Secondly, they have
shown a genuine capability to mobilize their inner resources, both human and fi-
nancial, and to take advantage of external inputs, knowledge inputs in particular.
Econometric evidence confirms that being an island, geographically or culturally,
is a growth booster. Hence creating a sense of island under pressure may be a key
successful policy drive for development and growth. This could apply not only at
the national level, but also at the infra national level – regions, cities – as well as
the supra national level.
The above mentioned elements can, for instance, can all be encountered in the case
of Finland. The World economic Forum ranks Finland as the most competitive na-
tion in the world. Finland also ranks first in education (OECD), governance (WB)
and innovation (UNDP). A feature that characterises this country is its exceptional
pragmatism and its communitarian sense. Besides, Finland has undergone a strong
crisis in the early 1990s (after the fall of the of URSS) and constitutes a “cultural
lone wolf”, made of both Western and Asian cultures (B. Lewis).
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2.5 Cross-border technology flows in a globalised
world
P. Mohnen
Introduction
To begin with it is important to make a fundamental distinction between spillovers
and technology transfer. Technology transfer refers to trade in technology. It hap-
pens when an agent sells a piece of technology with a price attached to the transac-
tion. A spillover, on the contrary, refers to a transfer of knowledge in which no
payment is involved. Moreover it must be unintended, because as soon as an agent
is able to internalize the knowledge spilt over, it is not any longer strictly speaking
a spillover.
It is also important to distinguish two kinds of spillovers: pecuniary and knowl-
edge spillovers. Pecuniary spillovers, also called rent spillovers, relate to a transfer
of rents. They arise as a result of imperfect price discrimination and imperfect in-
formation. For instance, when buying a computer, the price one pays does not re-
flect the real value of the computer to the buyer, as the seller is not able to extract
the full value of the computer to the buyer. The impossibility of implementing a
perfect price discrimination scheme implies that the buyer obtains some rents out
of the innovation done by the first agent. Knowledge spillovers, instead, relate to
the transmission of knowledge and to the fact that knowledge is a non-rival and
partly non-excludable good. Hence, it is not possible to prevent somebody from
using part of the knowledge that somebody else has created, and knowledge can be
used by two different persons without losing any of its content.
Knowledge spillovers and channels of transmission
In order to understand how spillovers occur, one needs to understand how knowl-
edge gets transmitted. There are various channels of transmission. First of all,
spillovers can occur as a by-product of trade. They can be proportional to the
amount of trade taking place between two countries, which can be trade in goods,
intermediate inputs, capital goods, commodities and so on. The idea is that knowl-
edge gets transmitted when two parties interact, or when the knowledge is incorpo-
rated in the object that is being transacted. Spillovers can also be the result of For-
eign Direct Investments (FDIs). For example, by investing in an underdeveloped
country, onemay transmit some knowledge to the host country itself. Furthermore,
spillovers can be proportional to the movement of personnel. They can occur at
meetings, fares, conferences and, more generally, at any social event. Collabora-
tion in research, Research Joint Ventures (RJV), are natural candidates for
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spillover transmission. Finally, purchases of know-how, licenses and patents can
produce spillovers to the extent that the prices of these technological transactions
do not reflect the full benefit for the buyer, in the sense that more knowledge is pur-
chased than paid for.
Knowledge spillovers may occur at different levels. There might be within-firm
spillovers, i.e. between teams/groups within a certain firm, as well as between
firms spillovers. Spillovers may occur between firms belonging to the same indus-
try but also between industries, within a country or between countries, and so on.
Modelling spillovers
Looking at the history of the literature on spillovers, in the early work of Griliches
(1979) and Mansfield (1965) the idea was to estimate a production function, where
output (Q
it
) is explained by means of a certain number of inputs (X
it
):
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denotes the own stock of Research and Development (R&D), a proxy for the
stock of knowledge. S
it
is the stock of knowledge of all the other agents from
which i benefits, i.e. spillovers. There also is an index of technological changeT
it
and some random component 
it
. Spillovers are then measured as a sum of the
R&D of all the other agents, with j i , where the R&D from the other sources is
weighted by a factor a
jt
. Initially, the idea was to simply sum up and give the same
weight to all originators of knowledge. However, as it wasmisleading not to attrib-
ute more weight to those knowledge sources from which one learns more, weight-
ing factors were later used to better mirror the relevance of the various channels of
knowledge. It does indeed make a lot of sense to suppose that one gains more from
someone else the more one purchases from this agent, sells to her, cooperates with
her and so on. Weights can also reflect direct and indirect effects like, for instance,
with the Leontief inverse matrix. The weighting factor can mirror the FDI flows
between the sender and the receiver, or be proportional to patent citations – that is,
the more you cite a patent, the more you are supposed to get knowledge from that
patent. The weighting can be proportional to cooperation agreements, R&D per-
sonnel, innovation and so on. It can also be proportional to proximity.
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Proximity and spillovers: Some stylised facts
When saying proximity I refer to a position or a proximity in a certain space. How-
ever, space can be defined in various ways. One type of space could be the patent
space, i.e. the idea that the more two agents patent in the same patent classes, the
closer they are to each other, the more they may benefit from each other. Space can
also be defined by the type of research that is carried out. Hence proximity in space
in this case may mean that you hire the same kind of scientists and engineers, with
the same kind of degrees, or that you have the same kind of specialisation, basi-
cally because you work in the same lines of business. Awhole literature has looked
at the different ways of measuring spillovers. Then, in 1998, came this article by
Keller where he simply used random numbers as weights. He found that, with this
kind of weighting, one basically gets similar results to those obtained by using in-
put-output coefficients. In other words, his results point to the fact that the partic-
ular type of weighting used may not be that important.
Significant spillovers of R&Dor innovative activity in general have been observed
at different levels of aggregation: at the project level, the firm level, the industry
level, or the country level. Given these findings, few people would disagree that
spillovers exist. Besides, knowledge spillovers are generally found to be positive,
although there are also arguments to believe that spillovers can be detrimental. Ev-
idently, in the sameway as one may benefit from the R&D done by one’s competi-
tors (by learning from them or extracting rents from their R&D), one may also suf-
fer losses of market shares. Generally, however, spillovers have been found to be
positive, thus ending up having a positive sign in the equation explaining produc-
tivity.
In this respect, an important stylised fact has emerged regarding private and social
returns to R&D. It has been estimated that the social rate of return to investing in
knowledge exceeds the private rate, the difference between the private and social
rates being determined by the spillover phenomenon. As an order of magnitude,
estimates suggest that the social rate exceeds the private one by about 50 %, but
quite a bit of variation exists among different firms, industries and so on.
Another stylised fact that has been observed regards the absorption hypothesis
and, in particular, the complementarity of spillovers and own R&D activities. This
implies that agents have to perform some R&D to be able to benefit from
spillovers.
The studies that have investigated the existence and the direction of spillovers in
general do not explain how spillovers occur.
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How and why: Explaining spillovers
Evidence suggests that R&D spillovers are set to vary. In line with the absorption
hypothesis, they vary, for instance, with the size of the firm, the technological ad-
vancement of the receiver and so on. Differences in spillovers also exist depending
upon the type of research carried out, the institutions involved and the level of in-
tellectual protection granted.
For instance, more spillovers arise from academic R&D than from defence R&D.
This may be due, as some have argued, to intellectual property rights being im-
posed too early in a research venture. Indeed, there exists a trade-off between pro-
tecting knowledge and fostering R&D when giving incentives for R&D by grant-
ing intellectual property rights. Doing so confers a monopoly right, a right to re-
strict knowledge flows from being transmitted to, and used by, others.
In any case, whatever the quantity and type of spillovers we observe, the question
remains: how do spillovers occur? In particular: does proximity matter?
Proximity
A branch of the literature has addressed this interesting question by investigating
the geography of spillovers. The field was inaugurated by Adam Jaffe (1989), who
used patent data to track spillovers. Although his results are somewhat mixed, he
found that there were signs of spillovers between firms located close to universi-
ties and the universities themselves, i.e. spillovers from the academic world to the
business world. The paper was followed by a response from Acs, Audretsch and
Feldman (1992). They used innovation data from the SBIR dataset, in the US, and
found evidence of geographically bound spillover effects. Almost contemporane-
ously, Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) inaugurated a research path that
has since been used quite extensively by many researchers. They used patent cita-
tions data and found evidence of research spillovers. For instance, they found that
firms are more likely to cite the patents of other firms or individuals that are lo-
cated close to them than they are to cite patents belonging to firms located far
away.
Networking
Other studies instead find that location does not matter that much, but it is rather
the relational, the networking effect, that makes a difference. Basically, when two
agents are located in the same region, it is not because of location that they benefit
from spillovers, but rather because they are part of a network. The relevance of
such relational effects has been, for instance, underlined by Audretsch and
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Stephan (1996) and by Zucker, Darby and Armstrong (1998). For instance, they
find that, within a certain industry, the work of scientists coming fromwestern uni-
versities might have an effect on the east coast researchers. It is not location per se
that matters in this case, but rather the fact that scientists have contacts with per-
sons from the business world on the other side of the country. There also is an im-
portant piece of work by Breschi and Lissoni (2001), who look at networking ef-
fects among Italian firms. They find that networking is probably geographically
concentrated, but it is the networking activity, not the location, that matters. The
above studies are all examples of the work that has been done to understand how
spillovers occur.
Labour mobility
Another part of the literature looks at labour mobility as a channel through which
spillovers may occur. Using matched employer-employee data, Møen (2005) tries
to trace knowledge flows from employees creating spin-offs from subsidized IT
research. He finds that, although spillovers from IT research and labour mobility is
not that great, there exist spillovers that are internalized in the wages of the R&D
workers. The idea is that employers know that the R&D workers, in which they in-
vest, might leave or work for another company and such possibility is reflected in a
lower wage. In a paper in which I am involved with Maliranta and Rouvinen
(2006), we use Finnish employer-employee data. We find that hiring young edu-
cated R&D experienced workers increases productivity. All these results point out
that labour mobility is certainly one way of transmitting knowledge.
Spillovers from science
There also is a part of the literature that looks at spillovers from science. For in-
stance, there is the work of Squicciarini (2005) that looks at Science Parks in Fin-
land. She finds that spillovers occur when firms join the science park: the very fact
that you are part of that geographical concentration, or cluster of enterprises, helps
increasing productivity or innovativeness. There is also some work, like for in-
stance that of Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), that uses the information contained
in the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) data. There the question concerns the
various sources of knowledge for innovation, whether competitors, suppliers, cli-
ents, universities. In fact, in empirical studies universities often come out as affect-
ing positively and significantly innovativeness.
The economic policy of spillovers
Knowledge spillover are ultimately a leakage of knowledge, and that leakage can
create disincentives to perform and invest in R&D. If the knowledge one creates
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goes somewhere else, this leakage of funds may make the investor less willing to
train the personnel, to invest in human resources, and so on. Now, several devices
have been created in order to restore this incentive to invest in R&D. Among them,
intellectual property rights, tax incentives and public laboratories. Besides, the
government may directly finance research or give permissions to, for instance, cre-
ate R&D joint ventures. However, the question arises of why should policy makers
intervene. According to the neoclassical theory (see figure 1) agents should con-
sider their private marginal cost and benefit of carrying out R&D and stop invest-
ing when the two are equal (intersection of private benefit and marginal cost
curves).
Figure 1. Source of market failure: insufficient R&D
The intersection point represents the private optimal amount of R&D to perform.
However, when doing so, firms do not take into account the fact that, because of
spillovers, the social benefit arising from investing in R&D might be higher than
the private benefit. The pursuit of the social optimum would in fact require invest-
ing beyond the privately optimal level. Hence, governments have to intervene to
get firms to invest more, in order to achieve the socially optimal amount of R&D.
This explains why governments have a role to play with respect to innovation. The
reason is spillovers.
Whereas the existence of spillovers is hardly questioned, as there is a lot of evi-
dence pointing out their existence, it is not clear how spillovers occur. This makes
managing spillovers a wishful thinking. In fact, I believe we are far from being
able to suggest to governments specific measures aiming to achieve the social opti-
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mal. We are not able to clearly measure the exact amount of spillover generated or
available, nor it is clear which channel of transmission spillovers use.
A few policy measures can, however, be suggested for countries to better exploit
knowledge spillovers.
Possible ways forward
Firstly, it is important to build absorptive capacity, as we saw that there exist
complementarities between own knowledge and knowledge spillovers. Increasing
the absorptive capacity is, for instance, extremely important for developing coun-
tries, as that puts them in a better position to be able to benefit from the research
done by others. Secondly, to the extent that knowledge is tacit and spillovers are
localised, there is the need to increase interaction, networking and to create loci
where knowledge can be exchanged. The ultimate aim is to internalise spillovers
and this can be pursued by locating close to universities, partnering with Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs) or other potential spillover providers. Thirdly, it is
important to create markets for technologies. Once you have a market for a tech-
nology, then you can also attach a price tag to it. In a way, this implies following a
path similar to that followed in the analysis of productivity. There you have the
Solow residual, i.e. the part of growth that cannot be explained through labour and
capital accumulation. One may try to reduce the Solow residual and explain it in
terms of quality, returns to scale and so on. By decreasing that residual there will
be less left, and that is somehow what we are doing here: we are trying to decrease
the amount of spillovers. Ideally, that could be a way to solve the problem, i.e. hav-
ing markets where selling and purchasing knowledge: once you have markets for
technologies there are no longer spillovers.
Finally, let me hint at negative R&D spillovers. Examples of negative spillovers
are the duplication of R&D activities, occurring when firms are in a patent race and
all agents want to be the first to achieve the desired result. This leads to the situa-
tion where several firms perform the same kind of R&D. On the one hand, this can
be socially beneficial as it may encourage the competing agents to work harder, in-
vest more and possibly achieve results in a shorter time. This may even lead to
ex-post cross-licensing with the other contenders. However, this also constitutes a
social waste of resources, as the same R&D activity is carried out twice. Another
example of negative spillovers is the use of R&D as a strategic weapon. What I am
referring to is the literature on strategic decision-making. Negative R&D
spillovers are, in that case, intentions to block or discourage new entrants, or to de-
liberately send wrong signals about the research directions pursued. Such dynam-
ics are also of relevance to the analysis of mergers and acquisitions and, more gen-
erally, competition policy. However, I still believe that R&D is mostly used in or-
der to advance knowledge or, at the very least, to keep up with competitors.
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2.6 Creating value in a digital era: the next
chapter in the IT revolution
J. Zysman
Introduction
The notion of a global knowledge economy has become conventional and often
misleading. Although the economic world grows ever more interconnected, it is
certainly not flat (Zysman in Zysman and Newman, 2006). Rather, it involves a se-
quence of national and local stories played on a larger stage, giving the world a
spiked development dependent on national choices. Moreover, while knowledge
has always mattered to economic growth, the place of knowledge has only been re-
cently affirmed in theories of growth7. “Tools for Thought” are at the core of the
Digital Revolution. They have radically expanded our ability to manipulate infor-
mation, underscoring the potentials in knowledge and information. Steve Cohen,
Brad DeLong and I (2000) have argued that we should conceive information tech-
nologies, data communication and data processing technologies as “tools for
thought that amplify brainpower in the way the technologies of the industrial revo-
lution amplifiedmuscle power…. They are tools to manipulate, organize, transmit,
and store information in digital form. …At each point in the last 40 years the criti-
cal step in the transformation of technological potential into economic productiv-
ity has been the discovery of IT users of how to employ their ever greater and ever
cheaper computing power to do the previously impossible.” These tools for
thought have been central to growth over the past decade. Demand for this tool set
has made Information Technology the leading sector in the economy. The perva-
sive application of information processing has transformed the economy and how
it operates.
We here consider the IT enabled Service Transformation as the next chapter in an
evolving story (Zysman and Newman, 2006). We will consider four core issues.
• How has the problem of creating value been changed in the global di-
gital era,
• Why the IT enabled Services Transformation is so critical,
• How the Service Transformation changes the process of innovation,
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7 Warsh, David. Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations. New York W.W. Norton, 2006. This is a remarka-
bly lucid popular treatment of the place of knowledge in economic theory, told a bit as an intellectual ad-
venture story.
• Whether the Service Transformation changes the dynamic of interna-
tional trade and competition.
Let us situate the current chapter, the Algorithmic Revolution in services, by
briefly setting the historical context and tracing the evolution of competition at the
end of the 20th century (Zysman and Newman, 2006). Mass production, really an
American innovation, was a core part of American industrial primacy. That indus-
trial primacy was challenged by the Japanese innovation of lean production in
which volume production was reconceived and reorganized. Production became a
strategic tool and gave Japanese firms, particularly in complex mechanical and
electro-mechanical goods, considerable advantage in global market (see Tyson
and Zysman, 1989, in this respect). An American and European comeback fol-
lowed. The American comeback was built on the emergence of new consumer
electronics, digital electronics from PCs through mobile phones, and a reconfigu-
ration of industrial production. Component driven competition facilitated vertical
de-integration of companies and gave decisive market power to suppliers of criti-
cal elements in final products. It was a period in which the winners were compa-
nies like MicroSoft with its Windows operating system and Intel with its proces-
sors, hence the designation as the Wintelist era. This Wintelist era was a transition
to a global digital era (Borrus and Zysman, 1997).
The global digital era
The fundamental feature of the current era has been that the unexpected, constant
disruption has become routine. The levers of competitive advantage have shifted
constantly and new mechanisms of value creation have appeared. In the 1980s the
strategic focus of major corporate consultants was on definable sectors with clear
targets for creating advantage and value. Today the clarity is gone. There is an am-
biguous language of “spaces”, a word from the dot-com era, and “domains”, a
more recent word expressing the ambiguity of the completive playing field8.
The global and digital developments combine to generate new products and ser-
vices, new entrants, and new strategies. Consider the global. One classic view of
the global is that the world is flat, that IT tools have radically reduced costs of com-
munications and coordination, facilitating operations spread across the world. In
fact, the story really is one of national innovations, such as Japanese production
systems, played out on a larger stage. There are then a series of national stories,
each changing the terms of competition for all the rest. Could the Finnish firm
Nokia have reached its stature without European and global markets? No, but
Nokia’s success was part of the broader Finnish move away from supplier to the
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8 Thanks to Erkki Ormala and Emilie Lasseron who, very differently, made this point to me.
Soviet Empire to technology based innovator in a global economy (Zysman,
2004)9. Similarly, China and India could not succeed without global markets and
production systems, but each is a separate and powerful national story. The se-
quence of national stories produces a sequence of challenges in the form of new
competitors and new competitive strategies for companies and countries. The re-
sult is an enduring tension between the dislocations and challenges of the global
against the adaptations and adjustments of particular firms and places.
Consider next the digital. The bloc of plastic with electronics we carry as a cell
phone could just as easily be a television or a PDA or an MP3 player10. Services
make the story messier and harder to locate the sources of value. Is accounting a
product or a service? Hire an accounting firm and you buy a service. Buy
Quicken, a shrink wrapped software package for personal accounting, and you
have purchased a product. But buy the same functions on Quicken from an online
accounting service, and once again you have bought a service11.The leverages of
marketplace advantage are constantly being reshuffled. Is the advantage in the
product? Is the advantage in the service? Which functions can be outsourced as
commodities? Which functions are central strategic assets? The answers will vary
by sectors and across the lifetime of the product. The strategic objective is to avoid
the realm of the commodity, the undifferentiated good or service that competes
principally on price. The classical strategies for differentiation endure; for many
goods, digital tools facilitate quality design or branding as well as market segmen-
tation. The decisive corporate edge then lies in systems integration and innova-
tion, the national advantage in the fluidity and flexibility to adjust to the shifting
terms of competition.
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9 This paper was part of the project, See in particular, Finland in the Global Economy, steering group, chair-
man Anne Brunila, vice-chairman Vesa Vihriälä. “Finland’s competence, openness and renewability –
The final report of ‘Finland in the Global Economy’ Project Prime Minister's Office, 2004.
http://www.vnk.fi/hankkeet/talousneuvosto/julkaisut/julkaisu/julkaisu/.jsp?oid=130669
Zysman, John. “Finland in a digital era: How do wealthy nations stay wealthy?” Prime Minister’s Office,
2004. http://www.vnk.fi/hankkeet/talousneuvosto/julkaisut/julkaisu.jsp?oid=130644
10 Again, thanks to Erkki Ormala and Emilie Lasseron who argue the same point from very different vanta-
ges.
11 GM’s onstar service is a key source of profit, blurring the service product line in the core of the industrial
economy. Is the iPod a product or a vehicle to deliver a service? For the moment there are only 6 Itunes
songs sold for every Ipod (that’s about 60 cents made for 6 Itunes songs vs. almost 100 dollars for each
Ipod. I believe Apple makes 10 % profit off every Itunes song sold, while it reaps 20 % off every Ipod.
Additionally, its worth noting that the Ipod was wildly successful for a year, perhaps longer, before the Itu-
nes music store service was ever introduced. But these are early days.
Services: The next chapter in the IT revolution
The latest chapter in the IT revolution is the Services Transformation. Let us prop-
erly frame the story. The story is not the growth in the quantity or value of the ac-
tivities we label services. As Steve Cohen and I argued two decades ago (Cohen
and Zysman, 1987), it is not a shift from agriculture to industry to services.The
current chapter is the service transformation driven and enabled by the application
of rule based Information Technology tools. The crucial issue is the reconfigura-
tion of the service sectors and the recreation of value creation in services as a result
of the global and digital developments.
Services were once seen as a sinkhole of the economy, immune to significant tech-
nological or organizationally driven productivity increases (Baumol, 1967). Now
the IT enabled reorganization of services, and business processes more generally,
is seen as a source of dynamism in the economy that will change the structure of
employment, the division of labor, the character of work and its location
(Bosworth and Triplett, 2004). Firms are being reorganized, markets reconfigured,
business models transformed, and entirely new service offerings generated12.
The conventional discourse emphasizing the importance of services in the econ-
omy often conflates and confuses four interconnected stories (Zysman, 2006). The
first service story is an accounting error, or perhaps better a matter of financial en-
gineering. Activities outsourced from manufacturing were relabeled as services; it
is a transformation in where the activities were housed (Cohen and Zysman,
1987)13. The second story is about changes in what consumers buy and what busi-
nesses use to produce and distribute their products and services14. The third service
story is about household outsourcing, the transformation in and changing role of
women in the workforce and, with that, the conversion of unpaid domestic work –
washing floors, watching babies, and delivering groceries – into commercial ser-
vices bought and sold in the market15.
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12 Archibugi et al. (1994) criticized the European Community Innovation Survey, one of the pioneering stu-
dies into service innovation, for only examining technical innovations. They countered by distinguishing
between different types of innovation, i.e. “innovation of product,” “innovation of process,” “innovation
of organization,” “innovation of design,” etc. Today, the services innovation literature is mainly do-
minated by discussions on how services distinctly innovate in organizational structures, business models,
process, knowledge management, and external relations with other firms and universities.
13 The argument Cohen and I made twenty years ago hinges on the beginning of outsourced services and the
blurred lines between many products and services.
14 This is shown by per-capita income and personal consumption figures constructed from U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, July 2001
15 For a complex and interesting analysis of this transition see Thistle (2006).
The fourth service story, our focus here, is the digital transformation. Service ac-
tivities themselves are changed when they can be converted into formalizable,
codifiable, computable processes, processes often with clearly defined rules for
their execution. Much of the innovation then is around the adoption and effective
implementation of IT tools. This IT enabled service transformation is driven by
the advantage that can be captured from private and public entrepreneurs reorga-
nizing firms, administrations, reconfiguring markets, inventing new business
models, reconstructing existing services and generating entirely new service offer-
ings. Certainly business processes from finance and accounting through to cus-
tomer support and CRMare altered when they can be treated asmatters of informa-
tion and data management. Routine and manual functions are automated, and fun-
damental reorganization of activities is enabled. Likewise, sensors and sensor
based networks change many personal services. For example, with sensors and
communications, some services such as the monitoring aspects of the home care
for the ill, the convalescent, or the elderly can be transformed fundamentally from
highly personal activities requiring a continuous presence to a distance activity
with sensor data signaling a need for attention. As service activities are conducted
by and with IT tools, the worker skills required change as well. Long-term nursing
in a home is rather different from data monitoring and intervention, and even more
distant from the skills to develop the systems in the first place. Different people in
different places trained different ways will be involved. And of course, as informa-
tion moves, many activities which were previously tightly linked to particular
places can be moved (Cohen and Zysman, 1987).
How does the business or social science researcher interested in the services evolu-
tion, not the tools themselves, follow a diffused technical discussion or a focus on
an ever-shifting array of “tools”? Assume that in considering the evolution of the
technologies transforming services there are then two sets of IT developments; en-
vision two technical stacks. One stack defines the networks and the other stack
defines the evolution of the tools that result in service applications. Francois Bar
and Michael Borrus (1997) proposed a generation ago, that the network stack con-
sisted of an infrastructure layer, a control layer, and an applications layer. As net-
works migrated from analog to digital a generation ago the possibility of multiple
functions on a single network and an independent control layer became critical.
The first data network revolution with the creation and liberation of the control
layer meant the emergence of virtual private networks and their innovative appli-
cation by sophisticated corporate users. Their research at the time involved a sys-
tematic comparison of major users in a set of sectors in different countries.
The current service revolution involves both the continued evolution of networks
and the maturation of the “services” stack. That tool set results in the significant
and radical reorganization of work as well as the diffused ability of small users to
build content and value for both non market and market applications. The “ser-
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vices stack” can be imagined as a platform, middleware layer, and a layer of direct
applications tools16.
A crucial aside is necessary. Of course the core of information technology tools is
the information that is being gathered, processed, stored, and transmitted. The cru-
cial matter then is often not the IT tools, or precisely how they are deployed, but
the information on which the service activities are based. And the question often
then is the definition and control of the information. Competition amongst service
providers will turn on control of the information of information products, offerings
will be differentiated by control and packaging of information.
The Algorithmic Transformation
The Algorithmic Transformation brings an avalanche of innovation, innovation in
the tools behind the service transformation and innovation in the services them-
selves. But a delusion lurks within the revolution. Let me explain. IT tools may
open possibilities for value creation (Barras, 1986)17. But capturing those possibil-
ities, and creating value, means reorganizing social and business activities, pro-
cesses, and strategies. The IT enabled Algorithmic Revolution, clearly, in that ser-
vice activities once defined as computable routines with clear algorithms can be
automated. The hypothesis would be that the first introduction of tools would be to
automate what can be routine processes. Here the notion of an algorithmic trans-
formation is most applicable. The Delusion is that the entire process of develop-
ment and delivery, of value creation, will become a computable algorithmic pro-
cess, that the algorithm and the IT tool can replace human insight and knowledge.
My view is that the crucial innovations, including business model innovations that
often underpin and realize value from the Services Transformation do not emerge
logically from the nature of the routines. They emerge, rather, from an innovative
process of experimentation and discovery (Zysman and Newman, 2006). The ef-
fective use of human insight, intelligence, and knowledge in the choice, develop-
ment, application, and effective use, of these tools will remain central. Managing
and exploiting tacit knowledge, as well as explicit knowledge that can stay within
a firm, will be the principle source of innovation and competitive advantage; this is
particularly true as digital tools and globalizing markets can accentuate the risk of
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16 These layers are available in the presentations of Jonathan Murray,Microsoft, and Stuart Feldman, IBM at
the BRIE/ETLA session at the CITRIS/Tekes seminar in Helsinki. They can be found on line at
http://www.citris-uc.org/files/2006-06-20-CITRIS_Europe/8.0-Jonathan-Murray.pdf
17 Richard Barras posited this as a reverse product cycle whereby new technology adopted by a firm first
leads to service process improvements, then to process innovation (which leads to a betterment of service
quality, not just efficiency), and finally an improvement in service innovation. As we can see here the tech-
nology adopted opened up the possibility for value creation and innovation, which Barras emphasized as
being uniquely true for services.
knowledge bleeding away from the firm18. This is both a matter of skill develop-
ment and of understanding how the routines can be segmented and make place for
the innovative and the entrepreneurial.
The subtler understanding, more intuitive and creative, involved in creating new
strategic models and generating significant new value comes after the first automa-
tion, as it did in the era of early data networks. The creative development and im-
plementation of new strategic directions is a separate process, not an extension of
computable routine. It is a story of choices about how information is gathered and
deployed, about how knowledge is developed and exploited. Consider two related
propositions. First, automation of basic routine will NOT create enduring market
advantage. There are two reasons: routinized steps can be copied, or the equiva-
lent steps with equivalent outcomes defined; automated routine involves usually
marginal gain on existing arrangements. Second, the real value capture comes in
the second step, transforming and reinventing activities, in short innovation in ser-
vices.
Most powerfully, capturing the possibilities of the Algorithmic Revolution be-
comes a story of innovation in business models, competitive strategies, and orga-
nization19. Let us review the argument. Tools always embed much of the know-
how required for production in their functions. We hypothesize that more of the
know-how required for service production is embedded in tools available as com-
modity products than is the case of manufacturing. Arguably, increasingly more
of the tools required for configuring new services will be available on the market,
thus potentially altering the possibilities for innovation. At an extreme, the huge
investment in innovation in tools – networks, software tools, and the hardware on
which it runs – is invisible to the user. One might also argue that the remarkable
and rapid emergence on the world stage of firms such asWipro, and the capacity of
firms outsourcing IT and services development, hinges critically on the availabil-
ity in the market of IT infrastructure and equipment. The critical question, as a re-
sult of the core infrastructure and tools being available as commodities, is how to
use the tools to create new productive ways of reorganizing or generating social
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18 That leads us to ask not just how information is coded, or how it is embedded as tacit knowledge in com-
munities, but how it comes alive as an interplay of different vocabularies and vantages within the com-
munity of the firm or the polity. The conversion of activities into algorithmic and computable processes
changes not only the underlying flow of work, but the dynamics of knowledge and innovation in the firm.
See for example; Nielsen and Nielsen in Zysman and Newman, 2006.
19 The broader services innovation literature focuses on process-, organizational-, external-relation-, know-
ledge/ information management-derived sources without detailing out how the character of each of these
are situated in varying regions as well as transformed by the Algorithmic Revolution. How we conceive of
innovation in comparative regional contexts, as well as how modules can be moved because of the Algo-
rithmic Revolution, are aspects to this new story and can be a standalone strategy generator.
processes and the rules that guide them. The capacities to experiment with new
services and to adapt to rules and generate productive changes in organization and
social process are critical. The service innovations constructed with the tools de-
pend on what can be imagined and the capacity to implement the imagination.
If the capacity to imagine innovative applications is critical, an understanding of
the social rules defining the space for experimentation and the processes of social
evolution is central. Services are deeply rooted in social rules, conventions, and
regulations; consequently, capturing the value possibilities in the algorithmic
transformation inherently means recasting the rules, regulations, and conventions
in which the services are embedded. Variations in national or sub-national rules
and conventions that shape how services are organized mean that the service trans-
formation will follow diverse national paths. Consider that the health care story is
different in the United States, with its mish mash of payers and providers than it is
in Britain or France with more centralized systems of payment and provision. The
technical problem is not the same in the three places, and hence the question of
how to use data, the routines of delivery and accounting will not be the same. The
flow of medical information is not a neutral matter. In the US one may want one’s
doctor to know a potential risk condition, but not if that also means the insurance
company cuts you off. In a centralized system early treatment may reduce total
system costs, so information about patients leads to preventative treatment not the
cancellation of coverage. Or consider that reorganizing services touches the privi-
leges of certain professions and will influence labor markets. Inevitably these will
be significant political struggles.
Despite the variety, one might propose that, at a very granular level, many of the
modules of routine and activities are similar. Or better still one must ask, which is-
sues and modules are common across systems and applications, in the same sectors
across countries, and which modules must be unique? Will the national variation
in service deployment be a matter of different modules in each place, or a strategy
of common set of modules orchestrated differently in different places? Thus, for
example, how transportable and transferable are the solutions developed in one
health care system to another?
Let us express this same question a different way. Will the reality of global suppli-
ers of IT technologies and service tools, of the modules and tools for service, over-
ride the reality of enduring national patterns and character of services usage? We
know that technological trajectories and patterns of innovation reflect the charac-
ter of demand in lead markets. Hence the very technologies developed in different
national systems for different purposes in banking or health will reflect the distri-
bution of gain and risk to the varied actors from reorganizing particular service ac-
tivities. Once we imagined trade between firms in advanced countries to reflect
advantage by national firms created by their differences in local markets. One fea-
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ture of globalization has often been an integration of many national markets. With
the fragmentation of production structures, the national and regional differences
often express themselves in terms of where the firms in a country or region insert
themselves into international supply chains. Rather than direct rivalries, regional
strategies will increasingly be about careful crafting of distinctive capacities and
strategic positioning (Breznitz, 2007). In services by contrast, national differences
in patterns of demand and delivery are likely to persist and to express themselves
as product offerings and technology trajectories.
Strategy policy and trade
Where does this leave us? For the corporation, automating existing processes is
just the beginning. Innovation comes in the imaginative reorganization of existing
business and reinvention of business models and strategies. It is a matter of auto-
mating the routine to leverage existing knowledge and facilitate innovation.
For policy, the task is to create the environment for experimentation and innova-
tion. And since service innovation is often about recasting fundamental social pro-
cesses, this is never an easy task; such change always has winners, losers, and po-
litical bargains.
And, finally, what does Services Transformation mean for the problems of growth
and trade? This is a more complex story. Certainly there is trade in the enabling
tools of the Services Transformation, the hardware and software tools. We know
that leadership in data network implementation and network standards, as well as
standards more generally, can advantage equipment producers. Global standards
are often set as a rivalry of national standards stories, whether that is a market ri-
valry or a political rivalry or a standards body influenced by both. But what of the
service offerings themselves? As important, as we argued, services are embedded
in national social processes, rules, roles, conventions, and regulations. The conse-
quence is that national markets remain potential launching pads for innovative ser-
vice offerings, and potential traps if the national standards processes lead to isolat-
ing the local service offerings from the standards in the global market place.
In sum, the IT enabled service transformation, the algorithmic transformation, has
converted the supposed sinkhole in the economy, the services sector, into a poten-
tial source of dynamism and of new tradable goods. Capturing those possibilities
though involves imagination and innovation in business models and public policy.
As important, even as the communications capacity of “tools for thought” contrib-
utes to globally interlinked markets and distributed production, national markets
with their distinctive processes, rules, roles, and conventions can be both sources
of innovation opening to new global business or potential traps isolating firms in
their home base.
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SECTION 2
Discussing Globalization:
Micro and Macro Perspectives
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3 Going Global: Challenging
Technology and Innovation Policy and
Governance?
3.1 In defence of public science
D. Archibugi
Introduction
In modern capitalist economies, both the public and the business sectors contribute
to funding and performing Research and Development (R&D). In the business sec-
tor, R&D is funded for commercial applications, it occurs in a competitive process
and should secure appropriable economic returns. In the public sector, on the con-
trary, R&D aims to provide public benefits, it is based on cooperation and dissemi-
nates freely its outcomes. Public and business R&D have been considered comple-
mentary assets in a successful strategy for human welfare and economic develop-
ment.
Over the last quarter of a century, however, the public component of R&D has
been more and more under stress. This paper explores two related issues:
• The first is the quantitative decline of public R&D: over the last twen-
ty years, it has declined from 44 per cent to 30 per cent in the OECD
area. This trend has affected most countries.
• This quantitative trend has been matched by a changing qualitative
mood. Universities and other public institutions have somehow been
invited to profit from their knowledge, either selling it to the business
sector (as with the USBayh-Dole Act), or by being prepared to accept
research contracts from other organizations.
If the quantitative trend and the qualitative pressure will continue, public R&D as
we know it today will disappear in a generation.
What is the rationale behind this new science policy agenda? And, above all, is it
in the public interest? In this paper, the intellectual origins of this counter-revolu-
tion are explored. It is argued that these trends are against the public interest and
that a substantial change in science policy is needed. Some suggestions are also
provided for the governance of the public knowledge system.
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The past and the present of science policy
The origin of science policy: the linear model. Once upon a time, there was the lin-
ear model. Simplicity was its main advantage. Actually, it was so simple that any
politician could understand it. According to the linear model, it is possible to draw
an almost automatic and direct linkage from the generation of basic knowledge to
its market exploitation. The generation of knowledge can be subdivided into sev-
eral stages, all of them in a clearly defined time line.
If the linear model is accepted, it becomes rather easy to distribute the various
tasks between public and business players. The function of the public sector
should be confined to develop knowledge which can be identified, classified and
measured as “basic research”, a term applied and popularized by the OECD
Frascati Manual. Basic research can be potentially useful to everybody: it is not
confined to a single product development, to a specific firm or to a single industry.
Already Kenneth Arrow (1962) defined “basic research” in the most elegant way:
activities that can be used as input in further research only.
The linear model dues quite a lot to an impressive scientific venture: the
Manhattan project. During the war, and in wars time and resources are scarce and
precious, the US government invested massively in a scientific experiment that, if
successful, would guarantee the victory. Thousands of scientists and engineers
were confined in a single location, and because of military secrecy, they were
asked of not interacting with anybody. The bet was successful: science produced
its Golem. It was also expected that the Golem would generate substantial
spill-overs: in the post-war period, many industries explored the potential eco-
nomic applications of the atomic discoveries, although the benefits ended up to be
much more confined than hoped. Nonetheless, the science policy lesson drawn
was that science can deliver what is requested, provided that governments fund
generously the academic communities.
The science policy agenda in the US followed the same pattern under the assump-
tion that the same story could be replicated. Two main targets were outlined in the
1960s: defeat cancer and land on the moon. In the first case, cancer research got
probably over-funded compared to the available scientific opportunity. In the sec-
ond case, the target was successfully achieved. Moreover, space programs gener-
ated a variety of by-products which proved to be relevant in many industries: aero-
nautics, consumer electronics, telecommunications, mechanical engineering, new
materials and even food and beverages benefited from them.
To develop these new technological opportunities commercially, however, com-
panies had to invest their own money and, as usual when innovating, this was a
risky business. Even when the new knowledge worked quite well for the purposes
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of the public venture, it was not obvious that it could be successful in the market.
Costs of mass production were sometimes far too high, consumer preferences were
harder to predict than expected, companies did not manage to acquire adequately
the knowledge, often because they did not master the tacit component.
Public institutions were also in an uncomfortable position when dealing with the
business sector: if they developed a preferential tie with some companies, they
were breaking competition rules. If they did not, the lack of face-to-face interac-
tion with the few companies with real absorbing capacity was often detrimental to
commercial outcomes. Therefore, the choice that public institutions had to face
was between advantaging one company and infuriating all the others, or put their
knowledge in the public domain, making it more difficult to provide benefits to the
taxpayers.
Knowledge transmission in a global economy. Another aspect soon emerged
which fits under the rubric “going global”: the fact that a national government was
funding massively R&D did not necessarily imply that companies of the same
country would benefit from it. On the contrary, it emerged that the companies
which took most advantage from the colossal US government-funded programs in
defence and space were often not American. In many areas and for many years,
Japanese and German companies were much more successful than American com-
panies to turn into competitive consumer electronics products some scientific and
technological openings originated by defence and space programs. The US tech-
nological leadership was progressively eroded.
Statistics on the world distribution of patents and high-tech products consistently
showed the rise of new economic powers which did not rely on large academic re-
search. Japan and Germany in the 1970s and 1980s, and South Korea and Taiwan
in the 1990s, showed that a country could catch up in technology even without
spending too much public money in R&D. Attention started to be focused on the
differences across countries in the composition of R&D expenditure. And it was
quite clear that the three empires with a substantial defence-space technological
complex, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, were spending much
more public resources than Japan and Germany. The latter relied on the resources
invested by their companies and managed to increase their competitiveness and
their market shares.
The Neo-Schumpeterian tradition. In line with these hard facts, the Neo-
Schumpeterian tradition, developed by thinkers such as Chris Freeman, Richard
Nelson and Nathan Rosenberg, started to be more and more dominant in science
policy and in the economics of technological change. As somebody who belongs
to this tradition, I am happy to emphasize its contribution to the understanding of
the knowledge economy. In particular, this tradition has convincingly shown that:
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• The transmission of knowledge between individuals, organizations,
companies and countries is a very demanding process. The traditional
assumption that knowledge is costly to generate but that can be trans-
ferred at zero or negligible costs was falsified.
• Themotivations and incentives of public and business researchers are
much more similar than generally expected.
• Interaction is a crucial element for the generation, transmission and
diffusion of knowledge.
These statements have been somehow codified in what has replaced the linear
model, the so-called chain-link model suggested twenty years ago by Kline and
Rosenberg (1986). I do not repudiate any of these statements. On the contrary, any
successful science policy should inscribe them in the golden book of learnt les-
sons. However, as I will suggest later, these lessons have somehow been
over-learnt. In particular, the linear model has been over-killed, and this has led to
the belief that, since the innovation process does not necessarily begin with basic
research, it is less needed to fund and perform it. In turn, this has also lowered the
significance of public R&D.
On the other hand, too much emphasis has been placed on interaction, as it hap-
pens, for example, in the so-called triple helix model. This model rightly stresses
the importance of interactions between academia, business and government. But,
on the other hand, it requires Universities to become entrepreneurial: interaction is
interpreted as a need from the public sector to change its vocation and to comply
with market rules.
The Neo-liberal revolution. The last but powerful ingredient has been the neo-lib-
eral revolution and the corresponding attack to all forms of public expenditure. In
spite of the reiterated statement that the investment in knowledge and innovation is
a crucial component for economic development, governments have failed to ex-
pand and often instead reduced public expenditure for R&D.
Even in Europe, a continent that has somehow resisted the Neo-liberal revolution
originated in the United States, it is now given for granted that a good balance of
public/business R&D should be based on a quantitative prevalence of business re-
sources. Take, for example, the Lisbon strategy outlined by the European Council
in 2000, and reiterated in Barcelona in 2002. It has been stated that the European
Union should become the largest knowledge-economy of the world. This has been
quantified in a target: R&D expenditure should become asmuch as 3% of the total
European GDP by 2010. But when indicating who should provide the resources,
the European Council has stated that 2/3 should come from the business sector and
1/3 only from public sources. In other words, governments call for an expansion of
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European R&D, but they put the burden to expand it on the business sector’s
shoulders.
The consequences
These trends have very serious consequences on the augmentation of knowledge.
We live in a period with a pace of change that has no historical precedent, and the
generation of knowledge is certainly at the front bench. But it is equally very rele-
vant who is producing knowledge and for which purposes. The fact that an increas-
ing share of the R&D budget is profit-seeking implies that some areas are over-ex-
panded and others are unjustly neglected.
Consequences on basic research. These trends will inevitably lead to a decrease of
basic research investment. The way in which R&D is classified into “basic”, “ap-
plied” and “development” is often tentative, and does not necessarily reflect the
relative importance and significance. But much of technological advances rely on
knowledge developed by humans just for their curiosity, when they did not antici-
pate at the time of investigation any useful outcome. Findings often anticipate ap-
plications. It is certainly true that public institutions are not the only organizations
to perform basic research. Also companies perform it, and often with great suc-
cess. But statistical evidence indicates that the portion of basic research funded by
the business sector follows the efforts carried out in the public one. Economically,
this can be explained by the fact that companies fund basic research when they can
follow-up some already available knowledge, while they are less willing to ex-
plore completely new frontiers. The reduction of the public investment in basic re-
search will therefore lower also the private one.
Consequences on Universities. For more than one thousand years, Universities
have been designed to share knowledge freely. Members of Academia often inter-
acted with the outside community, and it was rare that the results of scientific in-
vestigation were kept confidential. If Universities should more and more search
for funds from the business sector, it is very likely that they will change substan-
tially their nature. The key aspect that distinguishes academic life will be trans-
formed. Not surprisingly, it does not seem that, so far, Universities have managed
to cope with the requested changes. Many Universities have, in fact, opened indus-
trial liaisons offices, they start to protect their own inventions through patents and
so on. But work carried out in this field indicates that the changes have mainly
been a maquillage to please a general mood. In substance, the income generated
though selling their knowledge to the business sector has been rather small. In the
UK, it has been estimated that the income generated from commercializing R&D
outcomes has been smaller than the income associated to renting real estate facili-
ties.
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Consequences on teaching. The fact that teaching institutions are changing their
nature also affects the quality of teaching. Young researchers start their carrier in
institutions that do not have any longer the possibility to outline their long-term
scientific priorities. Rather than exploring “external reality” in the field which is
more likely to provide knowledge advancement, Universities have to deal with the
possibility to collect money on the market. In the long run, this will develop a new
class of scientists that use their intuition to anticipate market demand rather than to
expand the frontier of knowledge. There is not anything wrong in doing so. Actu-
ally, there is a vast social category that does this job everyday: the entrepreneurs.
The issue at stake here is: should scientists become entrepreneurs?
In a nutshell, the changes that have already occurred in public research institutions,
and the revolution requested by a new intellectual climate, may lead to a tragedy of
the anti-commons. The lack of investment in public R&D may end up in spending
money in fields that do not necessarily produce more knowledge and in the right
places. For example, business companies will have more interest in funding R&D
for hair re-grow and removal (for men and women, respectively) rather than for
vaccines for tuberculosis and malaria. This is simply associated to the fact that the
potential market is larger for the former than for the latter. This is not only a prob-
lem of obvious social justice (if we think that tuberculosis and malaria kill about 3
millions a year), but also of augmenting the basin of knowledge. Paradoxically, it
seems to be more likely that a successful vaccine is found for these diseases than a
proper cure for men’s baldness or women’s leg hair. In other words, a purely
profit-driven allocation of R&D expenditure is far from expanding the frontier of
knowledge.
What to do?
The discussion above may lead to a plea for increasing public resources made
available to publicly performed R&D. I think that the trends that occurred over the
last twenty years should be reversed. But, on the other hand, I do not think that this
will neither be useful nor possible without changing the system of financial alloca-
tion. Traditionally, the academic community has self-governed the process of allo-
cating public resources. Boards, Councils and Committees are generally com-
posed by scientists. Even when there are politicians, they should rely on the opin-
ion of experts in the hard moment to decide if funds should go to X or Y.
The academic community has not always ruled itself in the most efficient way.
Very often, disciplinary logic has prevailed over targeted research, scientists are
not very keen to change their area of investigation and they are likely to persist
stubbornly over their own agenda for all their life. In comparison, it is true that
business R&D is much more flexible and problem-oriented.
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In order to be effective and suitable, an increase in resources made available for
public institutions should be accompanied by a radical difference in the evaluation
systems and procedures. In general, this will require a move from funding pro-
vided to the institutions to project-based funding. In particular, to prevent that the
academic community goes back into a comfortable ivory tower, the request of
funding from taxpayers should be justified in front of the taxpayers themselves. I
am thinking to introduce some evaluation panels based on a two-tier system: on the
one hand, the academic community should assess the quality and the feasibility of
the projects, on the other hand, the general public should assess their societal rele-
vance.
The public budget for R&D could experiment some forms of direct democracy, by
selecting a sample of statistically significant ordinary citizens to which it is con-
ferred the task of assessing the societal relevance of the various projects. These cit-
izens should be briefed on the expected benefits of each research proposal and take
into account the result of the scientific evaluation. The reason why a sample of citi-
zens should be preferred to public servants or elected representatives is that they
will be less likely to be under the influence of academic lobbies.
There is, of course, also the problem to provide the results achieved by the publicly
funded institutions to everybody, including the business sector. This achievement
is very important and often the need to obtain a commercial exploitation reduces
the possibility of disseminating the results urbi et orbi. For this reason, it seems
that plug-in centres, i.e. spaces where academic scholars can interact with the busi-
ness community, are a much more fruitful strategy to expand the benefits of public
research than what has so far been provided by the new trendy academic offices for
the commercialization of intellectual property.
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3.2 Globalisation and knowledge-based
economies: European perspectives
H. Salmi
Introduction
Understanding the dynamics of globalisation and the challenges it poses to the
knowledge based economies is of paramount importance for the competitiveness
of Europe. We all know examples of how globalisation has changed the overall en-
vironment in which European enterprises and, more generally, the various EU ac-
tors operate. Certain industries have faced difficulties and found it hard to compete
on the global scenario, whereas other firms/sectors have been able to exploit new
markets and possibilities that were not open to them beforehand.
The underlying question hence is to find the right approach for Europe as a whole.
We need to understand how to face the increased competition and all that
globalisation really brings.
My answer to these question is clear: the only way forward for Europe is to build
upon our knowledge and our innovative capacity. It is by reinforcing these
strengths that we can move ahead vis-à-vis our global competitors. Trying to com-
pete through lower costs and wages is not an option. That is not where our inherent
strengths lie.
Europe must build on its knowledge and innovation to succeed. I do believe that
Europe has the capacity to innovate. Possibly more than most other countries. His-
torically we have thrived in a world where knowledge and innovative capacity is
what counts. It is hence a matter of building upon and reinforcing our traditional
strengths. Evidently, competing is hard and innovation cannot be the only factor
enabling us to compete. Still, the capacity to innovate constitutes a major competi-
tiveness asset.
Innovation in Europe
To design the most suitable policies it is in the first place necessary to verify where
Europe stands. We need to understand if we are good at building and exploiting
knowledge and innovation as we could and should be. My answer is unfortunately
not if we compare EU as a whole with our main competitors, i.e. United States and
Japan. As can be seen from the map in Figure 1, innovation capability and innova-
tive performance in Europe are very heterogeneous. From the European Innova-
tion Scoreboard – instrument that we use in our innovation policies – it emerges
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that the most innovative and best performing countries are Sweden, Finland, Ger-
many, and Switzerland – and the latter is not even a member of the European Un-
ion.
Source: European Commission / DG ENTR D1
Figure 1. EIS 2005 – Innovation performance in Europe
Among the least performing, instead, there are big member countries as Spain and
Poland, but also countries like Slovakia and Estonia. The countries currently ap-
proaching Europe, i.e. Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, are unfortunately lagging
behind. As emerges from the picture, some of the countries are really still losing
97
ground. This is the case, for instance, of Estonia. This country is doing very well in
other respects but not performing well in terms of innovation inputs. It is also inter-
esting to see that some new member states are already catching up. The picture that
emerges is, in any case, very much heterogeneous.
Another very important notion is that of “innovation efficiency”, i.e. comparing
innovative inputs and outputs. In this case, the picture that emerges is somewhat
different. The best performing countries in terms of innovation efficiency are Ger-
many, Luxembourg, Ireland and Malta.
Source: European innovation scoreboard 2005
Figure 2. Innovation performance in the EU with respect to the USA and Japan
As figure 2 shows, the gap between US, Japan and Europe is big. With respect to
Japan the gap is actually increasing. Moreover, there also are emerging economies
– in particular China and India – that are shaping the broader picture through their
ever higher investments in innovation and knowledge. Figures 3a) and 3b) offer a
more detailed picture of the main sources of Europe’s innovation gap.
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Source DG ENTR/D
Figure 3a. Main sources of EU innovation gap
Source: DG ENTR/D
Figure 3b. Main sources of EU innovation gap
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Europe is performing well compared to United States and Japan in terms of univer-
sity R&D financed by business, community designs and community trademarks.
Conversely Europe is not living up to expectations in terms of patents, population
with tertiary education and ICT expenditures. On the one hand, the economic in-
terpretation of these differences has to be conducted with care. In fact, patenting
performance does not only reflect the difference in innovation performance, but
also in terms of business usage and sector coverage. On the other hand, though, the
data suggest that the EU is doing less well than US and Japan in protecting its R&D
and transforming R&D into commercial products.
These differences are even more striking when public research organisations are
singled out. EU public research organisations are far less active in protecting their
intellectual property rights or sharing their rights than their United States’ counter-
parts. This does not imply that the EU is becoming less innovative, but rather that
our competitors are not, so to say, standing still.
In a way, those sectors where Europeans once felt safe are now open to global
competition. To face this challenge, we need to innovate more and faster. Just look
at the pharmaceutical industry, where Europe was the unchallenged leader in the
1990ies. We are now the second, after the US, but our competitive position can
still change.
Europe has still a lot of potential to improve. We are good at exporting, and some
industries are strongly positioned in the global markets. However, Europe’s manu-
facturing industries are still concentrated in sectors with medium-high technolo-
gies and low to intermediate labour skills.
Source: O'Mahony and van Ark (2003)
Figure 4. Share of low skill VS high-skill production
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Such an overall picture needs being “upgraded”, both in terms of technology and
labour skills. Policy makers need to invest in the knowledge-based economy.
Globalisation has raised the question of whether local conditions for companies
are still important. The answer is yes, more than ever. Globalisation has actually
increased the relative importance of location. While in the past choice was limited,
location is now a key tool for companies to compete and innovate. What is sure is
that innovative firms choose to go where innovation can flourish. They choose to
go where the workforce is well-educated, where R&D labs are excellent and where
strong clusters exist. The aim is to facilitate networking with universities and other
enterprises.
Innovation does not happen in isolation, but most often in cooperation with others.
States and regions all play a leading role in creating favourable conditions for such
cooperation at the local level. Regional competition does not happen just with re-
spect to the neighbouring regions, but worldwide.
R&D off-shoring and the innovative capacity of the EU firms
The Director General of DG Enterprise and Industry has undertaken a survey on
the so-called implications of R&D Off-shoring on the innovative capacity of the
EU Firms. The work has been done by the Finnish Research Institute of LTT,
which is part of the Helsinki School of Economics.
The study is mainly based on interviews of 160 European enterprises, both SMEs
and big companies, all having off-shoring experiences. It also includes in-depth
case studies and some econometric analyses. What the study particularly focuses
on is the development phase, i.e. the so called “D” part of R&D processes. In fact
the enterprises said they did not carry out research abroad, but only development.
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Figure 5. R&D off-shoring VS domestic R&D: replacing domestic R&D?
Both R&D spending and R&D off-shoring have increased over the last five years.
However, as can be seen from figure 5, off-shored R&D has only limitedly re-
placed domestic R&D. However, firms do anticipate a relative growth of
off-shored R&D compared to domestic R&D over the next 5 years. This might im-
ply that companies are basically off-shoring R&D to innovate in a new field or to
work anyway at something new. Furthermore, R&D off-shoring usually happens
between member states still and not so much beyond Europe. At present the trend
is from the old member states to new member states.
The fraction of off-shored R&D conducted out of the EU is still small, at least for
the 160 companies studied. However, the R&D off-shored to Asia is associated
with a higher level of replacement. The study also shows that the more important
product and process R&D are for a firm, the lower is the replacement of domestic
R&D. Strategic R&D is normally done at home. With respect to deciding how
much R&D to off-shore, LTT’s analysis shows that the percentage of R&D that is
off-shored is not affected by variables like the country of origin, firm size or R&D
intensity. It is also interesting to note that the higher the number of European pat-
ents, the higher the percentage of R&D that is off-shored. It’s not possible of
course to say anything about the causal relations, but this seems to be the fact. It
also seems that the percentage of R&D off-shored varies with the region to which
R&D is off-shored. Those firms that have off-shored their R&D to non-European
countries have off-shored a higher percentage of it.
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Figure 6. Reasons to choose where to off-shore R&D
A basic question is of course how companies choose where to locate the R&D they
want to off-shore. The study shows that public support, i.e. subsidies and tax
schemes, is not crucial in this decision. Conversely, efficient IPR protection, qual-
ity of the education system and developed infrastructures makes it more likely for
a firm to be willing to locate in a place rather than another. Among the most impor-
tant determinants of R&D off-shoring there certainly are the quality of the aca-
demic institutions, and the links between firms and academia. Important are also
the availability of cheap labour and the possible strategic benefits that may arise as
a consequence of off-shoring. The latter corresponds to the possibility of network-
ing with other companies, institutions, competitors or customers. A well-known
result from previous studies is also the fact that companies are interested in the
possibility to save costs and to be closer to their target markets, as well as the possi-
bility to acquire new technologies. The LTT study also shows that off-shoring has
had a clear positive effect on the export of the firms. They also perceive off-shor-
ing to have had a general positive effect on their capability to innovate.
103
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
% of responding companies
1 Not
important
2 3 4 5 Very
important
Don't
know
Public support (taxes,
subsidies)
Developed infrastructure,
size of R&D sector, R&D
concentrations
Quality of academic
institutions and education
system, links between
academia and firms
General attitudes towards
high-tech
IPR protection
Figure 7a. R&D offshoring and general innovative capacity of the firms
(magnitude of the effect)
Figure 7b. R&D offshoring and general innovative capacity of the firms
(magnitude of the effect)
They observe that the number of locations in which the patents have been invented
is positively correlated with the overall number of patents. This would imply that
successfully off-shoring, asmeasured by innovations being produced in several lo-
cations, has a positive effect on the overall innovative performance of the firm. It
basically means that the more locations you have the better and successful busi-
ness you have.
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Concluding, R&D off-shoring is a type of FDI that countries certainly want to at-
tract. Hence we can expect sharp competition as countries in Europe and elsewhere
try to adapt their structures to offer the best opportunities to the firms off-shoring
R&D. However, it should be kept in mind that R&D off-shoring is of benefit also
to the home activities of the off-shoring enterprise. Hence it should not be seen as a
game where one country or region loses what someone else gains. Rather Europe
must do its best to constitute a good destination for incoming off-shored R&D and
to exploit the opportunities that open up when foreign enterprises off-shore R&D.
The R&Doff-shoring rationale lies in enterprises aiming to reap the benefits possi-
bly arising from being present on each other’s knowledge markets. So far it has
largely been an affair between developed countries, but all signs indicate that the
stream of off-shoring will increase in all directions. Evidence from the study sug-
gests that off-shoring benefits European R&D productivity. The main policy con-
clusions would therefore be that R&D off-shoring is a phenomenon that needs not
to be feared, but understood. EU, both its citizens and its firms, have already and
will continue to benefit only if EU maintains and improves its science base and the
quality of its workforce, along with deregulating its labour market.
Europe’s agenda: What next?
Many initiative are being undertaken in order to foster Europe’s competitive posi-
tioning worldwide. DGEnterprise has proposed a bold revision of the way we con-
duct economic reforms in Europe to address the challenges posed by globalisation.
This is the so-called “Revised Lisbon Agenda” (RLA), which is a device con-
ceived in order to ensure Europe’s competitiveness. It reflects EU‘s determination
to carry out some necessary reforms, also taking into account that economic
growth will more and more depend on our productivity and that our working age
population is shrinking. In the RLA, the key message is that in order to create
growth and jobs we have to increase the attractiveness of Europe as a place where
to invest and work.We have to invest on knowledge and innovation for growth and
create more and better jobs. It means investing in research, innovation, using infor-
mation technology, but also keeping and developing a strong European industrial
base. The main elements to implement the new Lisbon Strategy are, on the one
hand, the Community Lisbon Programs, stating what should be done at the com-
munity level. On the other hand, we have 25 national reform programs, and that’s a
novelty of this new and revised program. So each member state’s policy response
to the key challenges they face has to envisage these two instruments working in
tandem to have the best effect. First concerning the EC Community Lisbon Pro-
gram, much progress has been made. The Commission has already put forward
proposals for most of the actions foreseen. Among the key actions related to
knowledge and innovations there are the seventh Framework Program for re-
search, technology development and the demonstration activities, and also the
competitiveness and innovation framework program. The Commission has also set
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out concrete initiatives to improve research and innovation environment in Eu-
rope. The seventh Framework Program introduces a new model of research sup-
port called Joint Technology Initiatives in the form of public-private partnerships.
These aim to back promising new research and to give European industry a head
start in areas ranging from hydrogen and fuel cells, aeronautics and air transport to
innovative medicines and nano-electronics. We have now 25 national reform pro-
grams in place since 2005. Each national reform program sets out what will be
done with respect the challenges faced at the macroeconomic, microeconomic and
employment level. Figure 8 illustrates the major challenges the EU faces accord-
ing to its member states.
Figure 8. Key challenges envisaged by the 2005 national reform programmes
As it can be seen in figure 8, 24 member states have mentioned R&D as a key chal-
lenge. Also education and skills is a key challenge for 20 countries. So in that re-
spect there is a strong commitment from all member states to improve, but another
question is implementation. And that is the problem with Europe. We have very
good plans, political commitment, but we are not implementing enough. Councils
in Europe make decisions, endorse, support, acknowledge but should also do.
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Figure 9. R&D targets
All member states have now set R&D targets. If all these targets are reached, the
EU will increase its overall share of R&D in GDP from its current 1.9 % to about
2.6 % in 2010. This would be an important step to increase its competitiveness. But
how close China and India will be to that level in 2010 is a real challenge for Eu-
rope. China is nowadays at the level of 1.31 %, but it’s increasing 10 % annually,
so they are catching up very soon. And India is following an analogous pattern.
One can see also the heterogeneity of Europe, there are so many countries with
very, very, very low levels, and there are only two countries, namely Finland and
Sweden, that are above 3.5 % already. We know that Finland has put the target for
2010 to 4 %.
“Putting Knowledge into Practice”
Building upon the work I have just described, the Commission has in September
2006 adopted a new broad-based innovation strategy for the EU, called “Putting
knowledge into practice”. This strategy presents a coherent framework to make
use of all existing policy instruments at the EU and the member state level, in sup-
port of innovation. This requires the full commitment from member states and re-
gions. So called “ten actions” are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1. The Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs: 10 actions to support
innovation
10 Actions to Support Innovation
Action 1 : Better education systems to promote an innovation friendly society.
Action 2 : A European Institute of Technology should be established to help improve Europe‘s
innovation capacity and performance. The EIT should be operational starting from 2009.
Action 3 : Develop a strategy to create an open, single, and competitive European labour mar-
ket for researchers.
Action 4 : The Commission will publish voluntary guidelines for Member States and stakehol-
ders to promote knowledge transfer between universities and other public research organiza-
tions and industry.
Action 5 : The EU’s cohesion’s policy for the period 2007–2013 will be mobilized in support of
regional innovation by ‘earmarking’ a large proportion of the 308 billion € available for investing
in knowledge and innovation.
Action 6: A new framework for State aid to research, development and innovation
and new guidance for the design and evaluation of tax incentives for research and
development will be presented.
Action 7 : A new patent strategy and a more comprehensive IPR strategy to facilitate the circu-
lation of innovative ideas will be presented.
Action 8 : An initiative on “copyright levies“, will facilitate new digital products, services and bu-
siness models.
Action 9 :The Commission will, after public consultation, test a strategy to facilitate the emer-
gence of innovation-driven “lead-markets” in Europe.
Action 10 :The Commission will publish and distribute a Handbook on how pre-commercial and
commercial procurement can stimulate innovation.
This innovation strategy brings together all the policy areas that are innovation re-
lated and exploits the full range of EU and member states’ policy instruments to
support innovation. Education is a precondition for a more innovative society. A
competitive internal market, free from internal barriers and open to the world is the
main stimulus to innovation. This in turn needs a favourable regulatory environ-
ment, including an effective and balanced intellectual property rights framework
to stimulate investments in creativity. Innovators find great support through clus-
ters, through well-managed knowledge transfers and from the ideas that can spill
out from a modernised university system. In particular from a European Institute
of Technology that brings excellence from business, research and education to-
gether, and addresses the challenges of leading edge technologies.
At present, there is a hot discussion going on about the European Institute of Tech-
nology, which should constitute the European counterpart, or the same kind of
high-level university, of the MIT in United States. The aim is creating some
knowledge elite type of working in Europe. And all this goes with better access to
108
finance to help turn investments in research into new products and services. Gov-
ernments cannot ignore the importance of their role in this. Preparation of stan-
dards, market regulations and planning ahead on public procurement can ensure
that new technologies are judged on their merits and not undermined by
out-of-date market conditions based on different approaches. But what is the real
innovative capacity of the EU firms and how R&D off-shoring impacts on the In-
novative Capacity of the EU Firms?
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3.3 Towards and integrated European
community policy on international cooperation in
science and technology
A. Siegler
The Seventh Framework Program (FP) also envisages international cooperation.
International cooperation” refers to the collaboration happening among the full
participants of the FP, i.e. the member states, as well as the “associated countries”
and the rest of the world (which we used to call “third countries”).
Supporting international cooperation implies acknowledging that Europe needs to
generate, absorb and apply new knowledge, and to do this in a sustainable way if it
wants to succeed in being competitive also in the future. Not cooperating with the
rest of the world would make it impossible to pursue EU goals, as scientific chal-
lenges are becoming more global, bigger in scale and certainly more difficult to
tackle. Examples are the Millennium Development goals and the scientific chal-
lenges related to it, and other big science projects that are currently underway on at
the world scale. Moreover, the need to cooperate stems from the necessity to un-
derpin other EU policies as, for example, international relations, trade, develop-
ment, environment, energy and info-communication.
The approach of the EC envisages pursuing broader policy objectives through the
achievement of scientific goals. To this end, specific strategic objectives have been
defined. Firstly, to make world-wide scientific excellence available to Europe, i.e.
accessing excellence via circulation and not via brain drain. This implies enabling
the access to globally available knowledge and promoting knowledge circulation,
providing training and facilitating researchers’ mobility. Secondly, to sustain Eu-
rope’s competitiveness through strategic partnerships with third countries, in
well-defined fields of science. Doing so Europe should also be able to explore new
markets. For instance, the European technology platforms could also be open to
third countries’ participation, on the basis of mutual interests and Europe’s partic-
ular interest. Examples are poverty-related diseases, environment issues,and sci-
entific challenges lacking of immediate utility. Cooperation represents the way
forward also in the pursuit of big science projects as, e.g., building a fusion reactor,
enabling high-speed information networks and the GEAM (Geographical Eco-
nomic Agglomeration Model) program. Thirdly, to reinforce the Community’s ex-
ternal relations and international commitments.
To accomplish such complex tasks, the European Commission has proposed an
approach based on segmentation and focus and the set up of so-called “strategic
reference frameworks”. These may have either sector / thematic foci, or indeed
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concentrate on a certain region, or both, depending on the targeted issue. The strat-
egy entails three major steps. Europe must first identify its own interests and prior-
ities, also in terms of country or region. Among these, we then need to see which
interests also shared by the other party, and which are equally beneficial to our
third-country, third-region partners. This further implies the necessity to be selec-
tive and focus on the implementation of a limited number of priorities. For in-
stance, the Euro-Mediterranean partnerships with some Mediterranean partner
countries has delivered a lot in terms better cooperation and better mutual under-
standing. Likewise, the Asia-Europe Aquaculture platform is achieving important
results in very broad and important issues related to aquatic sciences and fisheries.
Following the above mentioned approach, the EC has structured the seventh FP
into four main specific programmes. The novel feature of the FP is that the bulk of
cooperation with third countries takes place within the thematic priorities, in a
Specific Program (SP) called “cooperation”. This happens in twoways. On the one
hand, the program is open to third countries. The participation of certain regions of
the world is to be even promoted in some calls for proposals. On the other hand,
specific cooperation actions are designed to address specific problems and are spe-
cifically budgeted for the purpose.
To implement this strategy there is a “Capacities SP” in place, which uses various
coordination means to identify concrete priorities and launches the relative calls
for proposals. The Capacities SP is open to the participation of third countries
through Research Infrastructures, SMEs and Science in Society. It also has “Dedi-
cated International Cooperation Activities” that support the policy making and pri-
ority setting, to be used to shape the approach of the themes.
The “People SP” keeps the good tradition established with the Marie Curie inter-
national fellowships and S&T agreements with various countries. In the People SP
of the 7th FP the return aspect is more important than in the past. Outgoing fellow-
ships are to be in fact granted with mandatory return, i.e. the reintegration of Euro-
pean researchers gone abroad.
Moreover, in the 7th FP attention has been devoted to European researchers who
are active in third countries. To this end, there are host-driven actions, incoming
individual fellowships, schemes for neighbouring countries, S&T agreement and
actions to address the scientific “Diaspora” of Europeans abroad and foreigners in
Europe. The Ideas SP also offers the possibility for individual research teams to in-
vite third country researchers on the merit of their scientific excellence.
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Figure 1. FP7 – participating countries (situation at Sep. 2006)
Figure 1 shows the way countries are segmented. Extremely important is the group
in the lower right part, the so called “international cooperation partner countries”.
These are the ones entitled for funding, if they participate in EU programs (always
based on shared interests and benefits).
Figure 2. Number of participations of INCO group of countries in INCO (specific
actions) and in thematic priorities opening (contracts) overall (02/2006)
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Figure 2 gives a flavour on what has been done in FP6. A big difference emerges
with respect to the ability of different parts of the world to participate in the main-
stream European research (in dark blue). Mainstream research is now the thematic
priorities. From Figure 2 it can be seen that Russia, for instance, has gone a long
way ahead to be a full partner in many of our projects. Conversely, a lot needs to be
done with our neighbouring countries.
Concluding, as mentioned the organising element is the Capacities Program. This
has the aim to strengthen overall coordination and to ensure a coherent approach,
while finding synergies with other community policies, such as external relations,
development, trade or environment services.
The means we have for that are policy dialogues, S&T Cooperation Partnerships
and also coordination of national policies through ERAnets. We are also planning
an open method of coordination. The indicative budget for the CP is 182 million
Euros over the seven years of the FP.
Important challenges await FP7. Firstly, how to effectively coordinate the interna-
tional cooperation activities. Secondly, how to ensure (specific calls, dedicated
quota ?) the budgetary commitment for specific international cooperation actions
in Cooperation SP. Last, how to maintain the geographic and thematic diversity of
third country collaborations (collaboration only with selected countries?).
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3.4 Prioritization and engagement: The political
economy of organizing «Public goods» policy
responses
D. Foray
Introduction
I would like to report some of the results of the work we are doing within the expert
group on “Knowledge for Growth”, set by Commissioner Potocnik.The first report
we have produced deals with the globalisation of R&D. In particular, it investi-
gates how to better link the European economy to the ‘foreign’ sources of knowl-
edge and how to make EU a more attractive place for R&D investments (Foray,
2006)..
The “Knowledge for growth” (KfG) proposal
The Knowledge for growth proposal has suggested to Commissioner Potoènik a
four policy-axes plan for the development of the knowledge economy. This would
entail dramatic changes in the way resources are allocated to the critical domains
of the knowledge economy, i.e. to education and research. However, both the pri-
vate and the business sectors do not respond to political messages but rather to in-
centives. Hence, the problem is to change the incentives and the pay-off structures
of our economies so that investing in R&D becomes a highly profitable invest-
ment. I do believe this represent the main point.
The second policy axis we propose regards the orientation of the economy towards
the right fields of specialisation. In addition to this, economic institutions need to
be transformed and modes of governance changed in such a way as to support the
implementation of two axes previously mentioned. For example, if we want to
have an intensively innovative economy we need some labour market flexibility.
And this is something that most of continental Europe simply does not have. Fi-
nally, we need to adapt and coordinate the other policies to those of the knowledge
economy. Competition policy, but also and above all the macroeconomic policies.
In this respect, Philippe Aghion stresses the important role that macroeconomic
policy may play in the different phases of the business cycle. Especially during de-
pressions, when firms have problems to fund their R&D, macroeconomic policies
should aim at counterbalancing the negative trend and act in a countercyclical
fashion. How to pursue such an objective, also and especially at the European
level, is not obvious though.
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As for the second policy axis proposed, the KfG group deems fundamental for Eu-
rope to choose and fast move towards the “right” specialisations in Europe. This is
extremely important because not all innovations have the same value. Some may
have a huge impact over productivity, like for instance happens in the case of the
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Some others simply have
not. The knowledge base, with its different specialisations, is a key driver of
growth. Unfortunately, Europe is penalised precisely by having missed the new
economy. Apart from some obvious examples, like Finland, in general Europe did
not really commit to the new economy. Therefore, although Europe is strong in
some areas, these last end up having complex effects in terms of productivity.
All this said, however, we are aware that moving towards the right specialisa-
tion(s) is not straightforward, nor it is obvious how to get there. Creating a clear vi-
sion of the next areas that will be blessed by greater productivity potentials is not
trivial. The issue, I believe, is more complicated than simply selecting the most ex-
citing fields. Technology foresight exercises unfortunately tend to produce the
same priority rankings, regardless of the context and the country for which they are
produced. So it happens that all countries move towards those that are currently
considered as the best high-tech sectors, such as nanotechnologies,
biotechnologies, etc.. However, this scarcely imaginative way to choose the next
areas where to commit the countries’ strategic resources results in the dangerous
uniformity of the various national knowledge bases and the deterioration of their
originality and distinctiveness. I do not think that Europe can afford, for instance,
to have too many centres of excellence in the biotech field.
Each region, each country, should carefully reconsider what makes its knowledge
base original and unique. It is extremely important to carry out what we call a
“particularisation” process, i.e. to identify the next focus areas while maintaining
the originality and distinctiveness of the knowledge base. Particularising entails
the ability to find the intersection(s) between some kind of important generic tech-
nologies and what makes the various national/regional knowledge bases original
and distinctive. I further deem the particularisation process to represent a very
good mechanism to reconcile conflicting objectives. I believe it could help for in-
stance reconciling competitiveness and regional cohesion. In fact, although re-
gional cohesion is a very important objective for the European Union, it often con-
flicts with competitiveness. This happens because in any kind of growth process
there exist positive feedbacks, polarisation, and the consequent selection of a few
winners. This winner-takes-all type of equilibrium means that not all regions can
and will be world-renown centre of excellence in high-tech. R&D may also in-
volve indivisibility, which means that R&D projects always have a minimum effi-
cient scale, which makes some regions unable to get this kind of critical mass. Be-
sides, there are agglomeration economies and scarce resources. This means that, in
a sense, the intra-European distribution of resources among regions aiming to in-
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crease regional cohesion can lead to bad results. These consist in the dissipation of
a significant part of the agglomeration economies, with the consequent inability
for any region to achieve the critical mass needed to progress. Therefore, even in a
growth process where selection, polarisation and winner-takes-all issues are at
stake, competitiveness and regional cohesion can be reconciled. This might hap-
pen if each region innovates according to its particularisation process, thus gener-
ating useful technological knowledge for the benefit of the whole European com-
munity.
Governance and policy processes
Table 1 shows a simple taxonomy of the various «public goods» policy responses,
i.e. the different modes of governance and coordination of national actions put in
place in Europe.
Table 1. Organizing the "public goods" policy responses
Delegation to
a unified actor
EC, ECB
Hard coordination
with sanctions
Stability and Growth Pact
Voluntary
coordination
OMC, Lisbon strategy
Soft coordination
by guiding rules
Luxemburg and Cardiff Process
Source: Collignon (2003)
For instance, the Lisbon Strategy is based on voluntary coordination. This consti-
tutes a very “soft” way to push a policy agenda forward, as it is confined to the pro-
duction of reports and benchmarks, as well as to peer pressures, but no hard coordi-
nation and sanctions are involved.
I reckon this is not an appropriate way to pursue such fundamental policy objec-
tives, as this kind of open coordination proves to be effective only in presence of
strategic complementarities between the different national actions. This means
that countries will be able to benefit from collective achievements only if they as
well make the adequate national efforts. This is the case, for instance, of standard
setting but certainly not that of R&D. R&D is a sort of a public good and countries
do hope to reap some benefits from collective efforts without investing too many
resources of their own. Given the existence of spillovers, there always exist an in-
centive to free ride. Hence, we have a mismatch between governance – which is
very soft and not mandatory – and the economic nature of the goods that are in-
volved. This can certainly represent a problem. We would rather need strong and
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vigorous initiatives from the centre, aimed to increase and generate more incen-
tives and leverage effects.
In Europe we also experience a second type of problem. Our situation is in a cer-
tain sense opposite that of the US, where the budget is very low at the central level
and very high at the state level.
Conclusions
I believe the Lisbon Strategy is somewhat trapped between these two problems.
On the one hand, there exists the incentive for national states to free ride, simply
because of spillovers. On the other hand, the weak centralised capacity of the EU
makes it unlikely that individual states commit and act in the sought direction. I do
believe we need new policy processes, involving original models of research fund-
ing able to ensure an efficient and sufficient allocation of resources. This does not
entail changing the current EU modes of coordination, as they will always be ex-
tremely decentralised. Member states are and will be the main responsible for the
achievement of the targets set by the Lisbon Agenda. Still, this can be done accord-
ing to a suitable particularisation process. New areas of integrated knowledge and
technological services may emerge out of the particularisation process, thus offer-
ing opportunities and creating competitive advantages. This is especially true in
areas like healthcare, environment, energy as well as many others, where the cen-
trality of R&D is emerging as cross-sectional solution to structural problems. In
such areas one can expect to build coalitions, sub-coalitions of countries or other
stakeholders in favour of credible commitments to R&D. I believe such type of
governance should work. If particularisation is well-made, spillovers can be inter-
nalised within clubs of countries or people, thus avoiding to represent a problem
when trying to ensure national efforts and commitments to R&D. Evidently, the
particularisation process needs to be carried out at the EU level and there is room
for common ground rules for the formation of such coalitions (like transparency,
time origins, openness to all EU fronts, etc.). Still, I would envisage such a process
to constitute a suitable way forward to achieve EU goals.
Finally, I would like to emphasise the importance of prioritising and of avoiding
uniformity, sub-critical mass and dissipation of agglomeration economies. To do
so it is necessary to clearly identify the (possibly unique) knowledge base of a cer-
tain region/country. It is also necessary to find the best way in order to invest in it,
modernise it, forming coalitions and maximise the absorption of spillovers. In this
way, strategic complementarities can be obtained between national and regional
actions.
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3.5 National innovation policy in an international
world – perspectives from Finland
O. Toivanen
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Introduction
It has long been recognized that innovation is central to economic growth. Con-
temporaneously well appreciated have been the twin facts that private inventive ef-
forts rely on inputs from other actors in the society, and that innovators seldom if
ever are the sole beneficiaries of their innovations. Public policies to foster innova-
tion derive their justification from these observations and have after WWII come
to prominence and taken centre stage, for example, in the Lisbon strategy of the
European Union21. An almost trivial observation that seems to have escaped wider
public discussion of its policy consequences is that, in today’s increasingly inter-
nationalized market place, the other beneficiaries from a given inventor’s innova-
tion are not within the same national borders. In this article I will first review the
main justifications for innovation policy and then proceed to an analysis of how a
small open economy should reassess the implications of economic rationales. In
the third section of the paper I then review recent Finnish research that tries to
quantitatively assess the value of innovations to the whole society. I conclude in
the fourth section by offering my views on how to take the lessons of theoretical
and empirical work into account in designing European innovation policy.
Economic rationales for innovation policy
a) The basic argument
As is well known, economic theory offers a solid foundation for state intervention
in innovative activities, this being quite unlike most other spheres of human activ-
ity. The basic motivation for state intervention – this need for an activist policy –
comes from the following two observations: First, inventive activity by its very na-
ture necessitates upfront investments that are at least to some degree sunk. As an
example, somebody spending her time trying to come up with a new drug for ma-
laria will not be able to use that time in any other way. Second, once successful, the
inventor is not able to reap all the benefits from her invention. In the malaria exam-
ple, it is highly unlikely (somewould claim impossible, as we are talking of human
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21 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/innovation/communication.htm
life) that the inventor is able to price her newly invented drug in such a way that ev-
erybody who buys it pays as high a price as he is ever willing to pay. Besides users,
it is important to keep in mind that, to continue the example, the strides that the ma-
laria researcher makes may help researchers developing other drugs to get forward
in their quest. Thus other inventors and firmsmay benefit from research efforts and
investments done elsewhere.
We all have plenty of experience from buying new goods and services that we con-
sider enhancing our living standards by a vastly higher amount than what we paid
for them in the first place. An inescapable conclusion from these twin observations
of sunk costs and the inventor not reaping all the benefits is that there will always
be inventions that we as a society would want to take place, but which generate pri-
vate benefits to the inventor that fall below the costs of inventing, thereby render-
ing investments into these inventions privately unprofitable. The conclusion is that
we as a society would want to compensate the would-be inventors of those innova-
tions for whom the private benefits fall below private costs in order to reap the ben-
efits from their innovations.
b) The small economy version
How is this sound logic affected by the fact that the human race and policy makers
are fragmented into many, mostly small, nations? The view of economic theory is
that, at best, domestic politicians should strive to maximize the well-being of their
domestic citizenry 22. This, at least as a first approximation, must be then taken to
include the direct benefit that the citizens of a country get from a product after we
have taken into account the price they pay for it, and the profits of the firm from its
world-wide sales.
I first consider “only” the consumer surplus-justification for innovation policy, the
reason being that the same argument applies to many other justifications. I will
then turn to these other justifications.
It is however a well-documented fact in the economics literature23 that the benefits
of innovations made in a given country are not confined to that country alone. To
take a European example, a large part of the inventive activity that lead to the mo-
bile phones we all use was made by European firms in European countries.
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However, all kinds of people from poor Bangladeshi villagers to New York invest-
ment bankers have benefited from these inventive efforts. If one takes the view a
European politician that strives to maximize Europeans’ well-being ought to take,
the benefits of individuals in Bangladesh and New York should not be taken into
account when designing innovation policy, e.g. R&D subsidies. Narrowing down
to nation states, the politicians designing Finnish innovation policy should not take
into account the benefits that accrue from Finnish innovations to Swedish individ-
uals or firms.
It is important to understand that this observation may have profound impacts on
the currently used motivation for innovation policy. To illustrate, take again Fin-
land as an example. Imagine a Finnish firm planning to invest in research into a
new product and that if successful, that they would be able to sell this product to
every human being on the planet. The CIA factbook www-site estimates that there
were 6,525,170,264 people on this planet as of July 2006. The same source esti-
mates the Finnish population to have been 5,231,372 at the said point in time. The
Finnish population is thus some .08 % of the world population. To proceed, let us
make two assumptions: First, the benefit per a Finn from this new product is on av-
erage the same as for everybody else’s. Second, the firm and an individual share
50/50 the benefits from the product. Third, let each individual’s benefit from the
product be 1 €.
These assumptions lead to the following outcomes: 1) World benefits from this in-
novation to the value of 13,050,340,528 €, 2) the value of the innovation to the
Finnish society is 6,525,170,264 € (=firm profits) + 5,231,372 € (=the Finnish
consumers’ benefit), in sum, 6,530,401,636 €.
The inescapable conclusion is that 1) 99.02 % of the benefits that the firm does not
get are outside Finland, 2) the Finnish society gets almost exactly the same benefit
as the firm, the difference being only .08 %, as the firm’s profits are in this example
exactly as large as the benefits of all consumers around the world (this is what the
firm gains) and the Finnish society gains these firm profits and the improvement in
the living standards of its own citizens.
It follows from this exercise that there is very little reason for the Finnish society to
support the firm in its inventive efforts. The reason is that the firm’s interests and
the Finnish society’s interests are almost exactly the same, and therefore the Finn-
ish politicians can rest assured that whatever the firm decides to do is (almost) opti-
mal for the Finnish society at large, not the firm alone. Thus, the standard eco-
nomic justification for innovation policy completely evaporates in the case of a
small open economy.
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Innovation policy is often justified not only by consumer surplus arguments, but
one or more of the following, too: positive knowledge spillovers to other (domes-
tic) firms, tax benefits to the society, firm profits and risk aversion by the firms.
The key observation is that as long as firms are risk-neutral, being a small open
economy has the same impact on these arguments as it has on using consumer sur-
plus as the justification for innovation policy. By this I do not mean that there are
no justifications for innovation policy in a small open economy that have a solid
background in economic theory, but that many of the justifications most often put
forward may not stand up to scrutiny.
However, if firms are risk-averse, it no longer is the case that firm profits and taxes
lose weight as justifications for innovation policy. A small open economy should
practice exactly the same policy as somebody designing global innovation policy,
as long as the profits and ensuing taxes go to the home country of the firm.
There is a problem with this justification, too: There is, to my knowledge at least,
little if any evidence suggesting that firms are risk-averse. In fact, the theoretical
literature provides sound arguments for the opposite case. Because of limited lia-
bility which limits the downside a firm faces, and competition by other firms, firms
maywell have strong incentives to choose as risky (R&D) projects as possible24.
The foregoing raises considerably the importance of understanding how large
knowledge spillovers are within a national economy. It is to this question that I
turn to in the next Section.
How large are domestic benefits from R&D?
This question has attracted a lot of attention, but in the interest of space, I will con-
centrate here on a single study that has looked at it with a newmethodology and us-
ing data from a small open economy, namely Finland. In recent work, Takalo,
Tanayama and Toivanen (2005) study the R&D subsidy granting process in Fin-
land. R&D subsidies are the main policy tool of innovation policy and therefore of
direct interest.
They develop a method that allows one to use the decisions of the subsidy granting
state agency (Tekes) to evaluate the monetary value of a given R&D investment to
1) the firm undertaking the investment and 2) to the rest of the Finnish society.
What they find is that the value of private R&D projects to the rest of the society
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(excluding the firm making the investments) is small in comparison to the profits
the firm makes.
This is what one would expect in a small open economy. Importantly, for policy
purposes, they measure these spillovers (to Finnish consumers and other firms) to
react to R&D subsidies. For the median firm, if their estimates are correct, the
R&D subsidies that Tekes actually granted nearly double the benefits from a given
innovation to the rest of the Finnish society. This result suggests that even in a
small open economy, there may be a role for an activist innovation policy, even
though one must add that a social cost-benefit analysis clearly needs to be exe-
cuted.
Conclusions and policy implications
I have above argued that while economic theory provides a sound rationale for in-
novation policy, the usefulness of these arguments, or the conclusions one draws
from them, need to be heavily adjusted when considering a small open economy in
a globalized world. As to European decision making on innovation policy, the im-
plications are equally clear: While a small open economy to a great extent should
neglect the benefits from domestic inventive effort on other countries, this is no
more true if a number of open economies design innovation policy together. Then
they ought to take account the benefits (and costs) accruing to their joint citizenry
and to each countries’ firms. There is thus a clear role for policy coordination
within EU in terms of innovation policy.
The second, at least equally important implication is that a small open economy
should strongly consider investing in those parts of the innovation system that best
allow it to benefit from research and development efforts in other countries.The
obvious examples of such societal investments are education and basic research.
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3.6 The role of international trade rules in
promoting development and technology transfer
M. A. J. Teehankee
25
Introduction
I would like to share with you my experience as Chairman of the Working Group
on Trade and Transfer of Technology (TTT) of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). In particular, I will deal with trade rules, how development is related to in-
ternational rule-making and technology transfer, and how trade and technology re-
late to each other. I will then proceed to briefly illustrate the work of the WTO it-
self and, in particular, that of the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Tech-
nology. Along the way, I also hope to provide some historical framework, i.e. how
the TTT Working Group was born, the North–South perspective and the debates
that are currently on-going within the WTO. Finally, I will make some recommen-
dations and concluding remarks, which have been gathered from the discussions of
the Working Group that have taken place over the last few years.
International rule-making on technology transfer
International rule-making can be said to have both a reflective or positive role and
a normative role. On one hand, domestic and international rule-making may be
said to simply reflect historical practice, traditions or customs, as well as past
norms. In this case, it may not be of great interest to many science-based organisa-
tions or to the private investment sector, as the laws or rules would just mirror past
practices. On the other hand, legislation or rule-making may also reflect contem-
porary or up-to-date norms, as it happens for instance with respect to technology,
subsidies and investment-related policies. If done quickly enough, this kind of
rule-making may have quite an impact.
In addition, legislation or rule-making may be future-oriented, visionary and
geared towards development and the solution of real social problems. This is the
case when laws are used as an attempt to alleviate poverty or when rule-making
processes are pursued for purposes of designing coherent policies to address social
and development goals. For instance, we could consider the Bayh-Dole Act (35
USC 200–212), passed in 1980, to be an example of a visionary type of rule-mak-
ing – whereby universities were encouraged tomaximize their ability to exploit the
knowledge they helped creating. This is the hope and vision we have with respect
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to the rule-making we are trying to do at the WTO, i.e. future-oriented and devel-
opment-oriented, that these rules would ultimately have a real social impact. In this
sense, rule-making is and can be normative.
Another important role accomplished by international rule-making is to increase
the harmonisation of domestic systems and of the different rules in place in various
jurisdictions. This is the case, for instance, in the harmonisation of laws at the Eu-
ropean Union level, which is instrumental in order to achieve more harmonised
and coherent economic policies in the ultimate pursuit of the European Union’s
common development goals.
Transfer of technology and development
To fully understand the relevance of transfer of technology for the development of
countries we should consider how capital and technology flows relate among
themselves. Essentially capital, wealth and savings allow countries to invest in
Science and Technology (S&T), to fund research and to accumulate intellectual
assets and intellectual property. This brings economic benefits, as new enterprises
are created, trade and exports are spurred and employment increased. Society
hence benefits in terms of both the knowledge and the employment that are cre-
ated. Besides that, enterprises generate profits, dividends and royalties and, more
broadly, new wealth. These feed into the system and trigger new cycles of invest-
ments, thus contributing to reinforce the virtual circle and cycle of knowledge and
technology creation and exploitation.
Unfortunately, developing countries are often excluded from such a cycle. The
goal of the TTT Working Group is therefore to try and expand the cycle in such a
way as to include more developing countries. Our ultimate goal is to support de-
velopment and thus address poverty eradication.
The working group on trade and technology transfer: A brief
historical perspective
The WTO TTT Working Group has its roots in the activity of many developing
countries’ negotiators pursuing technology transfer and development goals. It all
started in the 1970ies, when there was an attempt by the United Nations to adopt a
draft international code of conduct on transfer of technology. This attempt failed
and the negotiations terminated in 1985. There is an interesting work by Patel,
Roffe and Yusuf (2000) on the impact and the aftermath of the failed negotiations
for the draft code.
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Then, in 1992, at the Rio Earth Summit, some concrete rule-making took place
within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In particu-
lar, Article 4, paragraph 1(c) expressly stated the mandate to “Promote and coop-
erate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer of technol-
ogies, of practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol…”. The
mandate of paragraph 4 is further concretised in the provision contained in para-
graph 5 of the UN Climate Change Convention. This achievement in Rio repre-
sents a major step towards international cooperation on technology transfer, since
it had takenmany years of debate and discussions to encapsulate the concept in this
one paragraph and to reach an international consensus on it. Paragraph 5 states
that
“The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included
in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and fi-
nance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally
sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly develo-
ping country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the
Convention. In this process, the developed country Parties shall sup-
port the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and
technologies of developing country Parties. Other Parties and or-
ganizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the
transfer of such technologies.”
The provisions contained in the 1992 convention constitute the first international
rule-making consensus on the importance of transferring technologies. This in part
relates to the commonly perceived urgency and societal benefit at the global level
in relation to environmental concerns and explains in part why it was possible to
achieve such a consensus in Rio. Conversely, there is no consensus or common
perception, as of yet, with respect to other technology-related issues, such as its
role in development.
At the environmental policy level, progress has also continued over the years. In
2001, an expert group on technology transfer was established, during the confer-
ence session of the Climate Change Convention. The group is composed of twenty
experts, three of whom are from Africa, three from the Asia-Pacific area, three
from Latin America, one from the Island States, seven from developed countries
and three from international organisations. Hence, progress has been made in the
realm of environment-related technology transfer issues, although these are still at
the level of a framework and much work remains to be done.
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Another example of consensus being reached, related to technology transfer, is
in the field of trans-national investments as contained in the 2000 OECD “Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises.” These are voluntary guidelines that the
OECD encourages its member multinational corporations to adopt or observe. In
particular, Guideline VIII on Science and Technology contains five main man-
dates, 1) to ensure compatibility with host state S&T policies; 2) to permit the
transfer and rapid diffusion of technologies; 3) to perform S&T development
work in the host state; 4) to agree upon reasonable licensing terms for intellectual
property; and 5) to perform cooperative research projects with local universities
and industry.
As regards the WTO, in 2001, the origins of the TTT Working Group started with
the proposal by twelve developing countries to study the relationship between
trade and technology transfer. The proposal (WT/GC/W/443) was reported to the
Doha Ministerial Conference. This resulted in paragraph 37 of the Doha Ministe-
rial declaration, which now serves as the legal basis for the establishment and the
work of the TTT Working Group at the WTO. At Doha the Ministers of all the
Member States of the WTO agreed:
“to an examination in aWorking Group under the auspices of the Gene-
ral Council, of the relationship between trade and transfer of technolo-
gy, and of any possible recommendations on steps that might be taken
within the mandate of the WTO to increase flows of technology to deve-
loping countries.”
This is a short paragraph, but in international law and rule-making one cannot dis-
count its importance as it has taken many years to reach a consensus on this issue.
The operative word used in the Doha Declaration, “examination,” denotes the
level of commitment that developed countries were ready to agree to, while devel-
oping countries had urged more than just an examination and more active
rule-making to be done. The Doha Declaration does mention the examination as
well of “any possible recommendations” and “steps that might be taken” but it was
left ambiguous as to whether the Working Group could or would in fact make any
such recommendations. Still, out of this compromise, at least the Working Group
was born in Doha and the work did commence in 2002.
WTO: Technology-related provisions
The mandate and activity of the TTT Group has to be framed within the other
WTO provisions related to technology. Some of them are contained in the GATS,
the General Agreement on Trade in Services. These are quite important, since a lot
of progress is taking place in the service sector and it is one of the areas with the
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highest growth rates. In particular, there are existing provisions aimed at strength-
ening the services sector of WTO member countries through access to technology.
The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement contains provisions encourag-
ing countries to agree upon and implement international standards. More pre-
cisely, the TBT Agreement encourages the formal acceptance of the standards of
other countries through explicit agreements, as well as the use of international
standards. Other important provisions are contained in the WTO Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement). The
ultimate aim of this agreement is to improve or protect human and animal health,
as well as the phytosanitary situation of all WTO member countries. It applies to
all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect
international trade and states both rights and obligations. Among other provisions,
of particular importance to our topic is Article 9 of the SPS Agreement, where it is
explicitly stated that members agree to facilitate the provision of technical assis-
tance to other countries, especially developing countries, in the areas of, inter alia,
processing technologies, research and infrastructure.
Another extremely important WTO agreement is the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which includes provisions on
trade in counterfeit goods.The TRIPS Agreement resulted from the acknowledg-
ment by all member countries that the varying standards applied in the protection
and enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and the lack of multilateral
frameworks, principles, rules and disciplines dealing with international trade in
counterfeit goods had become a growing source of tension in international eco-
nomic relations. The TRIPS agreement hence addresses the applicability of basic
GATT principles and those of the relevant international intellectual property
agreements. It also encompasses the provision of adequate IPRs and effective en-
forcement measures for those rights, multilateral dispute settlement, and transi-
tional arrangements. Of particular interest to us is Articles 7 and 8, for the general
principles they contain. Article 7 states that -
“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner con-
ducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations.”
To this statement of general development andwelfare objectives, Article 8 adds –
“Appropriate measures, … may be needed to prevent the abuse of intel-
lectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
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unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international trans-
fer of technology.”
The TRIPS agreement was much criticised as bowing to much to the demands of
intellectual property owners in the developed world and was amended in Decem-
ber 2005 in order to address the compelling public health crises relating to HIV,
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (WT/L/641) and to allow for the creation of an ex-
ception to the general protection of IPRs. This amendment arose out of a major de-
cision that had already been reached in 2002, which officially created a waiver al-
lowing for compulsory licensing and export of drugs done consistently with do-
mestic regulation. The decision had addressed the manufacturing capacity con-
straints of developing countries for generics, as these countries were unable to
make full use of compulsory licenses due to their limited manufacturing capacity.
This amendment and the waiver before it arose out of the great debate that public
health ought to take a higher priority than intellectual property protection.
The provisions of all these WTO agreements are quite important and significant in
the international rule-making context, as the WTO is an international institution
where rules, once agreed upon, have some real or effective bite. This arises be-
cause of the unique dispute settlement system of the WTO which has been crafted
to allow for actual commercial and legal impact when its rules are violated. This
ensures that WTO rules are internationally enforceable. Violations leading to dis-
pute resolution could result in billions of dollars of penalties being imposed
through tariffs, as has already been the case in several occasions.
The TTT group: IPRs and the North Versus South focus
Different perspectives can be observed within the WTO Working Group on Trade
and Technology Transfer. On the one hand, we have the position of the Northern
Countries, who focus on non-prescriptive aspects. Their activities primarily aim at
examining relationships while, at the same time, ensuring the avoidance of any
weakening in the protection of intellectual property rights. Among the Northern
Countries, the United States, the EU, and Canada have been especially active.
They have consistently maintained their position that the TTT Working Group
should: avoid duplicating the role and prerogatives of the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO); guard against any weakening of IPRs; and preserve the
protections granted in the TRIPS. For them, the debate on technology transfer and
potential decisions taken could constitute a possible loophole or back door that
could affect the protection of intellectual property rights.
On the other hand, the Southern perspective has been to seek the adoption of rec-
ommendations that will make the mandate for technology transfer more effective
and meaningful. These countries argue that the TRIPS is riddled with all sorts of
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qualifiers, even when it comes to simply acknowledging the possible benefits of
technology transfer to developing countries. Among the most outspoken develop-
ing countries there are Brazil, India and Pakistan. Brazil, for example, among de-
veloping countries has been able to develop effective technology transfer
programmes. It has consistently criticised developed countries’ refusal to move on
technology-related issues.
To support the discussion, several studies have been presented by Members and
expert organizations to the TTT Working Group. Among these, case studies on the
aircraft industry in Brazil, pharmaceuticals in India and automotives in South Af-
rica, as well as a survey of home country measures, taxation policies related to
technology and their impact on economic or business development. Various de-
veloping country proposals have also been discussed (W/6, W/10), including a re-
cent one calling for the adoption of the OECD voluntary guidelines.
Although the discussions on trade and technology transfer used to be a
North-South debate, the TTT Working Group has progressively shifted its focus to
the sharing of specific experiences, and countries have been generous in this as-
pect. The TTT Working Group has in effect attempted to enlarge its focus to take
into account the dynamic interplay of themany factors that can lead to the effective
transfers of technologies.
Figure 1. TT and the development goal
Technology transfer, like trade, is not an end in itself, but a gateway to growth and
development. To this end, specific issues need to be taken into account such as in-
vestment flows, competition rules and, certainly, intellectual property regimes. In
this respect, the consideration of the home and host country’s measures is of para-
mount importance. For instance, indigenous technology preservation is an issue
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within the Convention on Biological Diversity. Technology generation and cre-
ation is another fundamental issue at stake when it comes to analysing how domes-
tic technologies are created. Korea, for instance, is an example of a country where
a lot of technology creation happens as a result of certain result-oriented and con-
crete policy decisions. Another fundamental issue is the absorptive capacity of
countries and regions.
Given the high rhetoric that ultimately led to the creation of the TTT Working
Group, it has been extremely difficult to make progress on the myriad of issues
that should be considered and discussed in relation to the vital importance of tech-
nology transfer policies in promoting trade enhancement and development. How-
ever, with the passage of time, the discussions have becoming more mature. There
are less and less black or white or two-sided debates or arguments, and there have
been improvements, especially over the past two years, in the deliberations aimed
at providing recommendations to all Member countries on what would be the best
practices related to technology transfer policies. Also the developed countries, in-
cluding the United States, have shown some willingness to discuss or analyse, for
example, tax incentive measures concerning trade and transfer of technology.
Still, it is very challenging. Countries and negotiators, as humans, are often very
easily ready to be at the opposite side of the fence and at each other’s necks, and
less ready to put aside differences, and to view things from a broader and mutually
or bilaterally beneficial perspective, even within the international setting of the
WTO. Annexed herewith for reference is a summary of the work of the TTTWork-
ing Group, until 2006, and it still remains to be seen how far the work and discus-
sions will go in order to arrive at a consensus that can deliver more concrete results
which will make technology transfer serve the trade, economic and development
goals of all countries.
Looking forward: Our vision
My own vision of the way forward for the debate on transfer of technologies and
the TTT Working Group is made of four fundamental approaches:
Firstly, that there ought to be more consensual recognition of the necessity to pur-
sue the establishment of multilateral rules for technology transfer. Secondly, along
with this recognition there is the necessity that these rules, if any, also recognize
the primary role of home country measures and policies in making effective trans-
fers of technologies and concerning the absorption and adoption of technologies in
the home country. Thirdly, I would encourage domestic and multilateral fiscal in-
centives and funding for R&D and S&T. Fourth and last, the focus and energy
should shift away from intellectual property protection towards win-win technol-
ogy partnerships.
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Evidently, to do so there is the need to first identify the benefits for firms that in-
vest in R&D (with or without the assistance of their governments). Moving to-
wards a win-win position does not imply prejudicing intellectual property rights,
but rather encouraging cooperation and partnership, for the benefit of development
and for mutual benefit as well. And by development I mean the progressive devel-
opment of societies, increased incomes and prosperity,and poverty eradication,
which would in turn benefit and make more dynamic the global economy and the
global village we live in.
Although some governments do aggressively protect intellectual property, I be-
lieve still that things are changing. On the one hand, developed countries’ pol-
icy-makers are putting increasing emphasis on cooperating with developing coun-
tries, as Part VIII of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises shows.
On the other hand, developing countries are also adopting a more balanced ap-
proach, focusing less on questioning the need for IPR Protection while stressing
the need to cooperate in R&D, S&T and technology transfer (as can be seen in a
proposal tabled by India, Pakistan and the Philippines in October of 2005,
WT/WGTTT/W/10). The submission highlights the crucial role of technology and
technical know-how in improving productivity, promoting export growth and at-
taining developmental goals. It also introduced some possible recommendations
that the Working Group could make. The proponents believe that, in order to facil-
itate technology transfer, the development of clear implementation and monitoring
processes, including fiscal support, is very important. Such mechanisms, as those
in multilateral environmental agreements (e.g. the Montreal Protocol which men-
tions transfer of technologies needed to phase out the use of ozone depleting indus-
trial substance), could serve as models. The recommendations contained in this de-
veloping country submission included:
(i) Expanding technical assistance under the TRIPS Agreement by linking
Article 67 to Articles 66.2 and 7. to include institutions and firms in de-
veloping countries, especially LDCs.
(ii) Formal adoption of voluntary guidelines, such as those of the OECD to
Multinational Firms. Governments could provide incentives to their
multinational firms to “perform science and technology development
work in host countries”, grant licenses “on reasonable terms and condi-
tions”, and adopt “practices that permit the transfer and rapid diffusion
of technology and know-how” to developing countries.
(iii) Provision of help to developing countries to improve or implement
competition policies capable of monitoring and discouraging use of
restrictive business practices by technology owners and by ensuring
firms adopt similar or better practices at home and abroad.
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(iv) Developed countries could encourage licensing and subcontracting, and
support firms in developing countries access technological information
and drafting of contracts.
(v) Establish mechanisms of helping developing countries’ standard moni-
toring authorities acquire the necessary technology needed to achieve a
level that is internationally recognized, at least at sub-regional level.
Such amechanism could be tailored along themodel for national bio-sa-
fety clearing houses.
(vi) Expanding or encouraging the mobility of scientists, technologists and
technicians under GATS, develop science and technology agreements
to promote international scientific and industrial R&D collaboration,
and encourage firms and public institutions to employ, at least temporal-
ly, fresh graduates and offer consultancy services or contracts and at-
tachment to experts from developing countries to facilitate the transfer
of knowledge.
(vii) Identifying ways to encourage exchange of information on investment
and technology-related incentives provided to firms, develop
mechanisms to disseminate such information and ways to encourage
best practices in technology transfer, as well as in encouraging R&D in-
vestments or expenditures, and creating new technologies.
The submission was welcomed by the Members as a positive contribution, even
though some concerns were expressed and further clarifications were requested
and are ongoing. Members generally welcomed the submission because of its fo-
cused and pragmatic approach.
The TRIPS Amendment and the earlier TRIPS Waiver Decision is another exam-
ple of the possible new convergences between the North and the South.The WTO
stands very proud as an institution of having succeeded in getting the consensus of
all countries to agree to the TRIPS Agreement revisions. The TRIPS Amendment
has managed to pair IPR protection with flexibility. In fact, while ensuring that
those countries violating WTO agreements can be punished, it grants enough flexi-
bility as to avoid that developing countries would be too easily hailed to court for
alleged IPR violations.
In sum, therefore, I believe win-win results and new convergences can be attained
in the area of trade and transfer of technology with devoted hard work, good faith,
a belief in the doable and maintaining a level of pragmatism that does not prejudice
the ultimate goal of development for all countries and the prosperity that should be
delivered to all peoples.
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ANNEX A:
Summary of the work of the WTO WGTTT
As knowledge increasingly becomes a key strategic resource for national eco-
nomic development, technology and innovation are recognized as crucial global
means for job creation, income generation, and value-addition and for shared pros-
perity in an interdependent world.
The impact of technological improvement on economic growth and development
results from a complex long-term process involving a number of factors and ac-
tors, both at the national and international level. In this context the role of govern-
ments, businesses, academia, research and development institutes as well as inter-
national institutions cannot be overemphasized.
Issues related tothe transfer of technology on the one hand and international trade
liberalization and foreign direct investment on the other are of great importance.
Acquisition, adaptation, and diffusion of technology help improving competitive-
ness across sectors, and this is very important for developing countries, in their ef-
fort to become equal partners in the world economy.
It is generally viewed that appropriate international understandings and guide-
lines, particularly in the area of technology transfer may have the potential to facil-
itate efficient and effective generation, application, transfer, and diffusion of tech-
nology.
The Marrakesh Agreement of April 15, 1994, that established the World Trade Or-
ganization (the “WTO”), recognized the need for positive efforts designed to en-
sure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them,
could secure a share in the growth of international trade commensurate with the
needs of economic development26. The achievement of this goal may be facili-
tated, among others, by narrowing the technology gap between developed and de-
veloping countries. Accordingly, various WTO Agreements contain provisions
related to technology transfer, for example:
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26 The Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization reads in part:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while
allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable deve-
lopment, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doingso in a
manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development, ...
• the General Agreement on Trade in Services27,
• the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights28,
• the agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)29,
• the agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures30,
all contain a number of provisions, which relate to, or encourage the, transfer of
technology to developing and least developed countries.
In July 2001, a Group of developing countries tabled a proposal31 in the WTO
General Council, which proposed that the 4th Ministerial Conference of the WTO
to be held at Doha, Qatar, to establish a Working Group on Trade and Transfer of
Technology. The demandeurs proposed that the Working Group, among others,
would: explore the relationship between trade and transfer of technology; collect
and assess information on existing flows of transfer of technology to developing
countries; examine legal and administrative frameworks, particularly in technol-
ogy-exporting countries and existing financing mechanisms; as well as carry out
assessment of needs of developing countries for transfer of technology.
The Ministers at Doha in their Declaration adopted on 14 November 2001 agreed
to establish the Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology. Paragraph
37 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration states:
“We agree to an examination, in a Working Group under the auspices
of the General Council, of the relationship between trade and transfer
of technology, and of any possible recommendations on steps that might
be taken within the mandate of the WTO to increase flows of technology
to developing countries. The General Council shall report to the Fifth
Session of the Ministerial Session [Cancun 2003] on progress in the
examination.”
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27 GATS Articles IV, XIX and the Annex on Telecommunication
28 TRIPS Agreement Articles 7, 8, 40 and 66
29 Agreement on TBT, Preamble Tirets 8 and 9, articles 2 and 11
30 Agreement on SPS measures, article 9
31 WT/GC/W/443, Communication from Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Since the Doha Ministerial Conference, and keeping in line with the mandate and
the Work Programme adopted32, the work in the Working Group on Trade and
Transfer of Technology has focused on the examination of the relationship be-
tween trade and transfer of technology, as well as on any possible recommenda-
tions on steps that might be taken within the mandate of the WTO to increase flows
of technology to developing countries. Initially the work was of an educative na-
ture with theWTOSecretariat assisting the work of theWorking Group by produc-
ing a number of background papers on trade and transfer of technology as well as
providing a bibliography of referencematerials on the subject of trade and technol-
ogy transfer.33
Members also found it useful to invite other intergovernmental organisations to
make presentations on the work they were doing in the area of technology transfer.
So far, presentations have been made by the World Bank, UNCTAD, the Institute
for New Technologies of the United Nations University and UNIDO.
UNCTAD shared three cases studies on Transfer of technology for Successful In-
tegration into the Global Economy. The case studies focused on the aircraft indus-
try in Brazil, the pharmaceutical industry in India and the automobile industry in
South Africa. The focus of the three case studies is on industries where the se-
lected developing countries have demonstrated their ability to create new produc-
tive capacities and successfully participate in the world market. Each industry rep-
resents an example of created comparative advantage; that is, where a country’s
factor endowments were modified through investment in physical capital, human
resources and the building up of capacities to develop and use new technologies.
Establishing new lines of productive activity is the essence of the catch-up process
and the bridging of the gap between developing and industrial economies. The
case studies illustrate how this was done in three sophisticated and relatively capi-
tal – and technology – intensive industries.
Another UNCTAD study on “Facilitating Transfer of Technology to Developing
Countries: A Survey of Home-Country Measures”, highlighted the important role
of home-country measures in encouraging flows of technology to developing
countries.
In another study titled ‘’Taxation and Technology Transfer: Key Issues’’
UNCTAD has examined the implications of various tax instruments on technol-
ogy transfer from the perspective of both technology importing and exporting
countries, besides identifying tax policies that could promote technology transfer.
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32 Annex I of document WT/WGTTT/5.
33 WT/WGTTT/W/1 and Add.1 and WT/WGTTT/W/3.
While national tax policies can be used as an effective tool to attract FDI and tech-
nology by the host country, these can also provide incentives to encourage the ex-
port of technology as has been done by India and Japan. The mitigating effects of
excessive corporate income tax, high import duties, excessive taxation of divi-
dends, royalties and technical fees and high withholding taxes on technology
transfer were also highlighted.
More recently an UNCTAD presentation based on findings in the World Invest-
ment Report 2005 highlighted a number of means including foreign direct invest-
ments in research and development, payments for intellectual property, royalties
and licensing fees and volume of trade in capital goods etc., which could help in es-
timating the quantum of international technology flows. The study found that, al-
though the benefits of technology transfer are concentrated in a few countries and
limited to few sectors, the knowledge, skills and techniques are increasingly being
transferred internationally. The case study on the ‘Salmon Industry in Chile’ by
UNCTAD also found that as a result of concerted efforts by national and interna-
tional partners in the transfer, adaptation, development, and diffusion of technolo-
gies, there were distinct gains in this sector. The existence of national institutions
that help firms acquire and use technology, support emerging firms and encourage
the use of technical standards have also played a pivotal role in the rapid develop-
ment of this industry.
UNIDO presentations have focused on UNIDO’s role in facilitating transfer of
technology. Some of the barriers to such transfer and UNIDO’s approach and re-
sponse in this regard and UNIDO’s investment activities and initiatives with re-
spect to technology transfer were also mentioned. Another UNIDO study on
‘Technology Transfer & Trade: The Toy Industry in India’ underscored the vital
importance of technology and innovation for achieving economies of scale and
creating competitiveness; development of skills and local capacity; conformance
to international standards through technology upgrading; innovative designs;
quality; and the application of IT for enhanced competitiveness in the develop-
ment of small scale industry.
The World Bank also shared with the Working Group the studies which it had car-
ried out on the impact of trade-related technology diffusion on total factor produc-
tivity. These studies pointed to the importance of openness for north-south tech-
nology diffusion. Factors which could influence technology diffusion such as re-
gional integration, level of education, national policies and protection of property
rights were discussed. The question of what developing countries should do to at-
tract technology transfer and foreign direct investment was raised.
A number of national experts have shared their country’s experiences and perspec-
tives on technology transfer, such as Brazil, China, Korea and Canada. Submis-
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sions have also been made which highlight their experiences with technology
transfer and possible ways in which to provide incentives to increase technology
transfer to developing countries. Sharing country experience Brazil highlighted
some of the problems that it had faced in ensuring flow of appropriate technology
as well as pointing to some of the critical issues relating to technology transfer, in-
cluding in the context of FDI flows and regulatory IPR regimes. Canada explained
the function and operation of its Industrial Research Development Program and
highlighted critical issues relating to technology transfer especially with respect to
the ownership and transfer of intellectual property rights.
A number of submissions have been made in the Working Group. These include
issues that should be considered in the examination of the relationship between
trade and transfer of technology, such as the consideration of provisions relating to
transfer of technology in WTO agreements, and examining the extent to which
they have been effectively implemented; and possible recommendations on steps
that might be taken within the mandate of the WTO to increase flows of technol-
ogy to developing countries.
A large number of issues have been touched upon during discussions on the vari-
ous submissions, presentations and background papers. The broad themes dis-
cussed include the definition of transfer of technology; the importance of the en-
abling environment; the role of home and host countries; the linkages with intel-
lectual property rights and with foreign direct investment; transfer of technology
provisions in the WTO Agreements; and the role of technical assistance in this
area. The deliberations in the Working Group have contributed to a better under-
standing of the multifaceted nature of technology transfer and the crucial role
played by various elements and actors in this process.
With regard to the Working Group’s mandate pertaining to “possible recommen-
dations on steps that might be taken within the mandate of the WTO to increase
flows of technology to developing countries,” the discussions have focused on a
submission by a group of developing countries34. The proponents believed that the
suggested recommendations, which by no means were exhaustive, in the paper
could constitute a good basis for concrete and practical steps that Members might
take in line with the second part of the mandate dealing with possible recommen-
dations to facilitate transfer of technology to developing countries. The submis-
sion highlighted that for developing country Members, transfer of technology was
not an end in itself but a means to an end, the end being developmental objectives
and the recommendations in the paper were important with a view to ensuring that
technology transfer served as a means of promoting development as envisaged in
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34 WT/WGTTT/W/6.
the Doha Ministerial Declaration. The suggested recommendations included that
the Working Group should undertake examination of –
(i) different provisions contained in various WTO Agreements relating to
technology transfer with a view to making these provisions operational
and meaningful from the point of view of developing countries inclu-
ding least-developed countries (LDCs).
(ii) those provisions of various WTO Agreements, which may have the ef-
fect of hindering transfer of technology to developing countries and co-
me up with recommendations as to how to mitigate the negative effects
of these provisions.
(iii) the Working Group should examine the restrictive practices adopted by
MNEs in the area of transfer of technology and come up with recom-
mendations as to how to prevent MNEs from taking recourse to such
restrictive practices. Simultaneously, recommendations could be made
as to the methods through which MNEs could be made to effectively use
the licensing route for transfer of technology.
(vi) the impact of tariff peaks and tariff escalation in developed countries on
technology transfer and come up with recommendations to remove the
adverse impact.
(v) the difficulties faced by the developing countries in meeting the stan-
dards set by different agreements because of non-availability of the rele-
vant or required technology. It should alsomake recommendations as to
how to overcome these difficulties by facilitating transfer of the relevant
technology on terms which could be considered reasonable from the
point of view of developing countries.The Working Group could also
deliberate on the practicality of developing an early warning system
with regard to standards and a mechanism to facilitate adjustment by de-
veloping countries to meet the new standards.
(vi) the need for and desirability of internationally agreed disciplines on
transfer of technology with a view to promote trade and development
and come upwith appropriate recommendations. In particular, theWor-
king Group should examine and come up with recommendations regar-
ding possible internationally agreed commitments in the field of transfer
of technology to developing countries and LDCs in areas such as expan-
ding global technological exchange and special treatment for develo-
ping countries.
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The proponents have argued that one of the objectives of the Agreement was that
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) should con-
tribute to the technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge. There was a widespread recognition, that the developing countries
were facing more hardships than benefits because of the TRIPS Agreement and
that the balance between private profits and public policy objectives had not been
properly reached in the Agreement. In the light of this, it was necessary to examine
carefully those provisions in different WTO Agreements including the provisions
in the TRIPS Agreement, which hinder rather than facilitate transfer of technol-
ogy. For example, the stringent provisions relating to compulsory licensing in the
TRIPS Agreement as well as the provision relating to the term of protection (20
years from the date of filing of patent applications), were generally believed not to
be particularly conducive for easy or quick transfer of technology.
Similarly, in this age of globalization of resources, multinational enterprises
(MNEs) adopted a number of restrictive policies on transfer of technology. In the
past licensing was a route through which at least some transfer of technology took
place. However, the onset of globalization has removed barriers to investment. As
a result, MNEs set up their own production facilities in developing countries and
are reluctant to transfer technology through licensing because of the fear that such
an approach will create competition for their own subsidiaries. There are also situ-
ations in which MNEs put restrictions on the export of products which are manu-
factured utilizing the technology transferred.
It is also recognized that the continued existence of tariff peaks and tariff escala-
tion in developed countries limit the scope for technology transfer and reduce op-
portunities for learning and innovation in developing countries.
In addition developing countries faced a number of problems in knowing about
and meeting the new trade standards set within the WTO. In this regard t sanitary
and phytosanitary standards and technical standards often add to the se difficulties
as it was basically the technological backwardness of developing countries, which
come in their way in meeting the required technical or SPS standards. Although
there were provisions in the SPSANDTBTAgreements relating to technical assis-
tance (Article 9 of SPS and Article 11 of TBT Agreement), in reality, developed
countries did little to initiate concrete action to help developing countries in terms
of these provisions.
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More recently the Members have been engaged in a useful and constructive dis-
cussion on a new submission35 tabled by India, Pakistan and the Philippines. The
submission highlights the crucial role of technology and technical know how on
improving productivity, promoting export growth and attaining developmental
goals, and also introduced some possible recommendations that the Working
Group could make. The submission, among others, argued that technology transfer
often involved transactions in technology products and services. Such transac-
tions included the assignment, sale and licensing of industrial property and the
provision of know-how, technical expertise and technological knowledge neces-
sary to acquire, install and use machinery, equipment, intermediate goods and/or
raw materials, among others. Most of the trade-related policies, such as competi-
tion, incentives, export, and taxation policies as well as intellectual property rights,
among others, affect technology transfer. More importantly, the market for tech-
nology was not even and the buyer often had very little information on the technol-
ogy product or service. Several trade-related barriers, such as technical standards,
price undercutting and tariff peaks and escalations among others, also affect tech-
nology transfer. Standards could also be too high for firms to upgrade at an eco-
nomic price within a short time, tariffs may encourage the export of raw materials
and price undercutting may deter technology advancement. Taken together, they
can discourage technology transfer. Further, as TRIPS recognised in its first
preambular paragraph, it might be possible that measures and procedures taken to
enforce IPRs could themselves becomes barriers to legitimate trade. Therefore,
trade could affect the flow of technology and vice versa. On the other hand, the lit-
erature pointed out clearly that absorptive capacity was a pre-requisite for effec-
tive transfer of technology particularly in developing countries. It was exactly for
this is reason that several WTO agreements contained provisions relating to the
transfer of technology. However, most of these provisions lacked financing, im-
plementation, monitoring and technical assistance mechanisms in the area. To fa-
cilitate technology transfer, development of clear implementation and monitoring
processes, including fiscal support, was very important. Such mechanisms as
those in multilateral environmental agreements (e.g. the Montreal Protocol which
mentions transfer of technologies needed to phase out the use of ozone depleting
industrial substance) could serve as models. The recommendations contained in
the submission included:
(i) expanding technical assistance under the TRIPS Agreement by linking
Article 67 to Articles 66.2 and 7. to include institutions and firms in de-
veloping countries, especially LDCs.
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35 WT/WGTTT/W/10
(ii) formal adoption of voluntary guidelines, such as those of the OECD to
Multinational Firms. Governments could provide incentives to their
multinational firms to “perform science and technology development
work in host countries”, grant licenses “on reasonable terms and condi-
tions”, and adopt “practices that permit the transfer and rapid diffusion
of technology and know-how” to developing countries.
(iii) provision of help to developing countries improve or implement compe-
tition policies capable of monitoring and discouraging use of restrictive
business practices by technology owners and by ensuring firms adopt si-
milar or better practices at home and abroad.
(iv) developed countries could encourage licensing and subcontracting, and
support firms in developing countries access technological information
and drafting of contracts.
(v) establish mechanisms of helping developing countries’ standard moni-
toring authorities acquire necessary technology needed to achieve a le-
vel that is internationally recognized, at least at sub-regional level. Such
a mechanism could be tailored along the model for national bio-safety
clearing house.
(vi) expanding or encouraging the mobility of scientists, technologists and
technicians under GATS, develop science and technology agreements
to promote international scientific and industrial R&D collaboration,
and encourage their firms and public institutions to employ, at least tem-
porally, fresh graduates and offer consultancy services or contracts and
attachment to experts from developing countries to facilitate transfer of
knowledge.
(vii) identifying ways to encourage exchange of information on investment
and technology-related incentives provided to firms, develop
mechanisms to disseminate such information and ways to encourage
best practice in technology transfer, as well as in encouraging R&D in-
vestment or expenditure, and creating new technology.
The submission was welcomed by Members as a positive contribution to the work
of the Working Group. Though some concerns were expressed, Members gener-
ally welcomed the submission because of its focused and pragmatic approach. The
United States did raise the issue of the appropriateness and competence of the
Working Group in taking up some of the issues raised in the submission, noting
that these issues should ideally be addressed in the relevant WTO bodies which
were equipped with the necessary knowledge and expertise to do so. Members
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agreed to discuss the submission in further detail at the next meeting of the Work-
ing Group.
In response to questions asked by some developed Members with regard to the ob-
jective and content and the issues raised in the submission, the proponents pro-
vided detailed responses at the meeting held on 13 July 2006 of the Working
Group. These questions related, among others to issues on ‘’the meaning of formal
adoption of voluntary guidelines’’; ‘’the intent of the establishment of mecha-
nisms for the formation, assessment and implementation of technological stan-
dards’’; and ‘’the development of mechanisms to disseminate and exchange infor-
mation on investment and technology-related incentives and best practices’’. The
open-minded engagement of Members in discussing the proposed recommenda-
tions as contained in the proponents’ submission was positive and, perhaps, bodes
well for the work of the Working Group in the months ahead.
The work in the Working Group shows that the relationship between trade and
transfer of technology is complex and of a multifaceted nature. Since technology
and innovation is a powerful tool for development, the discussions in the Working
Group have a continuing relevance and importance, in particular, for developing
countries. The discussions held so far have shown that a host of factors play a role
in technology generation and its transfer. A better comprehension of the relation-
ship between trade and transfer of technology can be facilitated only if the issue is
viewed in a holistic manner. Members seem to broadly acknowledge the fact that
both private and public sectors in the home and host countries, play an important
role in the process of technology transfer through cohesive partnerships. Members
will continue to explore further the relationship between trade and transfer of tech-
nology in parallel with discussing the possible recommendations on steps that
might be taken within the mandate of the WTO to increase flows of technology
transfer to developing countries.
Indeed, in an increasingly knowledge- and technology-based business and eco-
nomic environment, the significance of international rule-making and intergov-
ernmental policy-making, particularly in areas governing international trade in
services and intellectual property, investment and intellectual property protection,
assumes a greater socio-economic role and impact as they inevitably define the
standards by which knowledge, technology and the movement and transfer of the
same by multinational corporations are to be conducted that serves both the inter-
est of protecting intellectual and proprietary knowledge while at the same time
promoting access and greater and more diffused utilization and absorption of in-
formation and technology by developing and least developed countries to foster
more rapid global economic development and poverty eradication.
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4 Growing Global: Countries’
Experiences and Firms’ Strategies
SECTION A)
Countries under the Spotlight
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4a.1 The Chinese: New contenders in
multinational R&D?
M. von Zedtwitz
Introduction
Until very recently, the Western world perceived China as an enigma, a populous
but underdeveloped country, isolated politically and underachieving economi-
cally, limited by a plethora of domestic problems including scarce natural re-
sources, natural disasters, poor educational standards, lack of innovation, and
many others.
Much of this is still true. But since the economic and, to some extent, political re-
forms started around 1980, China has dramatically improved its economic situa-
tion. Much of this was achieved by focusing on education and opening the econ-
omy to foreign technology and investment. Within twenty years, China has be-
come the de facto choice for cheap manufacturing and production of all kinds of
goods, ranging from plastic toys to laptop computers. Foreign direct investment
has increased to more than US$70 billion in 2005 alone. Whole cities with millions
of inhabitants were created to accommodate manufacturing centers in China’s
South and along the Eastern coast. The contribution of Chinese workers to global
production is immense; their efforts felt in every country around the world.
However, what is still missing are global Chinese firms and Chinese contributions
to global technology. Locally grown multinational companies (MNCs) and invig-
orated science and technology (S&T) seem to be inevitable consequences of a ris-
ing global importance in manufacturing and business. For instance, it happened
during the emergence of the United States in the early 20th century, Japan in the
1950s and 1960s, and Korea in the 1980s. Are we seeing any signs of this in
China? If so, how strong a development, in terms of S&T and Chinese MNCs, can
we expect within the next five to ten years? What would these developments spell
out in terms of opportunities and challenges for Western countries and firms in-
vesting in China?
In the following, these questions are explored in the context of recent research on
China and its changes in terms of science, technology and innovation. The objec-
tive of this paper is to summarize some of the relevant developments in China and
to present some key propositions for further analysis by more specialized research-
ers and China experts.
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Investments in science and technology education
Renown for its famous “Mandarin” system of educating government leaders and
officials, China has always been a prime protagonist of Confucian values of learn-
ing and education. Known as Needham’s paradox (Needham, 1954), it has been
long discussed why China has not been able to benefit from this advantageous pre-
disposition and during the middle of the second millennium lost technological
leadership to Europe. Huff (2003) summarized some of these reasons as pertaining
to the detrimental effects of centralization, leading in particular to the stifling of
entrepreneurial activity and standardization of technology throughout China, and
the failure to develop universities and independent academic institutions. China’s
recent history includes foreign occupation and a tumultuous 20th century mostly
focusing on ideological/political issues unconducive to technological progress and
innovation. Only with the economic opening of the 1980s did China reinvigorate
its own science and technology.
In the 2000s, English has been made mandatory at even the elementary schooling
level, and most young people speak English relatively well. Every year in June,
nearly 9.5 million high school students take a nation-wide exam to qualify for
about 2.3 million available undergraduate college student seats. The most reputed
universities such as Tsinghua, Peking and Fudan, select a few thousand from this
pool of millions, concentrating brain power in a few centres of higher learning and
research China-wide. But education in other universities is improving rapidly, too.
Foreign textbooks or translations thereof are used widely. Many universities, par-
ticularly those selected by the prodigious 211 program focusing on developing
about one hundred Chinese universities to international standards, have been hir-
ing Chinese returnees educated in America and Europe. Nearly 750,000 scientists
and engineers graduated from about 3,000 universities in China in 2004, second
only to the US.
The rise in the number of graduate students is particularly illuminating (see Fig. 1).
Between 1998 and 2004, it has risen from about 70,000 students to about 330,000
students, i.e., it grew by a factor of 3.7 within six years. Only about 5% of China’s
youth currently has access to tertiary education, five times less than European or
American students. Provided that universities are allowed to expand as they did for
the past decade, we can expect a continuation of this trend for some time before de-
mand for college education abates.
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Figure 1. Number of graduate studendts (Ph.D. and Masters) at Chinese
universities between 1998 and 2004
The 2020 policy plan promulgated in 2006 states China’s ambition to become a
top-5 country in terms of science-citation indexed publications. Universities and
national institutes started to assess the performance of their professors and re-
search staff by international publications. As a result, the number of papers sub-
mitted to international journals jumped, and the quality of research proposals sub-
mitted for funding also increased (as they warrant a higher chance of subsequent
publication). The annual share of investment in S&T is expected to top 2.5 % of
GDP by 2020, up from 1.3 % in 2005, and below 1 % during the 1990s. Money is
increasingly made available to achieve these high-flying scientific goals.
Thus, while it may still be too early to assess the quality of scientific publications
and graduates from science and engineering programs in China, the S&T input in
China’s system of innovation is certainly impressive. We thus propose:
Proposition 1: China will experience a relative shift from physical labour to intel-
lectual labour.
This by no means assumes that China will not continue to play a dominant role as a
manufacturing site for some time to come, but in relative terms in the mid-term
China’s intellectual (scientific and technological) contributions will rise faster
than its contributions to global manufacturing and production.
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Attraction for foreign R&D
Partly in response to the investments in local S&T, which leads to a growing pool
of engineers and scientists, but perhaps more importantly due to the rise of China
as a market demanding Western products, foreign MNCs have invested in
China-based research and development (R&D).
China’s demand for Western products is not independent from its investment in
science and education. A more educated workforce demands higher salaries which
in turn creates a growing class of people with an income that allows consumption
of more expensive Western products. But other factors more directly related to
China’s opening have also led to changes in the waymost industries andmarkets in
China operate, thus increasing the interest of foreign firms to invest. This can be
seen in the rise of FDI from around $ 4 billion in the early 1990s to the present lev-
els of more than $ 60–$ 70 billion in the mid-2000s.
The establishment of foreign R&D started in the early 1990s but took off only in
the late 1990s and around 2000. By 2006, the Chinese Government estimated the
number of foreign R&Dunits in China to be around 750 to 800. Most of those were
established in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen, but large differences
in attraction exist between industries (Fig. 2) and type of R&D activity (Zedtwitz,
2004). The rationales for foreign R&D in China has been the subject of much spec-
ulation and some research. Gassmann and Han (2004) found that the main reasons
to come to China included product localization, product development for China,
global product support, and – increasingly – technology research. Walsh (2003)
noted that the establishment of foreign R&D centers followed certain stages,
mapped along opportunistic/experimental R&D units to fully developed global
R&D network nodes. Costs, which are a major factor attracting production to
China, are a frequently mentioned but actually inadequate measure of foreign
R&D attraction to China (Zedtwitz et al., 2007). Patent research also indicated that
the share of Chinese invention patents were rising as fast as foreign inventions, and
much faster if all forms of Chinese patents were considered.
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Figure 2. Locastions of foreign R&D in China (GLORAD database)
In sum these results suggest that human factor inputs become increasingly impor-
tant to attract R&D to and retain R&D in China. If the S&T capabilities of locally
hired engineers do not develop further in quality and quantity as expected by for-
eign MNCs, their Chinese R&D centres will be closed down or remain at a small
scale. If S&T capabilities continue to be developed as they have been for the past
two decades, foreign R&D in China will expand. Given the political and scientific
ambitions of China, we suggest another proposition:
Proposition 2: China will increasingly become a source of innovation.
This proposition predicts the rise of Chinese innovation both in foreign-spon-
sored/owned R&D labs and research laboratories of Chinese universities and Chi-
nese firms.
Internal R&D efforts
Given the interest and rationales of foreign MNCs to invest in R&D in China, one
would expect Chinese firms to do the same. However, there are a number of impor-
tant differences to consider (see Fischer and Zedtwitz, 2004).
The first is that China did not have – and to a large extent, still does not have – a
private or national industry capable of investing in meaningful R&D. This is due to
the fact that China’s economic systems are in transition from an old-fashioned
communist planned economy towards a more entrepreneurial capitalist/mar-
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ket-oriented system. Many resources are used to execute this transition rather than
being spent on long-term R&D and future profits. Also, it precludes the existence
of a functioning domestic private industry with experience in privately-funded
R&D.
Second, private as well as state-owned Chinese firms have shown little interest to
invest in R&D by themselves. As long as diversification is a more profitable pur-
suit of revenues, and as long as hyper-competition favours short-term investments
in business development rather than long-term investments in more uncertain
R&D, there is little chance that this will change.
Third, it also appears that Chinese institutions are not capable of attracting a cali-
bre of scientists and engineers necessary to produce cutting-edge R&D. Review-
ing evidence from recruiting offices, it seems that the best S&T graduates – those
who presumably are the best educated and the smartest – are offered PhD scholar-
ships to foreign universities. At the top universities it is estimated that up to half of
their graduates leave for the US or Europe after completing their studies. Also,
among those who chose to remain in China, or those without the option to go over-
seas, seeking employment with a reputed foreign firm is very attractive, as they of-
fer interesting financial packages, overseas training and travel, unique learning op-
portunities, and social status. Chinese firms and their R&D departments thus can
often only access a filtered pool of engineering recruits.
Still, the human input to Chinese R&D is improving because of so-called “Chinese
returnees”, i.e., Chinese people who were educated in the West and return to China
to start up new companies, or to work in Chinese universities or firms, often bring-
ing along important scientific ideas or technologies. Also, it is improving because
R&D engineers of foreign R&D labs in China are leaving for Chinese firms such
as Haier, Huawei, ZTE and other increasingly strong Chinese brands. Last but not
least, even the presumably third-rate engineers are still of respectable quality, and
very well capable of advancing innovation in Chinese R&D departments.
Part of China’s new 2020 policy is to become a leading country in science and in-
novation. National R&D intensity is to be raised to 2.5 % of GDP, putting it on par
with most advanced European countries. Foreign technology contribution to
China’s economy is to be lowered to less than 30 %, and the worldwide rank of
Chinese-invented patents is targeted for place among the top-5. The focus on more
indigenous innovation and R&D cannot be achieved independently from other na-
tional efforts. Key to this development is the internationalization of Chinese firms.
One of the Chinese companies investing heavily in R&D and internationalization
is Huawei. Based in Shenzhen, Huawei manufactures next generation telecommu-
nications networks. By the end of 2006 it served 31 of the world’s top 50 operators,
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along with over one billion users worldwide. Huawei had grown by 30 % in sales
per year since 1999, and 110 % in international sales alone. With over 44,000 em-
ployees, of whom 48 % were dedicated to R&D, Huawei generated contracted
sales of US $ 8.2 billion in 2005, of which US$ 4.76 billion from international
markets. In the late 1980s Huawei set up R&D first in Shenzhen, then Beijing and
Shanghai and other major cities in China. As Huawei entered foreign markets,
R&D centres were established in Bangalore (India, 1999), Stockholm (Sweden,
2001), Dallas (USA), Silicon Valley (USA) and Moscow (Russia). Smaller R&D
units were set up in Israel, Amsterdam, and Bangkok. Each of those locations were
set up with clear missions, relating either to technology acquisition or market sup-
port and business development (see Zedtwitz 2007 for more detail). Haier, already
one of China’s most recognized brands, also maintains R&D sites in London, Sili-
con Valley, Syndey and Hong Kong. Recent research revealed about 40 R&D sites
of Chinese companies outside China (see Zedtwitz, 2006).
Huawei, Haier, and many other Chinese companies are considered to be pioneers
of China’s internationalization, and their progress and experiences are carefully
observed and analyzed. Still, as logical and as necessary as China’s corporate in-
ternationalization may appear, there are a number of steep challenges to overcome:
the general lack of internationally-trained and experienced managers, the lack of
English language skills, the absence of a high-margin home-base, the lack of size
of most Chinese MNC contenders, and the lack of brand recognition – positive
brand recognition in particular. Furthermore, Chinese firms are relative latecom-
ers, and most attractive markets are already heavily contested and entry barriers
have been built up against any new entrant. Also, with respect to Chinese R&D,
there are no cost advantages for Chinese MNCs to set up R&D abroad, not even
temporary ones that foreign firmsmay enjoy when they invest in R&D in China. In
addition, Chinese R&D is typically following the diversified pattern of their parent
companies, and a high degree of diversification usually leads to insufficient R&D
depth in any particular technology field, disabling Chinese firms to become tech-
nology competitors. For the time being, Chinese MNCs seem to rely on their do-
mestic cost advantages and their ability to survive despite thin profit margins.
Given the strong desire to build global Chinese firms, and given their demon-
strated ability to learn from foreign competitors, however, it would be foolish to
discount Chinese MNCs as future global players. Thus we formulate at last:
Proposition 3: Chinese MNCs will internationalize further, but at high costs and
not as fast as generally projected.
Conclusions
In summary, we have developed three proposition as follows.
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• China will experience a relative shift from physical labour to intellec-
tual labour.
• China will increasingly become a source of innovation.
• Chinese MNCs will internationalize further, but at high costs and not
as fast as generally projected.
There is early trend evidence and policy intention that China is headed in the direc-
tions that those propositions suggest. Further research is necessary to determine
how these trends can be further expanded and managed, with benefits for China,
foreign investors in China, and consumers of Chinese products around the world.
If those propositions turn out to be unfulfilled, not only China but the rest of the
world will suffer from the consequences.
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4a.2 India’s emergence as a global innovation
hub: the phenomenon and the consequences
R. A. Mashelkar
Introduction
The emergence of India as a global innovation hub calls for a deeper analysis of
the fact itself and its consequences. A thorough understanding of how this all hap-
pened should allow to better forecast which may be the consequence of this phe-
nomenon in social, cultural, political, economic and strategic terms.
In recent times, India has developed a reputation of being the fastest growing de-
mocracy in the world. This is even more remarkable if one thinks that, at the time
when India became independent (1947), the country was extremely poor and de-
prived and had a large number of illiterates. The architect of what India is today
has certainly been our first Prime Minister, Panditji Jawaharlal Nehru. He strongly
believed in science and technology. He was convinced that “it is an inherent obli-
gation of a great country like India, with its traditions of scholarship and original
thinking and its great cultural heritage, to participate fully in the march of science,
which is probably mankind’s greatest enterprise today”. In our impoverished
country he had the wisdom to set up scientific institutions, engineering colleges
and, more broadly, to invest in science and technology. Today it seems that this
strategy has paid off.
The “Indian Revolutions”
In India we tend to talk about several revolutions. One is the “Green Revolution”.
Before that, India was a country that used to go begging the rest of the world for
food. Then, thanks to our progress in agriculture and the leadership provided by
the scientists, the green revolution came and India became a surplus country. En-
tirely because of science and technology.
Another important revolution has been the “White Revolution” or, as it is called,
the “Operation Milk Flood”. Thanks not only to scientific and technological inno-
vation, but also to social innovations, we became the biggest milk producing coun-
try in the world.
India has also experienced the “Blue Revolution”, as we not only design, fabricate
and launch our own satellites, but assemble satellites for other countries too, e.g.
Germany and Korea. Evidently, this has had a tremendous impact in India.
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And finally, of course, our “Grey Revolution”. We call it this way as it refers to the
grey matter, the brain. The educational and engineering institutions that came up
and the related workforce that got created over time has helped India moving for-
ward in areas like software, for example. At present, the software industry in India
constitutes a real massive phenomenon. Around 600,000 professionals are in the
sector, i.e. the .06 % of Indian population. By 2008, these software professionals
would generate around 35 % of Indian exports. And the remarkable thing about
them, is that those who have created prestige as well as wealth for India are on av-
erage just 27 years old.
From brain drain to brain circulation
There is a change that is taking place in India, which is all the more evident every
day. And this is that, at present, India is attracting people from around the world.
As also Business India has highlighted, we are experiencing a third wave of influx.
The first wave was represented by Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), whereby
money was sent and invested in India. Then came the technology, the R&D and the
manufacturing. And now foreign nationals are coming to India to work. For in-
stance, in one of the drugs and pharmaceutical R&D set up, we are close to having
25 % of foreign nationals. This is certainly something that we would not have ex-
pected earlier. Besides, one new trend India is particularly happy about is that ap-
proximately 30,000 R&D professionals have returned to the country over the last
three years. Beforehand wewere suffering from brain drain but finally we are start-
ing to enjoy some brain gain followed by brain circulation.
When it comes to education and the creation of knowledge, our best institutions
are the Indian Institutes of Technology. To begin with, it is very difficult to get into
an IIT institution: 200,000 students apply every year but only 2,000 succeed in be-
ing accepted. In the past, many of these IIT students (around 70 %, ten years ago)
would migrate after graduating to countries like the United States of America. In-
dia used to be described as a land of ideas, but when it came to land of opportuni-
ties, this was the USA and, therefore, people used to migrate. At present the pro-
portion of IIT graduates that emigrates has gone down to 30 %, as new opportuni-
ties are now getting created in India.
Skill-based competition
India is seen as a global research and development hub. According to recent fig-
ures, 150 companies have set their R&D centres in our country. These are not
small companies and the number of R&D personnel they employ in India is quite
remarkable as well, as can be seen from table 1.
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Table 1. Multinational R&D centres: Snapshots of employment
Company # India R&D jobs
Texas instruments 1 300
Motorola 1 500
Cummins 400
GE 5 000
Bosch 2 000
Cisco 1 000
Adobe 800
Cadence 500
Intel 2 900
Source: CLSA Asia-Pacific markets 2006
I used to believe in the possibility for India to become a global R&D platform. Al-
ready in 1995, I remember I gave the “Lala Karam Chand Thapar Centenary Me-
morial Lecture”, presided by the at that time Finance Minister, currently our Prime
Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. The title of my lecture was “India’s Emergence as
a Global R&D Platform: the New Challenges and Opportunities” and people did
not believe this can really happen. My hypothesis was very simple. I believed –
and I still do – in skill-based competition, whereby skills and not products are the
critical asset. Products are just transients, they draw value for the company through
the market. But the key issue is how do you put that product together. The real
problem is getting the best skills together in the smartest and cheapest possible
way. It is this skill gap that plays a critical role. I must admit that it is nice to see
something like this happening in one’s lifetime.
India as an R&D hub: Driving forces
I believe that the dynamics we currently observe are driven by a number of forces.
One is certainly the globalisation of both the economic and the trading system.The
digital revolution and the enormous changes we have been experiencing in global
communications have also helped enormously. Other fundamental driving forces
are that, at present, product development is very much science-based and that the
mean time between technologies has been reduced. Finally, skills as enduring
competences and the and high cost and risk of R&D have also contributed to offer
India some competitive advantages.
Besides all these, there is another very important factor that is contributing to In-
dia’s success: its demography. Some comparative figures can help understanding
the deep implication of India’s demography. For instance, recent data (NSF, 2003)
show that in the United States of America 85 % of the working doctors in Science
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and Engineering are above 55 years of age. The percentage of the same workers
above 60 years is 76 %. Now, consider these numbers vis-à-vis India’s: 55 % of the
Indian population has an average age of less than 30 years. This gives an idea of the
importance of the demographic factor. Hence, what we are talking about is a large
country, which is young as well as democratic (a characteristic not be neglected).
Given this global framework, one might ask what happens to enterprises and to
their research and development endeavours. I believe there will be a new role for
in-house R&D. The key game will be to move around, to manage innovation net-
works. Companies will get engaged in monitoring external developments and ca-
pabilities. In terms of technology, their challenge will be to balance creation and
access: how much to create in-house, how much to access from outside. At present,
the dependence from external sourcing has increased from 5 % to 15–20 %, and
this is anticipated to grow to 40–50 %.
However, the question remains of why should companies decide to buy R&D or
perform R&D in India rather than elsewhere. Jack Welsh, when he inaugurated the
Jack Welsh R&D Centre in Bangalore, put it in this way “India is a developing
country, but it is a developed country as far as its intellectual infrastructure is con-
cerned. We get the highest intellectual capital for dollar here.”
This was his simple answer, but scientific publications, citations and patent figures
support such a view. I here offer some evidence based on David King’ s Nature ar-
ticle 2004. Although the indicators regard only the period 1997–2001 and there is
indeed room for further refinement, still they are indicative of India’s attractiveness.
Table 2. Scientific publications
Country SCI Publications
(1997–2001)
GDP per capita SCI Publication per
GDP per capita / per
year
India 77 201 487 32
China 115 339 989 23
USA 1 265 808 36 006 7
Germany 318 286 24 051 3
United Kingdom 342 535 26 445 3
Japan 336 858 31 407 2
Canada 166 216 22 777 1
Italy 147 023 20 528 1
Rep of Korea 55 739 10 006 1
France 232 058 24 061 2
Basic source: David King, Nature, July 2004
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Table 3. Citations
Country SCI citations
(1997–2001)
GDP per capita SCI citations per GDP
per capita / per year
India 188 841 487 77
China 341 519 989 69
USA 10 850 549 36 006 60
United Kingdom 2 500 035 26 445 19
Germany 2 199 617 24 051 18
Japan 1 852 271 31 407 12
Canada 1 164 450 22 777 10
Italy 964 164 20 528 10
Rep of Korea 192 346 10 006 4
France 1 513 090 24 061 1
Basic source: David King, Nature, July 2004
Table 4. Patents
Rank Country US patents GDP per capita US patents per GDP
per capita
1 USA 50 000 36 006 1 389
2 Japan 36 889 31 407 1 175
3 India 444 487 0.913
4 China 742 989 0.732
5 Germany 12 960 24 051 0.539
6 Rep of Korea 4 246 10 006 0.424
7 France 4 906 24 061 0.204
8 Canada 4 368 22 777 0.192
Basic source: David King, Nature, July 2004
The figures shown in tables 2 to 4 look even more impressing when considering
that India does not invest much in R&D, compared to other countries. India spends
less than 1 % of the GDP, whereas Europe and the US spend about 2–3 %. Besides,
even if patents represent a new phenomenon as far as India is concerned, looking at
the 2003 rankings’ data one finds US first, Japan second, and India and China in
third and fourth position. Now, although these numbers may look very small, I
deem that key issue is the “power of the exponent”. That is, one may start from a
small base, but if there is rapid expansion (e.g. figures are doubling every year),
one might be hopeful about the future.
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Figure 1. "Power of the exponent" - CSIR foreign patents and SCI publications
Figure 1 shows the number of US patents and the number of publications obtained
by the Indian Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) during the pe-
riod 1995–2005. It can be seen that, for instance, in 1995 the Council had only 14
patents in portfolio, whereas the same figure for the year 2005 has risen to 272. Ev-
idently, it is not only a matter of getting US patents, but the way of licensing them,
the value they generate. For instance, in August 2006, the CSIR sold its unique clot
specific streptokinase, which was licensed to a company for five-million dollars
plus 3 % royalties. Talking about a billion-dollar drug implies around 30 million
dollars of royalties. These are massive sums for an institute like the Institute of Mi-
crobial Technology, having a yearly budget of four to five million dollars. Hence,
we are not only experiencing a rising trend in terms of number of patents granted,
but we are trying to become smarter when it comes to licensing them.
R&D spending is also following an expansion path analogous to those of granted
patent and number of publications. I believe this is one of the greatest strengths of
India.
India’s development strategies
Currently, India is following two main strategies in order to spur its growth and de-
velopment.
On the one hand, on the supply side, we are trying to massively expand high-qual-
ity education and the research system. We started from having 3.4 million students
enrolled in the various Indian Universities in 1985. In 2005 the students enrolled
had already reached 10.3 millions, 350,000 of which are in engineering. The num-
ber of postgraduates students has also been rising sharply over the last decade. Our
forecast is that, by the year 2015, we should have 18.5 million students enrolled,
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1.4 million of which will be in engineering. That is the kind of expansion of the
system that is taking place.
On the other hand, with respect to the demand-side, India’s policy has been to try
and create measures enhancing competition and hunger for R&D, coupled with a
judicious government support for R&D. Examples of this strategy are the creation
of three new institutes of science, and then maybe three more, so they might be-
come six during the next five years. In the past, we just used to have one Indian In-
stitute of Science. We are also creating an autonomous National Science and Engi-
neering Foundation, similar to the National Science Foundation (NSF) of the
USA. Besides, the funding of basic research is going to go up within one year by a
factor of four, that is a planned 400 % increase. There also are innovative schemes
intended to get young people and scientists back from the countries where they
emigrated to.
Besides, and in order to stimulate innovation and creativity in enterprise, a number
of initiatives are being taken. One is, of course, to have intellectual property laws
complying with the WTO’s TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights) agreement. Hardly anybody would had believed that India would
make herself TRIPS compliant, but India actually stuck to its obligations. In addi-
tion to complying with the TRIPS agreement, many innovative public-private
partnerships were launched.
There also are new policies that have been progressively put in place, of which I
will offer a couple of examples related to sectors that are fast moving ahead. One is
definitely the drugs and pharmaceutical industry. In the past, we use to copy mole-
cules but, thanks to reverse engineering, also new molecules came up. Hence, an-
ticipating the changes that were going to happen in November 2005, a lot of these
companies actually improved their portfolios and got engaged into discovering
new molecules. The top ten pharmaceutical companies in India have in fact in-
creased their R&D spending by a factor of four during the last five years. A lot of
interesting breakthroughs are currently coming up. One for which India is particu-
larly proud regards tuberculosis (TB). In fact, the last molecule to be discovered in
this respect was dated 1963. India recently succeeded in discovering a new mole-
cule that, instead of taking six to eight months to clear TB – as it used to be the case
– , does it in two months. This molecule is currently undergoing clinical trials. This
is evidently an example of the fact that, when it comes to innovation, changing the
rules of the game makes the game change. The other example I would like to make
regards the automotive industry. At present we have indigenously designed new
models that are being launched globally. Our problem in the past was especially
one of lack of capacity, of lack of skilled innovators and R&D. Besides, we were
not able to make external acquisitions with respect to specific technologies. Now
these are problems that belong to the past. India has finally been able to start ac-
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quiring the technology and skills it needs. In addition, India is learning from doing,
thus further improving its technological innovation capabilities.
Figure 2. Building technological innovation capability
Evidently, cultural factors play a major role, but I deem the policy environment to
represent the most critical factor in ensuring India’s progress. In 1947 we had our
political freedom, but it has been in 1991 that we had our second freedom, because
we opened up globally. I in fact believe that India’s performance should not be
analysed over the last 60 years, that is after our policy freedom in 1947, but rather
since 1991. The effects of that event were enormous.
Emblematic is, in this respect, the case of Tata. For example whereas Henry Ford
used to say “Let the customer have any colour of the car, as long as it is black”, pre-
vious to 1991 the Indian government used to say ”Let the customer have any car, as
long it is Ambassador or Fiat”. In 1991 the situation changed and Tata was allowed
to make cars. JRD Tata is known to have said, already in February 1978, “If Telco
had been allowed to develop as it should have been, I have no doubt that we would
have beenmaking cars in India. And a Tata car would have been as dominant as the
Tata truck is today.” But Tata was simply not allowed to. Back in 1978 there was a
completely different environment. The moment Tata got green light things
changed. In the fifties, it was the British Morris Oxford which was sold as Indian
Ambassador and circulated on Indian roads. Today, thanks to the opening up, it is
the Indian Indica that is being sold as City Rover and circulates throughout Lon-
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don. Before 1991 Indian designers and developers were simply not allowed to take
up challenges like these. But not that India is open to global markets, we can mea-
sure ourselves. For instance, going back to the Tata example. They have recently
launched a 2000 dollar car that incorporates technological breakthroughs as, for
instance, high performance adhesives instead of welding. This represents a total
innovation towards a new paradigm of low-cost transport.
A new geography of science
The geography of science is changing at last. We are experiencing the internation-
alisation of public research. Research centres around the world are uniting their ef-
forts for the benefit of the whole society. This is, for instance, the case of the
“Global Research Alliance” whereby CSIR (India), CSIRO (Australia), CSIR
(South Africa), VTT (Finland), DII (Denmark), TNO (Netherlands), SIR (Malay-
sia), FGG (Germany) and Battelle (USA) and others have all come together. Each
of the institutions involved is supposed to take care of its own country’s interests.
The aim is to use the global talent pool to create global goods through global fund-
ing. The big challenges that lay ahead, for instance in the energy and health sec-
tors, will be tackled in a new cooperative and global way.
Looking at the history of science and the geography of science, it is immediately
evident that big changes are happening. For instance, the chart relative to the per-
centage of the science generated in the world over the period 1990-2004 shows
that the US relative share has somewhat declined, the European Union’s share has
increased, whereas the Asia-Pacific area’s share is continuously increasing.
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Figure 3. World science shares, 1990–2004
Analogous or even more remarkable patterns can be observed in the different sec-
tors, whether engineering science (figure 4), physics (figure 5) or material science
(figure 6).
Figure 4. Percent of world science in engineering, 1990–2004
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Figure 5. Percent of world science in physics, 1990–2004
Figure 6. Percent of world science in material science, 1990–2004
Another recent phenomenon that deserves attention is that of the multinationals’
R&D centres and the share of knowledge they create. Whether IBM, Texas Instru-
ments or others, the common trend is one where greater and greater knowledge is
generated in countries like India and China.
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Table 5. Multinational R&D centres – US patents generated from India (2002)
The huge challenge that lies ahead is, however, to increase productivity. In fact, as
stated in the report “Creating an Innovative Europe” following the Hampton Court
Summit in January 2006, “The 3 % challenge is one representing an input, rather
than an outcome, or even an output”. The real issue goes well beyond the 3 % in-
vestment in R&D. It is the returns on that investment and how to measure concrete
outcomes and outputs. The real challenge is to generate intellectual capital, accu-
mulate it and valorise it. This generation and accumulation is going to take a differ-
ent form, for example that of distributed knowledge production centres.
Conclusions
Evidently, there is a lot of expectation about India for its being the possible next
super power. There also is a lot of speculation about what can stop India and China.
The Indian science and technology system, whether working to obtain vaccines for
pennies or preparing missions to the moon, is aiming to help the people that are at
the bottom of the social pyramid. The ultimate goal is to create new technologies
for them and for all those 4 billion people around the world whose average income
is less than 2 dollars a day. That is the India of my dreams. When we talk about In-
dia, the emergence of India as a global innovation hub, we are not only talking
about multinationals coming and setting up R&D centres, but we are talking about
something far beyond that. India that looks at the global good.
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4a.3 Transformation into a knowledge-based
economy: the Malaysian experience
J. M. Jarjis
Introduction
As Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation, it is central to my Ministry’s
responsibility to implement policies and programmes that will enable Malaysia’s
transformation into a knowledge-based economy. “As we are undoubtedly aware,
the world economy is undergoing a revolutionary structural change. The tradi-
tional drivers of economic growth and wealth creation – land, labour or capital –
have lost some of their dominance. More recently, knowledge, technology and in-
novation, have replaced them as the new, key drivers of economic growth and
wealth creation.”36
In Malaysia we are currently dealing with many issues and facing important chal-
lenges associated with the knowledge-based economy. Among the latter the possi-
bility that the gap between developed and developing countries would widen.
On the one hand, the transmission of knowledge, know-how and technology
across national borders is growing and is facilitated by the advances in Information
and Communication Technology (ICT). This in turn is manifested in the growing
trend of the internationalisation of scientific and technological activities. On the
other hand, countries differ in their capacities to capitalise on the opportunities de-
rived from scientific and technological advancements. Those that do not have the
capability and capacity to access global knowledge and new technologies and uti-
lise them for their productive activities will remain marginalised.
This is why Malaysia has developed a vision and a set of strategies for the develop-
ment of the knowledge-based economy. These should also allow Malaysia to meet
the challenges that the country will face in its development path.
Malaysia’s Journey to the Knowledge Economy
Malaysia has come a long way, starting with an economy dependent on agriculture
and natural resources. In the early years the export of raw materials, namely rubber
and tin, was the main source of national income. For these sectors, land and low
skilled labour were the main factors of production. Tertiary education was almost
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36 YAB Dato’ Seri Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister of Malaysia, IDB Conference on Know-
ledge and IT for Development 2005, 23 June 2005.
non-existent and only a small group of the population with the necessary financial
capacity was able to acquire tertiary education abroad.
Malaysia’s transformation into an industrial or production-based economy in the
1960s led to major changes in physical infrastructure, financial system and educa-
tion system. The Government invested in transportation infrastructure to move
goods and services, financial and fiscal incentives to attract foreign investments,
and education and training systems to supply the industries with skilled labour and
technical workforce. Malaysia’s investments in providing world-class infrastruc-
ture, attractive incentives and sound education system have paid well in terms of
export earnings from manufactured goods, in particular electrical and electronic
products as well as foreign direct investments (FDIs). During the period 1991–
2005, Malaysia’s exports grew at an average annual rate of 13.5 % and today Ma-
laysia is the eighteenth largest trading nation. The FDI inward flows have been
substantial.
Malaysia’s efforts so far may be adequate if it can continue to leverage on low-cost
skilled and technical workforce as a major comparative advantage. Unfortunately,
this is not the case, as it faces growing competition from countries with abundant
workforce such as China and India. At the same time, the role of knowledge is be-
coming increasingly critical in the new economy as technology becomes more
complex and economic growth is driven by knowledge-intensive industries.
Malaysia’s leadership is fully committed to develop a nation that is progressive,
resilient and competitive. Malaysia’s national vision, namely Vision 2020, was in-
troduced in 1990 with the goal of attaining a developed nation status by the year
2020. One of the key challenges of Vision 2020 is to develop a strong foundation
for science and technology such that Malaysia will not only be a user of but also a
contributor to scientific and technological advancements.
Malaysia has a bit more than ten years to go to achieve its national vision. It is gear-
ing itself for the transformation into a knowledge-based economy or “K Econ-
omy”, that is, an economy driven by knowledge and innovation. Strategies and ap-
proaches for a K Economy would have to be different from those adopted to de-
velop an industrial or production-based economy. Physical infrastructure that is
critical for an industrial economy is no longer a major determinant for success in
the K Economy. Instead, the K Economy requires investments in the Knowledge
Infrastructure.
As knowledge is the most critical factor for competitive advantage in the K Econ-
omy, the infrastructure must enable knowledge generation, acquisition, and the
utilization of knowledge to produce goods and services that are competitive in the
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global market. Thus, Malaysia would need to invest in the Knowledge Infrastruc-
ture that consists of:
(i) an education system designed to produce a large pool of qualified and
skilled workforce in science, technology and engineering and other in-
novative, creative and enterprising professionals;
(ii) a research and development (R&D) system able to generate knowledge
at the frontiers as well as new technologies demanded by the production
and services sectors;
(iii) a strong intellectual property (IP) regime that provides effective protec-
tion and appropriation of intellectual property rights;
(iv) a technology transfer system that ensures efficient transfer of knowled-
ge and technology from the R&D system to the industry and business
sectors;
(v) a critical mass of innovative firms and entrepreneurs to exploit know-
ledge to produce goods and services for the local and global market;
(vi) a financial system that promotes investment in high risk ventures; and
(vii) an eco-system that facilitates knowledge flows and promotes interaction
between and among the systems mentioned above.
The Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006–2010)
In 2006 Malaysia launched its Ninth Malaysia Plan, which sets out the develop-
ment plan and strategies for the period 2006–2010. This is the first step in the next
fifteen years’ journey towards a developed nation status. The strategies and mea-
sures that have been identified in order to implement the national development
plan are the following.
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Figure 1. The multimedia super corridor (MSC) vision until 2020
Firstly, Malaysia will focus on strengthening the National Innovation System
(NIS). The National Innovation Council (NIC), with the Prime Minister as Chair-
man, will provide the leadership to set the direction and the implementation frame-
work for the National Innovation Agenda.
A strong NIS will facilitate Malaysia’s integration into the global technology and
knowledge creating networks. As technologies become increasingly complex and
the cost of creating new knowledge and technology rises, firms adopt strategies to
reduce cost through outsourcing some of their innovative activities. Developing
countries with relatively low cost but highly qualified human resources can take
advantage of this opportunity to undertake the outsourced activities. In this re-
spect, Malaysia is developing the infrastructure and capability to take advantage of
these outsourcing activities.
In the ICT sector, cost competitiveness, highly educated and skilled workforce, a
pro-ICT government and world class infrastructures make Malaysia an obvious
choice for activities such as shared services and outsourcing (SSO). A.T. Kearney
ranked the SSO cluster in the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) at number three
in the world after China and India. TheMSC initiative launched in 1996 was aimed
at attracting leading ICT companies to locate in the MSC and undertake research,
development of new products and technologies and export from this base. A set of
innovative incentive package comprising fiscal and non-fiscal incentives are pro-
vided to MSC status companies.
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Figure 2. The MSC strategy
As an ‘open economy’, Malaysia has attracted large inflows of FDIs and trans-na-
tional corporations (TNCs), especially in the electrical and electronic sectors. The
infrastructure and incentives to attract FDI in the knowledge based industries are
different from that required for the production economy. It is vital for Malaysia to
strengthen its NIS in order to compete with countries such as China and India for
FDIs. Recent trends that point to increasing internationalization of R&D activities
of the TNCs will benefit those countries that have the enabling environment. In
particular of paramount importance is the availability of human capital and R&D
infrastructure, as well as the ability to offer incentives for TNCs to conduct their
R&D in the host countries. In this regard, human capital development is central to
Malaysia development plan, in particular the human capital needed to enable ef-
fective harnessing of science and technology for wealth creation and societal
well-being.
At presentMalaysia lacks the critical mass of qualified scientists, engineers and re-
lated professionals that are much needed to drive the K Economy. In 2004, Malay-
sia had only 21 research scientists and engineers (RSEs) for every 10,000
workforce. The target set in the Ninth Malaysia Plan is to achieve 50 RSEs per
10,000 workforce by 2010. The shortage of RSEs will be somewhat mitigated, in
the short term, with the implementation of the National Brain Gain Programme.
The objective of this Programme is to attract scientists and engineers worldwide to
conduct R&D in Malaysia.
168
Malaysia views international strategic partnerships as an effective means to access
frontier knowledge and accelerate scientific and technological advancements. In
this regard, Malaysian universities and research institutions have been actively en-
gaged in collaborative research and technology development with centres of excel-
lence, in both developed and developing countries. We look forward to enhancing
our cooperation with the EU.
At present, we not only expanded the acquisition of knowledge through collabora-
tive R&D projects as well as attachments of Malaysian scientists and researchers
in renown research centres. We also devote significant resources to developing
Malaysia’s own centres of excellence in areas of strategic importance. For exam-
ple, three new centres of excellence in genomics, agriculture biotechnology, and
pharmaceuticals and nutraceuticals have recently been established. The aim is to
catalyse the development of a strong scientific base in biotechnology. In the sec-
ond half of 2006 the Government of Malaysia launched the National
Nanotechnology Initiative.
The Government of Malaysia realizes that building a strong scientific base and in-
creased investments in R&D are not sufficient to drive the transformation of the K
Economy. An equally if not more crucial requirement is to promote the creation of
a large pool of innovative firms and entrepreneurs. It is private enterprises that
have the capacity and business aptitude to exploit knowledge and new technolo-
gies for economic gains. It is therefore crucial allow private enterprises to exploit
the knowledge and technology generated from research laboratories, to generate
new products and services for the local and global market.
Three Grant Schemes to Move the Economy up the Value Chain
The Government of Malaysia provides various types of fiscal and non-fiscal in-
centives to private enterprises to promote their involvement in R&D and innova-
tive activities. The R&D and commercialization funding mechanism was recently
restructured to plug the financing gaps, in particular financing for development
and pre-commercialization activities. Three new funds have been created, namely
Science, Techno and InnoFund. These funds are open to both public institutions
and private sector enterprises. Firms that undertake R&D are also eligible for dou-
ble tax deduction.
The lack of entrepreneurs has been identified as one of the weaknesses of the Ma-
laysian innovation system. The Government of Malaysia has introduced various
programmes to address this weak link in the NIS. For example, in the ICT sector, a
“technopreneur” development programme has been implemented in the MSC.
With respect to the technology-based sectors, technology incubator facilities have
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been provided by the Government to create the critical mass of entrepreneurs as
well as to catalyse the creation of new technology based firms.
Table 1. Malaysia's grant schemes
Fund name SCIENCEFUND TECHNOFUND INNOFUND
Objective • Generate new knowl-
edge through basic
and applied sciences
• Develop laboratory
proof of concept
• Enhance research
capability and in-
crease number of re-
searchers
• Stimulate the growth
and successful inno-
vation of Malaysian
medium and large en-
terprises by increas-
ing the level of R&D
to market or commer-
cialisation
• Increase capability
and capacity of Ma-
laysian IHL and RI to
commercialise the
R&D findings through
spin-offs / licensing
• Individual, Micro
and Small Enter-
prises: Develop-
ment of new or im-
provement of exist-
ing products, pro-
cess or services
with elements of in-
novation
• Community
Groups: Conver-
sion of knowledge /
idea into products /
process / services
that improve the
quality of life of
communities
Endowment
(under the 9th
Malaysia Plan)
RM 1.2 Billion RM 1.3 Billion RM 0.2 Billion
While attention is turned to developing new technology based enterprises, the
Government gives equal attention to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which
make up more than 90 % of enterprises in Malaysia. With respect to SMEs, the
emphasis is on upgrading their technological capabilities to enable their integrati-
on into the global production network. One of the measures taken is through sup-
port programmes that enable SMEs to use new and advanced technologies, includ-
ing ICT, in their production and business processes. A new element in the SME
blueprint is the development of SMEs in the knowledge-based industries.
ICT: Overcoming the Social Divide
In transforming Malaysia’s economy to one driven by knowledge and innovation,
the Government of Malaysia is fully aware of the possibility of creating economic
and social divide among regions as well as its population.
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It has been recognised that ICT have an important role to play in overcoming
socio-economic inequalities, provided appropriate mechanisms are implemented
to ensure that ICT are used for this purpose. Developing countries should not only
invest in connectivity and access to ICT but give equal emphasis on socio-eco-
nomic inclusion programmes. Accordingly, Malaysia has developed a Framework
that focuses on the value that ICT are capable of delivering to underserved sections
of the Malaysian society. This Framework will address the digital value divide,
seen as “that which prevents certain sections of Malaysian Society from being able
to benefit from a more equitable share in the socio-economic value that ICT are ca-
pable of generating.”
Malaysia’s policies for ICT-based growth have been in place for some time and are
at the core of the country’s ICT strategy in realizing Vision 2020. The focus so far
has been more on infrastructure development than on the issues of e-inclusion. A
revised approach targeting e-inclusion implies the adoption of key socio-economic
development objectives by ICT programmes in areas such as health, education, ag-
riculture and rural enterprise development and local content development. The
Framework for digital value divide, when fully implemented, will be a key vehicle
to attain e-inclusion in Malaysia, which in turn will have the effect of accelerating
Malaysia’s progress towards attaining the developed nation status by the year
2020.
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SECTION B)
Global Strategies: The Experience
of Some High-Tech Multinationals
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4b.1 Why and where companies in Europe go
global? A Unilever perspective
J. Maat
Introduction
I offer here the views of Unilever on technology access and how we manage it,
why its main research divisions are still in Europe. To this end, it is necessary to
first understand what kind of company Unilever actually is. Unilever may in fact
not be known in itself, as people normally know our brands, like Dove, Knorr,
Omo, Slim Fast, and so on. Each of these brand is a global one and is possibly
worth over 1 billion euros.
The variety of brands belonging to Unilever encompasses what we call “fast mov-
ing consumer goods”. The products we sell have, on average, a unit cost of maybe
up to four euros and the price can be as low as one cent, if sold in Africa. Our prod-
ucts are really common household products, as for instance Knorr soups. What
sometimes people do not understand is that there is a lot of science and technology
behind those products. They are the result of continuous innovations, which often
represent evolutions and sometimes even technological revolutions.
Our products are very knowledge-intensive, also and especially on the consumer
science side. Understanding what a consumer desires is a very important aspect for
a fast-moving consumer goods company. One needs to really anticipate consum-
ers’ needs.
A “Multi-Local multinational”: Unilever’s organisational setting
Unilever is a real multinational, which is present all over the world. Overall,
Unilever’s turnover is something like 40 billion Euros; we are present in 150 coun-
tries and the company has 206,000 employees. We started out in Europe and still
have our main stake there, with a turnover of 16.2 billion Euros, i.e. 41 % of the to-
tal. Our business in the Americas, Asia and Africa is smaller, but especially Asia
and Latin America represent the biggest growing regions.
Unilever is indeed a global company or, as we say, a “a truly multi-local multina-
tional”. Our deep roots in local cultures and markets around the world give us
strong relationships with the consumers. These are the foundation of our future
growth, what makes us able to bring our wealth of knowledge and international ex-
pertise to the service of local consumers. Often our local enterprises are quite inde-
pendent, so that we can best understand consumer needs.
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Recently Unilever underwent a reorganisation aiming to considerably simplify our
structure and make us much more agile and innovation-oriented. This was needed
in order to speed up innovation and our market propositions, given that our growth
is limited as compared to our main competitors.
Figure 1. Unilever organisation
We have a clear accountability of the market operations and this is region-based.
However, the global brand, i.e. the long-term value creation - which also encom-
passes innovation - is taken care of at the central level and subdivided into two
main areas: food on the one hand, and home and personal care on the other hand.
They define what needs to be done innovation-wise at the global level. In the past,
such strategies were somewhat modified on a country-based level, but this does
not happen anymore and all is defined at the global level.
Another important step was taken by splitting what we call our “Global Virtual
Lab” into programmes and resources. The former define what to do, the latter who
is going to do what.
At present, we have one aligned global innovation and R&D organisation. This
represents quite a difference from the way we used to operate in the past. It actually
means that our global virtual lab is defined at the level of projects and is endowed
with considerable global resources and global competences. We make sure that
competences are mastered at the global level, thus avoiding duplicates. Evidently,
brand strategies, market strategies and R&D strategies are co-defined. This also
implies that we have to define very well what capabilities we need to develop our-
selves, and what capabilities we want to develop externally.
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Unilever foods – Home & Personal Care’s & Corporate Research
At present, within Unilever we have three main research centres located in Europe.
The HPC one is very close to Liverpool, in Port Sunlight (UK). We also still have a
corporate research laboratory in Colworth (UK), which takes care of new business
developments. The centre is not too big and carries out about the 10 % of our total
research, in terms of R&D spending. The third centre we have in Europe deals with
food-related research and is located in Vlaardingen (NL). Each of these laborato-
ries counts around 1000–1200 people.
We also have other two research laboratories outside of Europe: one located in
Mumbai, in Bangalore (India) and one in Shanghai (China). We have had the India
centre for the last thirty or forty years, as Hindustan Lever is Unilever-owned by
49 %. Conversely, in Shanghai we have only been present since 1997.
All in all, we spend one billion Euros in R&D (1,040 million Euros in 2005), which
is maybe about 2 % of our turnover, and have 8,000 R&D employees. For a phar-
maceutical company this sum would be small, but for the food and HPC market it
is a substantial sum. Besides the centres I mentioned we also have global technol-
ogy centres scattered all over the world, from South America to Japan, from South
Africa to Canada. These actually constitute our continuum, making sure that the
innovation flow goes well.
R&D and the role of policy
Although the R&D setting I just described is quite remarkable, still there are ele-
ments that we cannot do ourselves. We clearly have to rely on knowledge that co-
mes into the company from the outside world. We try to tap into that knowledge to
further develop our innovation potential.
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Figure 2. R&D in practice at unilever: the 4 Ds
In this framework I believe governments play an important role, as they may antic-
ipate the needs of companies like Unilever, even if they operate on a global scale.
In particular, there are three elements that governments can shape: the base of the
knowledge infrastructure, the legal environment and the social environment.
Within the knowledge infrastructure education is of course of paramount impor-
tance. It is fundamental that governments take care of education, intended not only
as higher education, but also as primary schools. In fact, we noticed that the sci-
ence orientation is less well developed in primary schools. Therefore, Unilever, to-
gether with some other multinationals, like e.g. Shell, DSM and Philips, are mak-
ing efforts to address primary and secondary schools. We show the youngsters
what kind of science and technology is in our products and what it could actually
mean to be in industrial S&T later on in their careers. At school it is where people
make decisions about what education to go to next, what to do in the future and I
think we, as industrie,s have taken up the responsibility to address the issue. Still,
we deem that governments should take care of this aspect and ensure that quality of
education is high.
A second element that government may address is to stimulate specific research ar-
eas. Policy makers need to ensure that these are co-aligned with industry needs.
First of all we believe that the government can help us in the more high-risk, lon-
ger-term knowledge investments. Although this already happens within the Euro-
pean area and the European framework, there is still room to optimize the policy on
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grants. Secondly, I believe governments can play an important role in partnering,
e.g. bringing together partners that normally would not be together, for instance
through subsidies and so on. We see both in the Netherlands and in Europe that
governments can play this role. Sometimes they do not realise that, but we regard it
as a very important role to play.
With respect to the legal environment, it is necessary to have an adequate level of
Intellectual Property (IP) protection and a good IP Rights (IPRs) system. In that
sense, Europe is in the strange position that there is no European patent yet. This is
a problem that is really hampering progress in Europe.
Finally, some remarks about the social environment and the mobility of human re-
sources. As mentioned before, about 30 % of our staff comes from countries other
than the Netherlands. We really have an international laboratory already, with peo-
ple having something like forty different nationalities. However, mobility of peo-
ple e.g. from China into Europe, should be further facilitated. At present it is not so
easy to get people from those countries. Being able to attract high talents is very
important. In this respect we had a very good Marie Curie system for industrial
placements during the Fifth Framework Programme (FFP) and a considerable
number of those students remained in our laboratories. I think that it was a very
valuable element, but the EC decided not to continue it, and this has created a con-
siderable reduction in the industrial participation in this scheme. Adaptation of es-
pecially the paperwork is hoped for in the 7-th Framework program. In conjunc-
tion to the big number of foreigners entering into our countries, the government
should insure good international schooling and mobility within the country.
The industrial innovation chain
Figure 3 shows our industrial innovation chain, i.e. the way we capture and organ-
ise knowledge as part of innovation. Our chain is very much R&D based. We have
segmented it to run from fundamental sciences to applied sciences, applied tech-
nology and product development. For illustrative purposes, figure 3 pictures the
chain as being a very sequential one, but is not quite that way.
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Figure 3. Industrial innovation chain
At present, Unilever’s company research is in the area of applied technology. We
cannot afford anymore to take care of fundamental research or for several areas to
deal with applied sciences. We need others to do that. In the Netherlands, for in-
stance, we have organised ourselves with several other industrial partners and
knowledge providers similarly to what one now sees in the joint technology initia-
tives. Basically we tried to organise and develop a way by which making applied
science fit our sector’s needs. We call it the area of “pre-competitive research”.
This is overlapping with the open innovation part, which here is defined as more
shorter term.
An example might help clarifying the concept. For instance, the Wageningen Cen-
tre for Food Sciences (WCFS) is what we call a leading technology institute. What
we did, in 1997, was to build an alliance between industry and academia, as can be
seen in table 1.
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Table 1. Wageningen centre for food sciences (WCFS)
• Alliance of industry & research organisations to strengthen Dutch food industry through innova-
tive technology
• Leading technological (virtual) institute; founded 1997
• Public-private investment: Industry-Academia-Government (30/20/50)
Participating research organisations
• Nizo food research
• TNO Nutrition
• Wageningen University & Research Institute
• Maastrich University
Participatig industries
• CSM
• DSM
• Unilever
• Netherlands Dairy Industry
• Avebe (till 2008)
• Cosun (till 2008)
• Sovion (from 2007)
The WCFS is a public-private investment, where the government brings in the
50 % of the budget and the rest is supplied by both industry and academia. The in-
teresting part is that it is industry that defines what needs to be done, that shows the
market orientation. The research institute contributes by means of creating knowl-
edge. Given the substantial amount of money involved, the institute benefits in
terms of ability to pursue longer-term competence developments, in order to safe-
guard its infrastructure. The government supplies money for a period of four years,
on the basis of a business plan. Projects are of up to 5 million Euros in size and this
guarantees the possibility of having a real impact. The government does not dis-
cuss how you handle your activities and the programming and execution and are
left to the partners. Government is measuring output.
At present the European Technology Platform Food for Life is evaluating this op-
tion for wider implementation in Europe.
The European Technology Platform “Food for Life”
The European Union has come upwith a novel concept that goes under the name of
European Technology Platforms (ETP). This concept brings stakeholders to-
gether, giving a vision of what one would like to achieve. The ETP subsequently is
supposed to set a strategic research agenda, and make sure that implementation can
take place. I believe this is a very interesting way of making sure, from a European
point of view, that knowledge is actually built up and applied.
As the food sector is the largest manufacturing industry in Europe, the EC has em-
braced the European Technology Platform “Food for Life” initiative to make sure
that its competitiveness is increased. Unilever is a big proponent of that, because it
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also helps building up a very good knowledge infrastructure. It gives us the possi-
bility to enhance the added value of our sector.
At present, there also is a much better alignment between the framework programs
and the European technology platforms. However, it would be important to make
this alignment even more visible. Besides, it would be helpful to reduce the bu-
reaucracy characterising the framework programs. In this way, it would truly be
possible to build a European knowledge infrastructure.
Centres of excellence: Making industry – Academia partnerships
work
There are a few lessons that we have learnt with respect to bringing together indus-
try and academy within an excellence centre.
Firstly, the success of the initiative depends on trust: establishing a multi-partner
institute with other firms requires that you trust also your competitors. Trust is an
element that you cannot build overnight: you really need to develop it and you
need time to do so. However, it is important that the necessity to know one another
well in order to work together well does not end up creating a closed shop, both at
the national and the international level.
Secondly, you must clearly define a research program, which normally is an exten-
sion of your own company’s program. Besides, governments need to be clear and
state what they are trying to achieve from this initiative, in terms of long-term ob-
jectives and economic development.
Thirdly, for the programme to be successful, there must also be something in it for
the academics. On the one hand, scientists should be involved in setting the pro-
gram, so that they fully understand the type of scientific achievements sought. This
certainly implies, for them, that some freedom is lost. On the other hand, though, as
researchers are interested in publishing in top journals, publications should not be
restricted. This, in turn, helps attracting top talents.
Fourthly, for industry to be sitting in the “driving seat”, they should have enough
absorptive capacity, otherwise academics may end up pursuing their personal in-
terests regardless of concrete applicability. This is why only the larger companies
and not the small or medium enterprises are present in the WCFS, as the latter lack
the absorptive capacity needed. As a possible solution to this problem, a plan
called Food & Nutrition Delta has been developed in the Netherlands. This gives
small and medium enterprises the possibility to tap into the knowledge developed
in the longer-term pre-competitive activities, as well as in the more applica-
tion-oriented ones.
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Fifthly, when developing a lot of capacity like a leading technology institute, there
is the risk that, while pulling the team together across the country, you are widen-
ing the distance existing between the country itself and Europe. Hence the initia-
tive needs to be expanded at the European level, but in a gradual way: I believe it
cannot be done in any other way. It may take time, but all forefront initiatives are
longer-term investments.
Finally, it is fundamental to focus on few areas, as one needs a critical mass in or-
der to have an impact.
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4b.2 Going global – Open innovations at Valio
R&D
37
T. Mattila-Sandholm
Open Innovations are one of the company’s strengths today
Valio R&D has been strong on innovations throughout its entire history. The No-
bel Prize in Chemistry won by our R&D director A.I. Virtanen in 1945 cast a win-
ning spell on our approach to research in general. Valio has always been a
front-runner, first with AIV butter salt and AIV silage in the 1920’s. In the 1970’s
we were first again with a UHT ready-to-feed infant formula called Tutteli. Valio
was certainly ahead of its time with probiotics in 1990 – the first company in Eu-
rope to launch the probiotic Lactobacillus GG (LGG®), a model for open innova-
tion, which today has more than 290 scientific publications backing its history and
proven effects. We have to remember that this was 5 years before the major
probiotics were launched in Europe. Valio has a strong history of technological in-
novation in lactose free products, now with product families and concepts we call
Hyla and Lactose-free. Lactose-free products are an example of a closed innova-
tion. It all started as a research curiosity within the company. Researchers were in-
terested in lactose in general and started to study enzymatic hydrolysis of lactose.
This research started in 1970, and the product appeared in the market later, in eight
or ten years. Gradually these Hyla products became a brand in Finland and Finns
started to drink them. Hyla is enzymatically degraded lactose that has a sweet fla-
vour. Researchers decided to continue with the research and established a method
for totally eradicating lactose with chromatography and later on with a membrane
technology. It came on market in 2000 and ended up being a massive market suc-
cess. Besides all this Valio has many product categories in low-fat cheeses – Finn-
ish consumers will not accept the high fat and salt content of European cheeses –
this is a first step in the fight against obesity!
There is ‘no zero-risk’ in real innovation
In both academic and applied research, there is always the possibility that results
do not come out as expected, which of course may be a risk depending on the in-
vestments made. One should also understand what a real innovation means and
that not everything can be turned into an innovation overnight. Creative ideas and
concepts do not all necessarily become success stories when they reach the pro-
duction line. Sometimes the innovation can simply be too early for the market.
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37 The present article is presented in its original version, as written by the author, and has not undergone any
revision by the editors.
Valio’s innovation strategies can be divided into five main categories: con-
sumer-driven, competition-driven, vision-driven, technology-driven and curios-
ity-driven. Evidently, the company does not invest the same amount of money in
all the areas. Consumer- and competition-driven strategies absorb more than 50 %
of the budget, whereas the vision-driven, technology-driven and curiosity-driven
ones get the rest. Marketing produces concepts linked to the Valio brand and prod-
uct development for competition- and consumer-driven markets. R&D establishes
innovations through technology driven and vision driven approaches. R&D in-
vests in curiosity driven research through its academic networks as well. Among
others this has led to the next generation of LGG, building on the strengths of its re-
search, which will be released next year. Our newest innovation Profeel milk is an
example of a weight control product where both the concept and milk has been
structured from technology innovation components at Valio aiming at satiety.
‘Valio R & D – the future is international’
Although Valio has focused on what we call our home market around the Baltic
Sea including Russia, we are already widening our horizons and will continue to
do so. Markets in Finland have also become international so there is no place for
single ownership any more. It’s important to be competitive and stand out from the
crowd. R&D works hand-in-hand with International Sales. Valio R&D strategy is
built for both our home market area and a broader international market, and takes a
truly international perspective. And in all cases differentiation is the core issue.
We have today some 20 companies around the world licensing our technology.
Most of them have licensed the rights to our probiotic LGG® for their dairy prod-
ucts. There are dairy products with LGG® on the market in 36 countries world-
wide. Some of our customers are also active in food supplements and one of our li-
censees is specialized in infant foods. Licensing of Valio’s Evolus® technology
has taken off in Europe where products are available in Iceland, Spain, Portugal
and Switzerland. We have also licensed our technology for lactose free milk to
some markets in Europe and recently to South Korea. Different parts of the world
naturally have different requirements but there are many similarities, too. Europe
has many common trends just as the Nordic countries do. Asia and the US offer
many possibilities for co-operation both ways.
Licensed products are normally developed and manufactured locally (and also un-
der local brands). This ensures that the needs of the local market are taken into ac-
count. Very often it is actually more a question of local consumption habits than
really different nutritional needs. Of course the ways in which products are used
can be very different as well: for French consumers fruit yoghurt is a dessert while
for Scandinavians it’s a breakfast product and a “snack” between the meals.
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Is there enough ‘real innovation’ in dairy ?
The dairy industry has been accused of looking too much within what it sees as its
own boundaries and simply cannot do so any more and certainly will not. One
could argue whether or not the dairy industry has succeeded in investing enough in
the ‘R’ part of research and development, since it seems that while people talk
about R&D they only do the D. Valio has the unique and rare combination of both
research and development bound to marketing, production and the pilot markets of
Finland with the curiosity of the country’s consumers – this is an interesting exam-
ple of an innovation pipeline – and all in one location.
The word ‘Innovation’ has suffered from inflation becoming a trendy phrase used
everywhere in the public and private sectors, and not always with much thought.
I do not consider me-too products to be innovations and in my opinion there are al-
ways too many me-too products out there. Valio’s aim is to be different, effective
and driven by curiosity.
Preventive medicine is food
Valio has led in launching several technologies that other companies have fol-
lowed. A good example is Evolus®, the first dairy product in Europe to lower
blood pressure. In 2005, other companies became interested and active in this seg-
ment as well. But because Valio technologies have been patented, the products
cannot be exact copies.
Evolus® has been on the market since 2000 and is already licensed in Portugal,
Spain, Switzerland and Iceland as you know. Of course its efficacy has been tested
and proven, in clinical trials, in cooperation with university hospitals and research
institutes, through our networking with the academic community. Valio’s success
with Evolus® has benefited from experience with our best known international in-
novation and the products that have stemmed from it. Lactobacillus GG better
known as LGG® can be found in, at the last count, 36 health promoting products.
And just as with Evolus® the number of products and licenses is growing all the
time. Like LGG®, Valio Evolus® is muchmore than just a brand – it’s a genuinely
valuable technology. The way we are now commercialising our lactose free tech-
nology in for instance South Korea, where 80 % of the population is lactose intol-
erant, shows the human value of branding an innovative technology. And then
there’s Gefilus, too. Let us not forget the science behind the marketing. Valio has
strong national and international scientific networks consisting of
multidisciplinary expertise in the medical, physiological, molecular and biological
fields. The technology and product development expertise is kept very much
in-house since most of our patents rely on in-house technology.
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Knowledge-based economy is part of Valio’s history
It is interesting to see the motivation offered by the Valio Board, in 1916, when es-
tablishing Valio’s Laboratory: “Only such a country whose entire economy is
based on science can attain and keep the first place in the economic war between
nations”. This sentence shows that the board had understood the importance of the
knowledge-based economy, and did so quite a long time ago. They just did not
name it knowledge-based economy, but they certainly understood that knowledge
is important and that you need to invest in knowledge to compete. Valio will con-
tinue to focus on innovations that cannot be copied easily and are truly for the ben-
efit of the global consumer!
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4b3. The challenges of globalization for R&D:
Honeywell’s perspective
B. Pellereau
Introduction
Although I am currently not part of an R&D organization, I am responsible for
driving business innovation and business growth in the wider European region,
which for Honeywell includes Europe, Middle East, Africa and India. In that con-
text I would like to share my thoughts on the challenges of globalization to R&D. I
will first illustrate the globalization of R&D activities carried out within
Honeywell Specialty Materials and then make a number of recommendations to
encourage innovation, especially in Europe.
Honeywell specialty materials (HSM) and its R&D centres
Honeywell Specialty Materials is not always known as a chemical company, but
we are active in a wide range of industries. Honeywell Specialty Materials is a $
4.5 billion unit of Honeywell, the $ 30 billion multinational company. We are a
chemical company active in a wide range of industries and providing customers
with high performance materials. For example, we make bullet-proof materials
with advanced fibres and composites based on Spectra Technologies. Spectra
Technologies is committed to innovation and to providing powerful materials for
armour used by soldiers and police officers around the world, so that they may sur-
vive. We also produce environmentally friendlier refrigerants for air conditioners
and refrigeration units. Besides, we provide non ozone-depleting blowing agents
for closed-cell spray foam. These are used to build homes with higher energy effi-
ciency and improved indoor air quality.
HEM is a leading supplier of chemicals and metals for the semiconductor industry.
We have a Specialty Chemicals Business, which is an established leader in the pro-
duction of high purity Life Science and Research Chemicals and therefore an im-
portant partner of R&D labs throughout the world. We also make additives for
plastics and other applications, high barrier films, nylon resins and fertilizers. Our
UOP Business Unit is a leading supplier and licensor of processing technology,
catalysts and adsorbents, process plants and technical services to the Oil, Gas and
Petrochemical industries.
With respect to our R&D labs, as you can see from figure 1, we have established a
global R&D position, meant to support and speed up product development
throughout the world.
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Source: Honeywell
Figure 1. Honeywell specialty materials research locations
In the US we have a number of R&D labs: one in Sunnyvale, California, for elec-
tronic materials; one in Buffalo, New York, for fluorine products; another one is in
Des Plaines, Illinois. This last belongs to the UOP business units and focuses on
process technology for oil and gas cleaning and petrochemical plants. In Europe,
our main laboratory is located in Seelze, Germany, close to Hannover. This is a
centre focused on specialty chemicals, electronic chemicals and security pigments,
called Lumilux. Seelze is our centre of excellence for Europe. It is located in our
main production site for Specialty Chemicals and Security Pigments and serves the
Global Product Development needs in these areas. It focuses also on the develop-
ment of specific European products and local application expertise. In Asia, and
more precisely in Shanghai, we have an application focused lab, where no funda-
mental research is carried out. The Shanghai centre is meant to develop applica-
tions and products that are suitable for the needs of the Asian markets. The Shang-
hai R&D Centre of excellence was opened in 2004 to support our Asia Growth
Strategy. It provides critical mass for the business in Asia, contributes to a better
product alignment with local market needs and customer preferences and reduces
the costs of product development. Besides, we are establishing very strong collab-
oration programmes with universities throughout the world, including India.
The R&D we perform is primarily for our own purpose. When working with other
companies we create partnerships aimed at developing specific industry solutions.
For instance, we work a lot in the area of brand protection, in order to be able to de-
tect counterfeited products and to protect our brands. Besides, most of the R&D
carried out internally is not only focused on developing new products but more and
more on developing solutions. Honeywell has the advantage of being a company
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that is very active in many different industrial and consumer segments. Andwe can
use synergies between the different divisions of the company.
Honeywell’s R&D going global: Drivers and challenges
As far as Honeywell is concerned, performing R&D at the global scale brings
many advantages to the company. To begin with, one of our main drivers is the will
to benefit from the world’s best talents. Besides, we want to have more diversity
when it comes to the generation of ideas.
Secondly, we want to make sure that we get more research capabilities, and use the
available 24 hours a day for our research. At Honeywell R&D never goes to sleep,
so to say.
Thirdly, we want to take advantage of the new market opportunities arising world-
wide, while achieving a better alignment with the local market needs. It is in fact
well known that a product developed in the US or in Europe is not necessarily a
product that can be successful in China or in India. We have to adapt to the cus-
tomer needs and preferences.
Fourthly, we also want to take advantage of the reduced cost of new products’ de-
velopment.
I would say that two points, i.e. a stronger R&D portfolio and a higher speed to
market, constitute the main benefits of Honeywell global R&D capabilities. Doing
so our R&D portfolio becomes much stronger, thanks to the diversity of ideas. We
also enjoy a better time-to-market, as the number of hours spent in R&D is higher.
Honeywell SM’s motives and drivers that push the firm’s R&D more and more
globally are mainly ‘horizontal’, i.e. additional research capabilities, portfolio
widening, speed up the time to market, and defining customer-specific applica-
tions for the different markets. Although we are also located in low cost countries,
to take advantage of their competitive and talented workforce, the major benefit of
our lab in China, for instance, is to deliver solutions that are better suited to the cus-
tomers’ needs. The same applies to Honeywell as a whole. For instance Honeywell
has developed a campus in Bangalore where we have today more than 4500 peo-
ple. These people work for most of the Honeywell divisions for instance in the
area of software development and business analytics. We are recruiting in India at
the pace of more than 100 people a month. Our limitation is to find enough talents.
India is a low cost country but the driving force is not only the low cost per se, but
rather getting the right talent at the lowest possible cost and obtaining the best re-
sults.
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Becoming a global R&D organization also implies facing a number of challenges.
To begin with, it is not always easy to attract and retain local talents in emerging
markets. This requires a pro-active human resources policy based on training and
local management, links with local universities and head-hunters, investments in
corporate brand building, understanding salaries and local benefits, local career
planning and so on. Other challenges include of course building or finding the nec-
essary infrastructures, appropriately dealing with cultural issues and effectively
communicating within and outside the company. Last but not least, patent protec-
tion and the respect and enforceability of intellectual property rights are central to
Honeywell and its innovation activities.We reckon they should represent a top pri-
ority, as we make more and more progress in global free trade negotiations.
How Europe could improve the innovation game
As both business and research become all the more globalized, Europe must take
some action to encourage and nurture innovation. To do so, I believe it needs to
rely on four main elements: businesses, governments, academia and the labour
market, as they all have important roles to play.
Figure 2. Collaborating to innovate
By investing in research, businesses provide private capital that helps creating
new and innovative products and services. Businesses also develop new business
models that allow regions to thrive in the global economy. In fact, the biggest
“risk” for innovation is providing too much stability: new business models must be
supported but also allowed to fail. In this respect, I do believe that access to more
venture capital in Europe would help enhancing innovation.
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Innovation can also be improved through the development of innovation clusters
that would enable small and medium sized companies to be more productive and
innovative than they could be in isolation (similarly to the Silicon Valley model).
As businesses focus primarily on the market, success is linked to their innovation
capacity and their ability to meet the changing needs of customers. Evidently,
businesses must have a commitment to health, safety and protecting the environ-
ment. We say in the chemical industry that this is our license to operate. Industry
actually should take advantage of new legislation. I think in particular to the new
chemical legislation called “Reach”. We often see regulations as a threat, but they
also create new business opportunities by triggering the development of products
with less impact on human health and the environment.
As for governments, they can foster innovation in many ways.
Firstly, governments must have robust systems for recognising and protecting pat-
ents and, more generally, intellectual property and make sure that these are also
seen as top priorities in free trade negotiations. Besides, simplifying the European
patent system would help enhancing innovation.
Secondly, I deem that simpler and better regulations in Europe, in line with the Lis-
bon agenda, would have a positive impact on innovation, economic growth and
jobs.
Thirdly, I believe that collaboration platforms aimed at increasing the interaction
between business, government and academia can strengthen innovation by sharing
ideas, knowledge and expertise and improve the commercialisation of research.
Governments can certainly play an important role in helping these platforms to develop.
Fourthly, governments should provide R&D fiscal incentives and coordinate R&D
funding to focus on key sectors that are sources of competitive advantage in the re-
gion considered.
Finally, competitive energy prices, access to a wider spectrum of energy sources as
well as energy efficiency regulations would all contribute to enhance the competi-
tiveness and innovation potential of Europe.
Academia can also play a major role in fostering innovation. In fact, Universities
can be and often are incubators for entrepreneurs (more so in the US than in Eu-
rope). This must be enhanced even further to support faculty and students inter-
ested in taking ideas to the market place and to help produce graduates who can
lead this type of activity. Academia tends to reward people comparatively more for
their academic achievements and tends to ignore those achievements that have a
commercial impact. I believe this must change. Besides, academia should seek to
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work closely with both governments and businesses to ensure that its R&D activi-
ties are focused on the most promising and strategic areas. Academia should avoid
the “silo” approach to science, where disciplines rarely cross, e.g. engineering and
business. I would further suggest that education curricula should also deal with in-
novation.
Finally the labour market. As innovation obviously depends on good ideas and
talented people, the labour market should be structured in such a way as to encour-
age and support life-long learning. This, in turn, would ensure that skills remain
in-line with global demands. I believe the supply of a deep and wide talent pool is
critical to success. The labour market certainly plays a fundamental role in ensur-
ing opportunities for talent growth. Besides, we do need to grow talent through ex-
posure to other disciplines, for instance through collaborative programs. Finally,
labour legislation should be somewhat more flexible and ready to more easily
adapt to the continuous change that the global markets and the economic circum-
stances determine. That means that our workforce needs to be more flexible and
mobile, which is not always the case.
Conclusions
I do believe that globalisation, and especially the globalisation of R&D, should be
not be seen as a threat. R&D globalisation is truly an opportunity. Being able to
reap its benefit simply depends on changing the way we operate. We would all
benefit if there existed better links between academia, businesses, users and the
governments, especially when it comes to new and emerging technologies. New
technologies are not always competitive, and one needs to make sure that the de-
velopment work done by the universities has some commercial significance and
that businesses support the commercialisation of these ideas. In turn, businesses
need being supported by the government when dealing with emerging technolo-
gies. This is why I would certainly like to see more coordination along the value
chain, as there are sectors in which universities are leading and others where busi-
nesses lead. To accelerate growth and innovate more and better we have to work
together more intensively: being the first to bring an idea to the marketplace in-
creases one’s chances to make this idea profitable. People always talk about num-
bers, but what matters is not the number of people, but rather the number of talents.
It is not the number of patents, but the amount of money you get out of your pat-
ents. It is not the size of R&D, but what comes out of the R&D funnel.
If we do not cooperate and innovate more in Europe somebody else will do it in
other regions. This is why I believe that we need to accelerate cooperation in Eu-
rope. in particular with respect to emerging technologies. Collaboration with the
various actors in the value chain will accelerate the chances of technology scale up
and successful commercialization.
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5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
Concluding: Policy implications
The Going Global 2006 conference offered quite an array of interesting elements
related to knowledge and innovation policy. We here proceed to explicit and
contextualise the most important policy implications highlighted both in the litera-
ture and by the GG2006 contributors.
We begin by synthesising the main features of the current “new phase” of global-
ization and then analyze globalization and the knowledge-based economies
vis-à-vis the challenges they pose (Section 1). In Section 2 we briefly review the
discussion concerning the recent global trends characterizing companies’ R&D
and innovation. Section 3 highlights the possible implications for the innovation
strategies and policy-making of both the EU and of selected emerging economies.
Section 4 points out possible developments and issues for further analysis and puts
forward a more “compact set” of policy implications.
5.1 Implications of main traits of globalization
and knowledge-based economies
We here overview the current trends of globalization and knowledge-based econo-
mies, looking at science, technology and innovation as strategic assets for the suc-
cess of enterprises and nations. Our aim is also to look at the implications of funda-
mental issues as:
(a) the measurement and performance of knowledge-based economies;
(b) the structural transformation of the economy into a service economy dri-
ven by the IT, innovation and knowledge;
(c) the changes happening in the global IPR regime;
(d) the relevance of cross-border knowledge spillovers;
(e) the increasing role of technology transfer and science and technology
within global trade rules; and
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(f) the pressure globalization exerts over national innovation policies and
how it may shape the underlying economic theory.
Measuring the performance of the knowledge economy
The ability to use, create, and adapt knowledge is held to be a fundamental deter-
minant of the global competitiveness of countries as well as an indicator of how
well countries may perform. Still, the fundamental question remains of how to
measure, evaluate and compare the performance of knowledge-based economies.
Jean-Eric Aubert proposes to use a methodology that relies on both quantitative
and qualitative indicators, as the World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment Method-
ology (KAM) and Knowledge Economy Index (KEI). Evidence supports the hy-
pothesis that strong correlations exist between knowledge related investments and
economic growth, regardless of the development level considered. The existence
of such links between knowledge-related investments, countries’ performance and
prospect economic growth certainly has important implications for innovation pol-
icy and calls for careful investments in knowledge.
Countries’ performances should be framed in a broader anthropological context,
innovation systems within their broader development systems, and the latter un-
derstood within the broader social systems. As Aubert points out, most of coun-
tries’ success stories of the past decades, such as Finland, regard geographic or cul-
tural “islands” that have experienced severe pressure and threats and overcome
deep crises. These islands have been able to develop a genuine endogenous capa-
bility and to mobilise their human and financial resources. The questions thus arise
of whether it could be possible (and desiderable) to replicate such phenomena,
vis-à-vis the implications of these development models at national, local and inter-
national level.
Structural changes: Towards an IT knowledge-based economy
The current knowledge and innovation driven development has been also and es-
pecially spurred by ICTs and by the transformation of the manufacturing sector
these are triggering. John Zysman argues that we are living in a “global digital
era” and that the service transformation has been globally driven by innovation, IT
and digitalization. Some of themain features of the global digital era are the impor-
tance of component producers, the shift towards modularity and outsourcing, and
the ability to decompose production into cross-national supply chains.
Outsourcing is transforming many traditionally internal functions of the compa-
nies, including R&D, into tradable goods or tradable tasks, as Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006) point out.The network-based transformation of services
has become a critical part of the global knowledge economy and the current algo-
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rithmic transformation makes some aspects of the service activities convertible
into quantifiable processes. In such a global digital era the main advantages lie in
the ability of firms to innovate business models and to exploit the blurred bound-
aries between goods and services as a source of innovation. However, compared to
manufacturing, service production requires more knowledge. Still, this knowl-
edge, Zysman stresses, is embedded in the IT tools currently available on the mar-
kets. Such a feature explains why, for instance, firms like the Indian Wipro can
quickly enter the global market.
The implications of the global transformation of services for corporate strategy
and national policies are profound. There must be experimentation in what compa-
nies do and imagination in what they are going to be able to do, the key question
being how they reorganise their routines. National policy is creating the context
for experimentation. When previously untraded sectors start being traded, the role
of national policy and international competition begins to shift. Data networks
constitute a base where experimentation takes place and the ability to reorganise
the service sectors becomes critical. Moreover, what is done at home may become
the basis for competition abroad. This means that the “global” is not quite as global
as we think, but there is a permanent tension between global and the national level.
Much of what, say, Finland or Japan have accomplished in fact mainly rests on
their national policies and contexts.
IPR: Recent changes and the global regime
The ever-growing strategic importance of knowledge is reflected in the relevance
of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and in the challenges traditional IPR policies
are facing. The underlying rationale behind IPRs is to spur innovation and creativ-
ity by attempting to solve the tension between knowledge diffusion and lack of
appropriability. However, the IPR system is currently under stress, due - also al-
though not exclusively - to the massive expansion in the demand for IPRs, to the
broadening of IPR areas (new rights, legislations, layout designs, database protec-
tion, etc.), and to the challenges posed by piracy, new innovation models (“open
innovations”), and anti-IP movements. This calls, as Francis Gurry does, for the
need to rethink IPR policies and to find possible pathways to solve the tensions of
the IP system. A more inclusive discussion about other models of innovation,
rather than only IP, is needed. One should not talk anymore about IP policies, but
rather about broader knowledge policies that concern the generation, transmission
and use of new knowledge. Access to technology should also be improved, espe-
cially geographically, thus leading to the democratization of access to technology.
Besides, a deeper consciousness about countries’ development should be fostered,
so that the role of IP could be suitably contextualised. The functionality and effi-
ciency of the IPR model can be improved, thus being of better service especially to
small developing countries with scarce resources.
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Relevance of cross-border knowledge spillovers
The growing strategic role of knowledge and innovation for the competitiveness of
businesses worldwide makes the cross-border transfer of knowledge and technol-
ogy extremely important. Key is also the issue of whether knowledge is intention-
ally traded or it rather un-intentionally spills over. Pierre Mohnen argues for the
need of policy makers to intervene. Governments need to incentivize firms to
make their investments in R&D reach the socially optimal level, rather than stop-
ping at the private optimum. Besides, agents need to invest in their absorptive ca-
pacity to be able to benefit from spillovers. Geographical proximity, networking
and labour mobility also matter for spillovers, as they represent important trans-
mission channels. Despite the limited knowledge about how spillovers truly work
– which makes experts unable to provide governments with normative guidance -
some clear policy implications arise. Among these, the need to build up absorptive
capacity, and to increase interactions, networking and knowledge exchange. De-
veloping absorptive capacity is extremely important also for developing countries,
as this would put them in a better position in order to benefit from the research
done by others.
Global trade rules: The increasing role of science and technology transfer
Global trade rules are attributing growing importance to S&T and to the transfer of
knowledge and technology. Manuel Teehankee underlines that S&T invest-
ments, research funding, and intellectual assets are high on the agenda of both de-
veloping countries and international organizations like the WTO, the UN and the
OECD. The discussion at present encompasses not only technology transfer but
also investment flows, competition rules, IP regimes, and limits to IPRs.
Teehankee advocates the formulation of multilateral rules that would recognise
and regulate the role of technology transfer and adoption, as well as domestic and
multilateral fiscal incentives and funding for R&D and S&T. Teehankee hopes for
a change in the focus of intellectual property protection that, without prejudicing
IPRs, would lead to a win-win strategy and thus benefit development.
Globalization and national innovation policies: Challenging economic theory
Traditionally, national innovation policies have aimed to promote and encourage
domestic production, transfer and commercialization of new knowledge by enter-
prises, R&D centres and other private and public actors. Globalization challenges
all this. As Otto Toivanen highlights, the economic rationale for innovation pol-
icy is the assumption that R&D investments benefit not only inventors but also
others, i.e. the society as a whole. The prospect social benefits that may accrue
hence justify closing the wedge between private and social incentives to innovate
by means of active innovation policies, i.e. taxes or R&D subsidies. However, the
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implicit assumption of such reasoning is that the society is all mankind. Hence,
justifying innovation policy on the basis of economic theory gives small open
economies fewer reasons to support private innovation by public means than a
world government would have. This is why Toivanen argues in favour of the need
to try and coordinate R&D policies within bigger units, like the EU, in order to
better internalize spillovers. Alike Mohnen, Toivonen suggests that a small open
economy should nurture its absorptive capacity, to benefit from the knowledge
created elsewhere. On a basis of the small open economy argument Toivanen also
casts doubts on the belief that public R&D subsidies would encourage firms to un-
dertake riskier R&D projects than they would have otherwise.
5.2 Implications of enterprises’ global R&D and
innovation strategies
The current phase of globalization sees business dynamics and worldwide compe-
tition settings changing dramatically, also due to the internationalization of enter-
prise R&D and innovation. Emerging economies like China and India look in-
creasingly attractive to enterprises - especially transnational corporations (TNCs) -
in terms of science, technology and innovation.
Despite it is not proved or disproved that the internationalization of enterprise
R&D hollows out domestic capabilities, the media often define such relocation
mechanisms as a threat. Doing so, they also forget that R&D relocation and
off-shoring constitute just one element of the broader enterprise R&D and innova-
tion strategies. Besides, the latter vary a lot, depending upon the characteristics of
the companies, their home country, their technological capabilities, their markets
and so on.
We here focus on three main aspects. Firstly, on some evidence about R&D
off-shoring and its impact on the innovation capacity of the EU firms, as offered by
an UNCTAD survey and a study commissioned by DG Enterprise. Secondly, we
discuss R&D relocation taking our moves from the experience of three companies:
a Dutch and U.S. based TNC and a Finnish company. Thirdly we consider and dis-
cuss a relatively less explored issue, i.e. the R&D internationalization dynamics
and possible impact of Chinese companies. Besides attracting FDIs, emerging
economies’ firms are in fact entering global markets following strategies that re-
semble those of their developed economies’ counterparts. Among the newcomers,
Chinese corporations are anticipated to be the new contenders in global R&D and
innovation.
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Transnational corporations: Driving of R&D globalization
The generation of knowledge through R&D and its exploitation are some of
TNCs’ strategic factors of competition. Important challenges hence become find-
ing the most suitable place where locating in-house R&D and deciding to what ex-
tent and from where acquiring external knowledge. In fact, although R&D consti-
tutes one of the least internationalised business functions, it is nevertheless becom-
ing increasingly global, mainly due to firms’ need to innovate, to keep costs down
and to access new talent pools. TNCs in particular are progressively increasing the
amount of R&D they carry out outside their home country and much of this reloca-
tion targets developing countries.
At the same time, the R&D performed in some developing countries is becoming
more complex. In addition, more innovative R&D is also being undertaken in e.g.
India and China, as well as in Singapore and Korea, thus signalling that the actual
innovation process is getting transferred to some extent to these countries. Asian
economies seem to be those that most benefited from the globalisation process.
Through dedicated policies they succeeded to become more competitive knowl-
edge-wise and to improve their national innovation systems. They also actively
sought to leverage TNCs investments and activities, by focusing on human re-
sources, public research activities, and IPR protection.
Thorbjörn Fredriksson underlines how these developments open up new oppor-
tunities, not only for developing countries but for the world as a whole, as they
may lead to achieve win-win outcomes. In particular, as far as Europe is con-
cerned, Fredriksson holds that R&D off-shoring is creating more opportunities
than challenges. Many European and American companies often find it difficult in
their home countries to find the sufficient number/quality of staff needed to under-
take R&D. Through off-shoring R&D activities in new locations they may instead
manage to remain competitive. This being the case, R&D investments in, say, In-
dia or China do not constitute a loss of R&D for Europe or the US, but rather a use-
ful complement. Countries should therefore pay attention to the strengths and
weaknesses of their national innovation systems if they want to select and support
those companies’ relocation strategies that bring the most benefit to the home
country. The same applies with respect to attracting foreign companies’ invest-
ments.
Such a perspective seems to be shared by Heikki Salmi, who points out that do-
mestic R&D has been very limitedly replaced by off-shored R&D. This suggests
that off-shored R&D differs from and complements the R&D carried out in the
home countries. Only R&D off-shored to Asia seems to be associated with higher
level of replacements. In general, though, R&D off-shoring happens between EU
member states, from the old member states to the new ones, and not so much be-
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yond EU. Strategic R&D is normally carried out in the home countries: the more
important the product and process level R&D is, the lower the replacement of do-
mestic R&D. Public support does not seem to be crucial in R&D off-shoring deci-
sions, but efficient IPR protection, the quality of the education system and the de-
velopment level of the infrastructures are highly valued. Among the top reasons
for off-shoring there are cheap labour and strategic benefits, intended as networks
with other companies, institutions, competitors or customers. Off-shoring seems to
have a positive effect on export firms, and these perceive off-shoring to have a pos-
itive effect over their capability to innovate. Evidence suggests that the higher the
number of locations where a firm patents, the higher the number of patents. Hence,
successful off-shoring, intended as the ability to innovate in several locations, has
positive effects over the overall innovative performance of the firms.
All this said, it becomes evident that R&D off-shoring is certainly a kind of FDIs
countries want to attract. We can thus expect fierce competition in this respect, as
countries mould their structures in order to better attract the R&D off-shored.
R&D off-shoring in any case also benefits home activities and should not be seen
as zero sum game, where one country or region loses what some others gain. Eu-
rope should do its best to attract incoming off-shored R&D, but also see the oppor-
tunities that open up when enterprises off-shore R&D in other countries. Off-shor-
ing is not a one-way path, but rather depends of the ability of enterprises to reap the
benefits accruing from being present on each other’s knowledge markets. Evi-
dence suggests that off-shoring benefits European R&D productivity. Salmi hence
suggests that, instead of fearing R&Doff-shoring, we should understand it: EU cit-
izens and firms will be able to continue to benefit only if the EU maintains and im-
proves its science base and the quality of its workforce, while deregulating the la-
bour market.
Global R&D and innovation strategies of enterprises
The current phase of globalization is imposing new requirements on both the
R&D and innovation strategies of firms, independently of their sector, market
orientation or function within the global value chain. Location is just one of the
issues to be dealt with, as R&D and innovation strategies must take into account
important features such as technological capability, overall company structure,
and so on.
Jan Maat (Unilever) underlines that it is the need to achieve long-term value cre-
ation to define what is to be done, also innovation-wise, at the global level. To
speed up innovation and strengthen its global market position Unilever has thus
built up an aligned global innovation and R&D organisation, “a global virtual lab”
where projects, resources, and competences are global.
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R&D relocation, as Bernard Pellereau (Honeywell) puts it, is not driven by the
need to lower costs but rather by the necessity to acquire local knowledge, under-
stand themarket, and develop products suitable to the needs of the local customers.
Low costs do matter, but the real driver is recruiting the right talents at lowest pos-
sible cost.
Besides, as Tiina Mattila-Sandholm (Valio) stresses, it can be difficult for any
company, especially for a small company, to succeed in innovating. Hence the
need to open up, to collaborate with top scientists and, most fundamentally, to
build up the necessary absorptive capacity. Doing so, firms may be able to attract
those researchers that are at the forefront of science. Mattila-Sandholm also high-
lights the importance of relying on win-win strategies: when all the parties in-
volved perceive that they are in a win position cooperation in any innovation is
fruitful.
Pellereau further underlines the necessity to intertwine more academia and re-
search and to generate stronger interactions between university and business. If
competencies can be brought together Europe might have a strategic advantage
over its competitors: the capability to innovate and commercialise new ideas in a
successful manner.
Enterprises of emerging economies as new contenders in global markets
While R&D and innovation bring foreign companies to the emerging Asian econo-
mies, the enterprises of these countries are entering both the markets and R&D and
innovation systems of all countries, including developed economies. Max von
Zedwitz anticipates Chinese corporations to be the new contenders in global R&D
and innovation. Some of them have in fact already become aggressive global play-
ers, even if, in general, Chinese firms are not as internationalised as their Western
counterparts. As the latter are reluctant to send their latest technologies to China,
the Chinese are establishing R&D centres in Western countries and investing in
the research carried out in Western universities, to become legal owners of the IP
generated.
At present, though, some barriers exist to the internationalization of Chinese com-
panies. These are represented by are the firms’ scarce resources, their little experi-
ence of foreign markets, and the fact that they lack of both product innovation his-
tory and R&D resources and management’s expertise. Besides, the cost of doing
R&D in China is relatively lower than carrying our R&D elsewhere. However, as
Chinese firms are good at learning, imitating, picking up and absorbing knowl-
edge, they might soon become strong competitors in R&D as well. If technology
does not go to China, Chinese will go to the sources of technology and get it right
there.
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5.3 Innovation policy strategies: Implication for
EU and selected Asian economies
In what follows we analyse the links between globalization, national innovation
policy-making and policy strategies by looking at the EU and at the dynamics of
selected emerging Asian economies (i.e. India and Malaysia).
The EU is in fact responding to the challenges posed by globalization by attempt-
ing to increase its attractiveness and competitiveness. Four are the aspects that de-
serve particular attention in this respect. Firstly, building EU’s knowledge and in-
novation capacity. Secondly, implementing a EU strategy in international scien-
tific cooperation. Thirdly, renewing the European knowledge policy. Fourthly,
strengthening European industrial innovation performance.
Globalization, new growth strategies and the role of universities
Unfortunately, the “European paradox” is still hunting the continent. David
Audretsch highlights how, in Europe, knowledge investments do generate new
knowledge but this knowledge does not spill out of universities. Not being suffi-
ciently commercialised, knowledge does not bring the expected returns, in terms
of both growth and jobs. Whereas investing in new plants and equipments tradi-
tionally resulted in growth and jobs, the current investments in knowledge do not
automatically lead to results. Knowledge investments have to go through what
Audretsch calls “the knowledge filter” in order to become valuable and bring re-
turns, i.e. knowledge investments’ outcomes need to be commercialized.
Audretsch suggests that the missing link between knowledge investments and re-
turns is entrepreneurship, which serves as a mechanism or a conduit by which
knowledge investments bring the expected fruits. He therefore calls for a more en-
trepreneurial role of universities, as universities are important sources of knowl-
edge. In this way the transfer of knowledge to commercialization would be facili-
tated, thus resulting in economic growth and employment.
Daniele Archibugi somewhat challenges Audretsch’s view by asserting that uni-
versity’s main mission is to carry out basic research. It should therefore be fi-
nanced by means of public money, as it provides a public good. Archibugi reckons
that public science is becoming too instrumental, R&D too much targeted at spe-
cific aims, and too linked to industrial competitiveness. He finds that, in the past,
linking research and industry, having science parks, and fostering academic entre-
preneurship was justified by the need to support the commercial application of sci-
ence. However, this process has possibly gone too far. As a consequence, universi-
ties are getting very few money for research and depend too much on external con-
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tracts. Archibugi argues that, although universities should be strongly integrated in
the societal context provided by the market economy, the public sector should fol-
low its own scientific priorities. These are to develop knowledge and provide that
to citizens. Academia should be forced to socially justify what it does but its re-
search should be funded by general taxation, as it provides general goods. He sug-
gests that the society needs business and academia to work together, but not acade-
mia to work for businesses.
EU innovation policy
To increase its attractiveness and competitiveness and thus respond to the chal-
lenges posed by globalization, the EU is putting new initiatives in place, among
them the Revised Lisbon Agenda and the development of EU international scien-
tific cooperation (ISC).
As Heikki Salmi highlights, Europe can only compete on the basis of its knowl-
edge capacity, given that its inherent strengths do not lie in competing through
lower costs. In order to “put knowledge into practice” he deems that key strategic
areas to be tackle are: education, the competitiveness of the internal market, the
regulatory environment, clusters, knowledge transfers, a modernised university
system, and the European Institute of Technology (EIT).
Salmi’s list of strategic priorities is backed and complemented by the set of actions
Pellereau proposes in order to enhance the innovative performance of Europe.
These actions would require the commitment of businesses, governments, acade-
mia and the labour market. Businesses should provide the funding to develop inno-
vative products and to create new business models, while committing to preserve
the environment, health and safety. Governments should instead create robust sys-
tems for patent protection and make of intellectual property protection a top prior-
ity in free trade talks. Such a perspective is also shared by Maat, who argues that
the main problem of the legal environment of Europe is the lack of a European pat-
ent. When it comes to the creation of collaboration platforms, R&D fiscal incen-
tives, and the coordination of R&D the two industry representatives agree on the
necessity to focus on key sectors. As for academia, Pellereau advocates that uni-
versities should try to constitute incubators for entrepreneurs. Academia should
also seek to work more closely with governments and businesses to ensure that
R&D is focused on the areas that may provide the most benefits. This, however,
should be done while ensuring the independence of academic research. With re-
spect to the labour market, Pellerau as well as Maat underline the need to encour-
age and support life-long learning and to ensure that skills remain in line with
global demand. As innovation depends on good ideas and talented people the sup-
ply of a deep and wide talent pool is critical to success. Workers, however, should
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be more mobile and flexible to adapt to the changes forced by global markets and
economic circumstances.
As for international scientific cooperation (ISC), the need for it principally arises
from the fact that scientific challenges are becoming all the more global and big: it
is simply not possible to face them without cooperating. Besides, as András
Siegler underlines, there is a need to underpin other EU policies based on interna-
tional relations (trade, development, environment, energy, etc.).
However, the main challenges that EU ISC face lay in the ability to coordinate
these cooperation initiatives, as well as in the ISC actions’ budgetary commit-
ments, and in the possibility to maintain a geographic and thematic diversity with
the third countries.
Another issue that, according to Dominique Foray, needs to be addressed in order
to foster Europe’s attractiveness and competitiveness is the way in which re-
sources are allocated to critical domains of the knowledge economy, in particular
education and research. As the private sector responds only to incentives, these
must be changed in order to make investing in R&D profitable. Besides, Europe
needs an economy orientated towards the “right” fields of specialisation, with each
region and country focusing on the knowledge base that makes them distinctive
and unique.
Fundamental for Europe is to transform its economic institutions and modes of
governance, and to better coordinate and adapt policies, especially macroeco-
nomic policies. The latter should in fact play a countercyclical role during depres-
sions, but this does not happen at the EU level.
As Foray suggests, the governance and coordination of national actions in Europe
is not effective possibly because there is a mismatch between the soft method of
governance adopted and the economic nature of the good object of the R&D pol-
icy. The Lisbon Strategy is in fact based on voluntary coordination, which allows
member countries to free ride on each other in order to get benefits from commu-
nity actions, without making their own investments. Moreover, Europe has a low
budget at the central level and high national budgets. As a result, a somewhat dissi-
pated effort of national states echoes the weakness of the centralised capacity of
the EU.
Foray’s words are echoed by Jan Maat’s analysis of both national and European
innovation policies. The latter says governments have an important role to play
with respect to the knowledge infrastructure, especially when it comes to guaran-
teeing quality education and contributing to orientate schoolchildren to science.
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Besides, governments should stimulate those research areas that are better aligned
with industrial needs, while supporting higher risk and longer term knowledge in-
vestments. Governments should also work at bringing partners together and to
support networking.
Innovation policies of emerging Asian economies
The challenges that Europe is currently facing are also although not exclusively
determined by the growth of some Asian economies, whose successfulness seem
to be largely due to their knowledge oriented education, science and technology
policies.
India, for instance, is currently emerging as a global innovation hub. As
Mashelkar points outs, the “Grey Revolution” helped India to move into areas
like software. Since it opened up globally in 1991, India’s performance has im-
proved substantially, to the point of now hosting the R&D research centres of 150
large companies. The strategy India has pursued to achieve its development is two-
fold. On the supply-side India has seen a massive expansion of its high-quality ed-
ucation and research system. On the demand-side many policy measures have
been put in place to enhance competition and R&D, measures also coupled with
government support for R&D.
Another example of the successfulness of someAsian economies is offered by Ma-
laysia. The transformation of Malaysia into an industrial production-based econ-
omy in the 1960s led to major changes in the physical infrastructures of the coun-
try, as well as into its finance and education systems. Among other initiatives, the
Government developed an incentive scheme aimed to attract foreign investments.
These investments have paid well in terms of export earnings from manufactured
goods, in particular electrical and electronic products. The country is now prepar-
ing itself to face the challenges that lay ahead, in particular the growing competi-
tion fromChina and India. Given that, as J.M. Jarjis underlines, the role of knowl-
edge is becoming increasingly critical, the Malaysian government is also investing
heavily in ICTs, as they are deemed to represent powerful tools to overcome social
and economic divide among regions and the population.
5.4 Not to conclude: Summarising some key
policy implications
The wealth and depth of the contributions presented during the Helsinki confer-
ence makes it challenging to extract the most important policy implications with-
out risking to leave aside important issues. Besides, the policy implications formu-
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lated below can be looked at as possible policy recommendations only in so far as
they remain duly contextualised in the analysis that generated them. In what fol-
lows, we – the editors – have proceeded to interpret and systematise the content of
both the experts’ presentations and the discussion that the Helsinki conference
triggered. We therefore assume full responsibility for the conclusions drawn,
whether the analysis entails the national or the international (e.g. the EU) policy
making level.
5.4.1 Contextualising the analysis
The current trends of globalization are forcing (knowledge-based) economies to
re-think and re-formulate their S&T and innovation policies as science, technol-
ogy and innovation represent key components of countries’ competitive strategies.
Evidence in fact suggests the existence of a positive correlation between knowl-
edge related investments and economic growth, thus making of knowledge and in-
novation strategic assets for the success of both enterprises and nations. The need
for new S&T and innovation policies is felt compellingly especially by the EU,
willing to become the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world
by 2010 and facing a global scenario where:
• Knowledge-based economies are gradually shifting from manufactu-
re-based structures to intangible, knowledge-and-service based bu-
siness models. This new phase of globalization is a product of the
knowledge-based economy and just one of the ways in which new
technologies are reshaping the economies of the third millennium.
Such a shift from a resource-based to a knowledge-based paradigm
occurs to different degrees and at various speeds in both developed
and developing countries. This is contributing to modifying the dist-
ribution of both wealth and income and, sometimes, also to widening
gaps and deepening existing unbalances.
• Multinational enterprises (MNEs) play amajor role in shaping world-
wide industrial and R&D activities, as they account for a major share
of global business R&D.
• The development patterns of emerging economies as China and India
are changing the foci and dynamics of the global economy. Besides
featuring growing markets and affordable cost levels, these
economies are characterised by dynamic “region-states” able to ab-
sorb foreign investments also thanks to their increasingly attractive
S&T systems. Although global R&D is still geographically concent-
rated in the developed countries, the role of these big Asian develo-
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ping economies is increasing. Moreover, the enterprises of these de-
veloping economies are gradually becoming stronger contenders for
global markets and R&D activities.
• One of the biggest challenges laying ahead is ensuring a global so-
cio-economic and ecologically sustainable development. The need
arises to find the most effective ways to solve acute problems like po-
verty, hunger, health, and the protection of the environment. These
can be pursued also and especially through global collaborations in
education, science and technology, thus making of globalization a
welfare-enhancing opportunity rather than a zero-sum game.
Win-win solutions can be achieved. To this end, knowledge-based
economies can and should rely on knowledge and innovation to ensu-
re global sustainable growth and welfare.
5.4.2 Policy implications
The analysis of the above global scenario leads to the formulation of the following
policy implications:
a) Intellectual property and global trade rules need to be further
developed
The growing strategic and economic importance of knowledge amplifies the stra-
tegic relevance of Intellectual Property Rights and of technology transfer mecha-
nisms. Innovation policy related rules hence need to become clearer and easier to
follow than they currently are. Bureaucracy need to be simplified, rules mademore
transparent and laws certain and enforceable.
We need an inclusive discussion about different models of innovation, as for in-
stance open innovations, and about broader knowledge policies encompassing the
transmission, the generation and the use of new knowledge.
With respect to IPRs in particular, the need arises to rethink the rationale behind
them and to find better ways to ensure appropriability while allowing for diffusion
(including technology transfer). Doing so IPRs would become tools for growth
and development, strategic elements of win-win strategies, rather than being
pointed out as exclusion devices.
The global access to technology and patent related databases should also be im-
proved, as should the consciousness of the links between IP and development: the
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worldwide democratization of access to technology is, in this respect, of para-
mount importance.
Technology transfer, R&D and more broadly S&T are acquiring growing impor-
tance when global trade rules are discussed as well as in the agendas of both devel-
oping countries and international organizations like the WTO, the UN and the
OECD. The discussion has been extended from technology transfer to investment
flows, competition rules, IP regimes, and IPR limits.
Multilateral rules for technology transfer should come along with a blueprint for
the future, with a more recognized role for the diffusion and adoption of new tech-
nologies. Domestic and multilateral fiscal incentives and S&T funding could also
be encouraged.
b) Building absorptive capacity and exploiting incoming spillovers
The growing strategic role of knowledge and innovation for the competitiveness of
both businesses and countries calls for a better understanding of knowledge
spillovers’ dynamics, i.e. the un-intentional cross-border transfer of knowledge,
and of the role played by absorptive capacity. This is true also and especially be-
cause the existence of spillovers and the possibility to exploit them are used as ar-
guments justifying government intervention and innovation policies.
As the knowledge-based global paradigm sees competitiveness to depend upon
knowledge being generated and exploited, absorptive capacity becomes a key as-
set for growth. Absorptive capacity – which is created through education, R&D
and, more broadly, investments in knowledge – in fact enables agents to profit
from the knowledge generated elsewhere, to absorb incoming spillovers, and to
seize the opportunities that may arise.
Unfortunately, researchers are still far from being able to offer normative guidance
to policy-makers with respect to spillovers. However, one features emerges
clearly: the necessity for both developing and developed economies to invest in
building their absorptive capacity and to increase interaction, networking and
knowledge exchange among the relevant actors of innovation.
Globalization not only challenges the traditional innovation policy-making but
also the underlying economic theory. Would the justification for innovation policy
be taken out of economic theory, small open economies would have much weaker
reasons to support private innovation by public means than a world government
would have. Coordinating R&D policies within bigger units, like the European
Union, would make it possible for more spillovers to be internalised.
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c) Global localization of enterprise R&D
Firm R&D, especially that of transnational corporations, is becoming increasingly
global. This phenomenon opens up new opportunities and challenges, not only for
developing countries but for the world as a whole. The arising challenges are
where to locate in-house R&D, and why, to what extent, and fromwhere to acquire
external knowledge. Companies’ top reasons for R&D off-shoring are held to be
the search for cheaper labour and for strategic benefits, e.g. networking with other
companies and institutions, or better managing competitors and/or customers. The
company cases included in the present volume show that location is just one of the
issues driving R&D and innovation strategies, whereas fundamental are factors
such as the firms’ technological capability, industry’s dynamics etc.. The advan-
tages that enterprises perceive they may gain through establishing a “global R&D
laboratory” are: to benefit from the world’s best talents, to carry out research
around the clock, to better adapt to customers’ needs, and to take advantage of
lower R&D costs.
Some Asian economies seem to have enormously benefited from such
globalisation processes, whereas other developing countries have not and should
look at these countries to learn “how to”.
As for Europe, such dynamics create both challenges and opportunities, although
emphasis is on opportunities. R&D off-shoring in fact seems to benefit homeR&D
activities as well and, therefore, should not be considered as a zero sum game
where one country or region loses what some else gains. Accordingly, R&D in-
vestments in India or China should not be considered as lost R&D investments for
Europe or the U.S., but rather as complements, given that there is scarce evidence
of substitution effects. Besides, off-shoring seem to have a positive effect over the
export of companies and on their ability to innovate.
In any case, it is increasingly important for countries (at all levels of development)
to pay attention to the strengths and weaknesses of their national innovation sys-
tems, and to see how the latter can best support the activities of their own country’s
companies as well as those of the foreign firms interested in investing in the coun-
try.
From a policy perspective it is also important to realise that, although public sup-
port is not crucial for R&D off-shoring decisions, efficient IPR protection, the
quality of the education system and the development level of the infrastructures
constitute highly valued factors.
Europe should therefore do its best to constitute a good destination for incoming
off-shored R&D, but also to carefully evaluate the opportunities that open up when
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European enterprises off-shore R&D activities to other countries, as in this way
enterprises may reap the benefits of being present on each other’s knowledge mar-
kets. Instead of fearing R&D off-shoring we should attempt to thoroughly under-
stand it.
d) Promoting entrepreneurship to solve the “European paradox”
The knowledge investments made in Europe do generate new knowledge but the
latter does not seem to (sufficiently) spill out of universities and research centres to
become the object of commercial transactions. Traditionally, investing in new
plants and equipments resulted in growth and jobs. Conversely, investments in
knowledge have to go through “the knowledge filter” to become valuable, i.e. they
need to be commercialized in order to bring returns. The missing link between
knowledge investments and returns is entrepreneurship, which serves as a mecha-
nism or “a conduit” by which knowledge investments bring the expected fruits. As
universities are important sources of knowledge, the development of an entrepre-
neurial university culture is important in order to facilitate the transfer of knowl-
edge and its commercialization. This would result in economic growth and the cre-
ation of new jobs.
Europe needs to rely on a more flexible, innovative and entrepreneurial economy
and society, where mobility is facilitated also and especially when it comes to sci-
ence and R&D. Firms need to be ready to adopt or create new business models and
to fully exploit the potential of ICTs. New regulations – in particular those related
to preserving the environment and ensuring sustainability – should be looked at as
windows of opportunities rather than as constraints.
New ideas should be able to more easily reach the market in a more entrepreneurial
society where risk (and therefore failure) is part and parcel of the innovation pro-
cess.
e) Renewing the culture of the academic community
Globalization offers new perspectives to the academic community while calling
for deep changes, and in particular for universities to be strongly integrated in the
societal context provided by the market economy. However, although integration
between public and business resources is needed, the public sector should follow
its own scientific priorities, i.e. to develop knowledge and provide that for citizens.
Academia should socially justify what it does, but scientific research should be
still funded by general taxation because it provides general goods.
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f) European agenda: Strengthening the knowledge base and global
S&T cooperation
The EU is responding to globalisation challenges by trying to increase its attrac-
tiveness and competitiveness. As its inherent strengths do no lie in competing
through lower costs, Europe must build on its knowledge capacity: innovative
companies go where innovation can flourish, workforce is well-educated, R&D
labs are excellent, and strong clusters exist. To this end, key strategic areas for Eu-
rope are: education, the competitiveness of the internal market, a favourable regu-
latory environment, clusters, knowledge transfer, and amodernised university sys-
tem.
To increase Europe’s competitiveness, many new initiatives have been put in
place. Among these the Revised Lisbon Agenda (RLA) and the development of In-
ternational Scientific Cooperations (ISC). Interesting are also the Joint Technol-
ogy Initiatives (JITs) included in the 7th Framework Programme. The EU pro-
motes ISCs in order to carry out a better science and to pursue broader policy goals
via scientific achievements. The main challenges posed by ISCs relate to the ca-
pacity to effectively coordinate ISCs, to the countries’ budgetary commitment to
ISC actions, and to the ability to maintain a geographic and thematic diversity of
ISCs with third countries.
g) European policies: Specialisation, coordination and governance
The development of the European knowledge economy calls for a dramatic change
in the way resources are allocated to the critical domains of the knowledge econ-
omy, in particular to education and research. Incentives should be designed as to
make investing in R&D profitable.
Europe needs its economy to be oriented towards the “right fields” of specialisa-
tion. Economic institutions and modes of governance also need to be transformed.
Objectives need to be well specified and policy instruments carefully selected if
policies have to be effective. From the point of view of S&T and innovation this
implies being able to focus on and specialise in well defined areas, both geographi-
cally and sector wise. In this way, competitive assets can be preserved and new ad-
vantages created, at the benefit of the overall competitiveness of both member
countries and Europe as a whole.
Besides, Europe needs to make other policies – not only R&D and innovation ones
– support the goal of being a competitive knowledge economy. Macroeconomic
policies, in particular, should play a countercyclical role during depressions, when
companies have problems in funding their R&D activities.
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Active and efficient coordination mechanisms are also needed in order to ensure
that the variety of initiatives put in place converge towards the broader policy ob-
jective of increasing the competitiveness and welfare. More stringent coordination
and a better alignment between the methods of governance and the nature, objec-
tives and level of S&T and R&D policies would enhance the likelihood of success.
Coordination and a better match between policy objectives and methods of gover-
nance would magnify the commitment of the various actors involved and reduce
free riding problems. Europe needs to ensure a sufficient allocation of resources,
given that the allocation process is decentralized whereas knowledge is a
semi-public good.
5.4.3 Concluding remarks
The many linkages intertwining globalization and the knowledge-based economy
give rise to a multifaceted and complex phenomenon that, in many respects, is not
fully understood. Drivers, motives, dynamics and causal relations are still some-
what unknown. Besides, the global knowledge-based economy is continuously
and dynamically changing, thus making today’s conclusions and policy sugges-
tions not necessary valid tomorrow. Scientists’ ability to forecast future develop-
ments is also hindered by the scarcity of data they can currently rely upon. Indeed,
a more systematic and wide collection of data, on a global scale, would enable the
creation and use of indicators and statistics. These, in turn, would augment our
knowledge and understanding of globalization and its challenges.
The complex dynamics of the global knowledge economy call for synergic ac-
tions. Public and private R&D investments, S&T policies, regulatory frameworks,
the education system, and so on are to be intended as complementary. As such, the
absence of some of them impinges upon the usefulness/successfulness of the oth-
ers. Knowledge-based economies that want to be innovative and competitive on
the global market need firms, academia and research institutions to work together.
In this way knowledge could be both optimally created andmaximally exploited.
The Going Global 2006 conference identified the global socio-economic and sus-
tainable development as the main challenges lying ahead. Globalization is not to
be seen as a zero-sum game, in which the improved welfare of some is counterbal-
anced by the reduction of welfare in other parts of the globe or for a different group
of individuals. When discussing the contribution of global science, technology and
innovation, the ultimate aim should be to identify the most acute needs and prob-
lems that require a science-based solution. Examples certainly are poverty, hun-
ger, development, health and environment protection, as well as the distribution of
income and wealth. The main challenge and mission for the knowledge-based
economies thus becomes to reinforce the sustainable global welfare by means of
creating and exploiting knowledge and innovation.
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